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Abstract
In this dissertation, I articulate a hermeneutics for reading Ralph Waldo
Emerson’s seminal text Nature through drawing on the insights of the
contemporary philosopher Sebastian Rödl. Particularly, the performative, literary
characteristics of Rödl’s quite conceptual work resonate with the poetic strategies
that Emerson employs in Nature. In the section on the work of Rödl, I make the
performative aspects of his philosophy explicit through a close reading of the way
self-consciousness happens in his texts through the language he employs. Rödl
refers to his elucidation of self-consciousness as idealism. In the section on
Emerson, I show how Emerson’s project of engaging and transforming the
individual soul also rests upon a performative idealism that occurs within his
writing. Thus, I demonstrate how Emerson transforms the idealism that he
inherited from such thinkers as Coleridge and Kant into a poetics of transcendence.
The aims of this work point in the directions of heightening the value of Emerson’s
texts beyond their historical importance, showing the significance of idealism for
both literature and philosophy, and establishing a communication between
literature and philosophy along the lines of the poetics of idealism.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
A. The Problem of Emerson’s Poetics
Emerson’s Nature is not really about nature. Nature’s chapter headings,
after its introduction and self-named first chapter, enumerate "Commodity,”
“Beauty,” “Language,” “Discipline,” “Idealism,” “Spirit,” and “Prospects” as its
specific concerns: we might have expected “Rocks,” “Water,” “Plants,” “Animals,”
“Weather,” “Planets,” and “The Cosmos.” The things and concepts Emerson names
are essential to human mind and culture, not nature, at least in the traditional
sense of this term. If, however, we remember that Nature is a work steeped in the
tradition of German idealism, then its focus on the primacy of human consciousness
and essential human concepts hardly seems surprising. In his lecture “The
Transcendentalist,” Emerson explains this reorientation of the idealist’s approach
to describing the world by contrasting it to the approach of the materialist:
In the order of thought, the materialist takes his departure from the
external world, and esteems a man as one product of that. The idealist
takes his departure from his consciousness, and reckons the world an
appearance. . . Mind is the only reality, of which men and all other
natures are better or worse reflectors. Nature, literature, history, are
only subjective phenomena. . .His thought, — that is the Universe.
(TCRWE I, 203)
Here, Emerson provides us with an elementary dialectical elucidation of his
approach in Nature. Whereas the materialist views herself and the world from a
third-person perspective, the idealist begins with the first-person perspective
(whether singular or plural) and orders all appearances in terms of its outward
directed arrow. To use my pair of my examples from above, to understand “Rocks,”
1

the idealist would ask how we first encounter rocks as relevant appearances (for
instance, the relevance of flint for starting fires), rather than assessing them in
light of their neutral material being. “Water,” as well, always appears for me first
in its value for slaking thirst and the beauty and sublimity offered by its
scintillations and vast expanses, etc., and if I want to study its chemical properties
as H2O, I only do so through the discipline of a science that allows me to discern an
elegant molecular geometry.
In this lecture, though it is nowhere nearly as poetically reflective as the
great passages from Nature, Emerson is extremely subtle and consistent. In the
next sentence following the passage above, Emerson implicitly indicates that we
should not consider even “Transcendentalism” as a subject of neutral intellectual
interest but should rather encounter it through its relevance for us: “From this
transfer of the world into the consciousness, this beholding of all things in the mind,
follow easily his whole ethics. It is simpler to be self-dependent.”
Transcendentalism is not merely an account of the mind’s relation to the
world but rather an account of this for the subject in her pursuit of autonomy. In a
parallel move later in the essay, he acknowledges that “the Idealism of the present
day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that term by Immanuel
Kant, of Konigsberg” and gives a brief philosophical genealogy of the term, only to
transfigure it in the next paragraph once again:
Although, as we have said, there is no pure Transcendentalist, yet the
tendency to respect the intuitions, and to give them, at least in our
creed, all authority over our experience, has deeply colored the
conversation and poetry of the present day; and the history of genius
2

and of religion in these times, though impure, and as yet not
incarnated in any powerful individual, will be the history of this
tendency. (TCRWE I, 207)
No one is a “pure” transcendentalist, since sensory affection and the call of material
interests are always present, sometimes pressing in such a demanding way that
individuals forget themselves and pretend to think of a world without them in it,
but here, Emerson follows the articulation of transcendentalism from a theory into
a calling, an orientation seeking an incarnation on her way to being poetized within
a history of genius, transfigured beyond the body, a spirit waiting for others to
inspire. If we place Emerson along such a path, we will witness him change from
Emerson the man into Emerson the idea, an idea that travels from him to us on the
way to our inheritance of it within the creative projection of our ideal selves.
The main argument of this essay is that Emerson’s Nature composes its own
sophisticated idealist poetics. The idealism within these poetics is not merely
inherited from metaphysical idealists such as Berkeley or German idealists such as
Kant and Fichte, although Emerson was variously influenced by their thought.
Rather, the brilliance of Emerson’s idealist poetics consists in its blending the
project of the self-consciousness of the subject together with a poetic language of
self-figuration (figuration as artistic creation and as representation, a sounding of
the “unsounded centre,” finding its voice, founding its call). Part of the work in
making my argument will involve showing how Emerson deploys these blended
configurations in his work. This will require me to take a micrological approach,
one focusing on dense or subtle junctures in Emerson’s language at the expense of
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discussing broad themes or contexts, although I do not consider this to be a close
reading in the new critical sense. Sometimes, disclosing the operations within these
configurations will involve going beyond Emerson into historical comparisons with
other works, such as philosophical texts or poems. Sometimes, this will require the
invention or retrieval of meditations connected with the articulation of selfconsciousness. The main thing I want to demonstrate is that Emerson articulates a
sophisticated idealist poetics, and achieving that goal requires attentiveness to the
surface working of his language (his metaphorical plays and juxtapositions, his
elucidatory re-phrasings of conventional expressions, and his constructions of new
models through which to understand experience, for instance) rather than the
tracing of historical causes and influences. What matters most is what he does (for
himself, to himself, for others, to others, to us) through his mode of articulation.
If we are to esteem the idealist poetics within Emerson’s work, we must be
able to esteem it as valuable for ourselves. There are an indefinite number of ways
of doing this. For instance, I could, in Emerson’s terms, defend his writing as
valuable for me in my personal life, detailing the rapturous affective reveries
afforded through my reading him through transcendentally tinged glasses. Within
an academic essay, however, I implicitly commit myself to a different standard of
value than that of the merely personal: the value of intellectual integrity within a
responsive community of serious, educated individuals. In defending the value of
Emerson’s sophisticated idealist poetics, “I” would have to defend it to “them,” and
its defense would involve the projective creation of an us.
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The mode of doing this I choose is one resonant with Emerson’s hermeneutics
of history that brings us closer to it and it closer to us in a revolution of
transtemporal communication, where harmony and relevance matter more than
historical proximity. I aim to show how Emerson communicates with us and how
we can communicate with him through the apparatus of the idealism of our own
time. In fact, the reports of the death of idealism have been greatly exaggerated.
Here, I do not mean that idealism lives on in the post-idealist traditions of
phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism, although this is to a certain
extent true. As well, I do not mean that German idealism still lives on through
historical interest in its study and even through the interpretive defense of its
historical relevance, for instance in the excellent work of Robert Pippin on the
idealism of Hegel. Rather, I wish to establish a rapport between the work of
Emerson and the work of the most significant idealist of our time, Sebastian Rödl.
Rödl is a German philosopher who writes in the analytic tradition, the author of
three substantial works published by Harvard University Press, a growing
philosophical presence with seminars and workshops dedicated to his work, and a
self-professed absolute idealist. Because there is a relative chasm between literary
studies and works of current relevance in the analytic tradition in philosophy, it is
not surprising that Emerson (or other literary figures) have not been interpreted in
light of Rödl’s work, but this chasm provides me with the opportunity to construct a
bridge.
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For the purpose of drawing this connection, I will have to introduce the
reader to the work of Rödl, and I will do this at the end of this introduction, as well
as contextually, within my interpretive defenses of Emerson’s works. There are
three important characteristics of Rödl’s project, other than the fact that it contains
the most significant contemporary inheritance and projection of idealist thought,
that bring it into direct communication with Emerson’s writing.
1.) Rödl’s understanding of idealism, since it comes through an inherited
formulation within the analytic tradition of philosophy, is primarily linguistic,
rather than dialectical or phenomenological or psychological, for instance. Rödl,
explicates and defends idealism with an attentiveness to its affirming, selfconscious inscription within a philosophical language attuned to the working of
language throughout human experience. Although Rödl does not call himself a
linguistic idealist, he could be said to practice a linguistic idealism, if one has
an appropriately sophisticated notion of language and the role of selfconsciousness in such an idealism. Emerson’s writing, I argue, articulates an
idealist poetics, one whose sense and defense also involves careful attentiveness
to its self-conscious inscription. Rödl’s channeling of idealism through the
passage of the careful, self-conscious analysis of language and Emerson’s
channeling of idealism through the passage of the careful, self-conscious
figuration of the poetic place them within a natural site of mutual interflow.
2.) Rödl’s idealism has significant influences from the Emersonian lineage of
American pragmatism. Two of the most significant figures that Rödl draws
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upon in the positioning of his work are Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom,
both of whom owe significant debts not only to the tradition of German
Idealism but also to the tradition of American pragmatism. Sellars’s critique of
the Myth of the Given, which draws on Kant, Hegel, Peirce, and Dewey, as
much as on Wittgenstein and Austin, forms the basis of much recent analytic
work. Robert Brandom is perhaps the most influential living analytic
philosopher, and his analytic pragmatism, as the name suggests, draws heavily
on works such as Dewey’s Logic and the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty (his
thesis advisor), as well as the idealism of Kant and Hegel (whom he reinterprets, in a variety of historical essays, in light of his analytic pragmatism).
The important point here is that the Peircian semiotics, already largely implicit
in Emerson’s understanding of the symbol, and the Deweyan a priori social
relatedness of the subject, already largely implicit in Emerson’s understanding
of society and history, transmit throughout these discussions a sort of metaEmersonianism, and this meta-Emersonian pragmatic idealism pervades Rödl’s
work as well, although translated into his own unique language. Thus, placing
Rödl in communication with Emerson does not merely involve the application of
a theory in order to interpret the literary text—rather, it involves allowing an
Americanized idealism to return to itself, enabling it to represent itself in a
more systematic if not sophisticated form from the vantage of its tomorrow.
3.) The third characteristic that brings the work of Rödl into communication with

Emerson, over and above their shared commitment to idealism, is largely a
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function of the first two characteristics, as well as this shared commitment, and
this characteristic involves the always intense, usually enigmatic, sometimes
overbearingly profound poetic awareness of their own language as it unfolds
(as) their thought. This awareness, however, takes place in radically different
manners in their work. In Rödl’s work, the self-knowledge afforded by
philosophy, which he, in classic idealist fashion calls “the science,” (not a phrase
that one would often hear in a textbook of literary theory) is already implicit
within any substantial manifestation of human life, such as having a
conversation, playing a game, or going to the store. What Rödl does in his work
is to articulate this self-consciousness, always already at work, within a
philosophical formulation that partially completes this self-consciousness and
partially operates as a countermeasure to our incessant urge to misunderstand
it. In order to do this, Rödl constantly avoids merely describing things or
processes from the outside but rather records (gesturally, one might say
poetically) his own self-conscious activity in whatever he writes. Writing in
and through awareness of one’s own linguistic activity is, of course, not unique
to Rödl (although his way of doing it (as well as his hiding of it) is nearly as
strange as Wittgenstein’s) but rather unites him in a strange community with
philosophers such as Derrida, Blanchot, and Nietzsche and poets such as
Stevens and Ashbery. And Emerson. In my prefiguring reading of Rödl, I will
be attentive to the way in which Rödl’s philosophy unfolds in poetic fashion, one
resonant with the poetic thought of Emerson, and in the reading of Emerson
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following my introduction of Rödl’s thought, I will take hermeneutic inspiration
from the theoretical intricacy of Rödl’s analytic poesis in order to help us
receive, as relevant, the more figurative but not less difficult poetic thought of
Emerson.
B. Emerson’s Ghosts
There is something Emerson’s quasi-idealist and quasi-poetic great essays
that haunts us. Randall Fuller, in Emerson’s Ghosts: Literature, Politics, and the
Making of Americanists, notes the haunting quality of Emerson’s texts:
Emersonian hauntings are generated . . . within the volatile
transaction between readers and an aesthetic mode that encourages
perceptual transformation while remaining multivalent enough to
suggest numerous, and often conﬂicting, transformations. These
hauntings achieve their most salient eﬀects by suggesting ways of
opposing or critiquing the often disappointing actuality of American
modernity—a modernity that sometimes seems relentless in its eﬀorts
to colonize or limit thought and action. (EG, 4)
Fuller finds Emerson’s writing, for instance, simultaneously to instantiate
the truths of the ideology of American individualism and exceptionalism, drawing
forth critics such as Sacvan Bercovitch to locate these truths as emblems of this
ideology, while at the same time offering an internal displacement of their own
ideological functioning, affording a possibility of dissent towards the American
dream from within its voicing. We can see this nowhere more clearly than in the
preface to the 2012 edition of The American Jeremiad, where we find Bercovitch
citing Emerson in an odd manner:
The private life of one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy …
than any kingdom in history…. The root and seed of democracy is the
doctrine, Judge for yourself. Reverence thyself. It is the inevitable
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effect of that doctrine, where it has any effect, … to make each man a
state….. “How is the king greater than I, if he is not more just?” …
There is a revolution … taking effect around us, … the greatest of all
revolutions which have ever occurred; that, namely, which has …
demand[ed] a faith satisfactory to [the individual’s] own proper
nature.… Man begins to hear a voice that fills the heavens and the
earth, saying that God is within him; that there is the celestial host.
(AJ 2012, xxxi: ellipses in original)
Concerning this passage, Bercovitch concludes, “This is ideology at work,
within cultural structures that had evolved over two centuries and more—ideology
as I found it in the mid-1960s, as I find it today.” The odd thing about this cited
passage is that it is found nowhere in Emerson’s corpus, at least as a part of a
single text. Normally, ellipses such as Bercovitch uses above indicate the elision of
words or sentences from within a single text from which the citation is drawn, but
Bercovitch constructs this passage by drawing from multiple Emersonian texts
(including sermons and journal entries), starting with “The American Scholar”
(“The private life of one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy”). Here,
Bercovitch is not attempting to cite Emerson correctly and failing at it. Rather, in
this assembled passage, he seeks to distill the essence of Emerson’s thought
through the connection of disparate segments into a new exemplary text. While
locating Emerson within the confines of American ideology, Bercovitch, in a quite
Emersonian fashion, poetizes, creating from Emerson’s oeuvre a strange semiconnected, semi-disjoined meditation on individual sovereignty as it functions
within the American dream. Bercovitch is so successful at his alchemy that even
within this synthesized text, we can also hear Emerson’s voices in the characteristic
dissonance found in any of his best essays. In Bercovitch’s assemblage, we both
10

receive a call for action—"to make each man a state”—and the acknowledgement of
a passive reception of that which is to come—“Man begins to hear a voice.” We find,
on the one hand, a content distilled from Emerson’s work that can be easily located
within the ideological history of American exceptionalism, both in terms of the
exceptionality of the (white male) American individual and the exceptionality of the
America he represents (in the invocations of “revolution” and “democracy”) but on
the other hand, we encounter a style at war with itself, awaiting to become other
than it is, perhaps prophesying a new individual not beholden to the strict order of
identity.
But how are we to understand this stylistic “haunting” of Emerson’s work
that Fuller indicates and that we find to inspire Bercovitch above? It is one thing to
say that a work resists easy interpretation and, thus, that it remains to haunt
whatever is said about it, and it is quite another to determine the specific nature of
this haunting. Of course, we are always already haunted by the materiality of the
dead, whether of the corpse or the dead letter. But what is it about this corpse or
letter that haunts us? Is it, for instance, the voicelessness of the dead, whether
letter or body, that reveals to us the ever-imminent possibility of our own death? Is
it the passivity of the dead body, whether corpse or word, that allows their receivers
and carriers to do whatever they wish with these remains, precisely because these
things have no more life left within them? Or, by contrast, are we haunted in our
encounter with the dead body or letter by a remnant of the spirit, still somehow
inspiring, despite its grave circumstances?
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Robert D. Richardson opens his biography Emerson: The Mind on Fire with
an account of a twenty-eight-year-old Emerson opening the coffin of his wife Ellen,
who had died fourteen months prior from tuberculosis. Richardson reassures us
that Emerson’s action was not psychopathological, noting, “Opening the coffin was
not a grisly gothic gesture, not just the wild aberration of an unhinged lover. What
Emerson was doing was not unheard of.” Richardson also indicates that minister
James Freeman Clarke and Rufus Griswold “did the same thing,” before
speculating on Emerson’s motivations for this act:
The act was essential Emerson. He had to see for himself. Some part of
him was not able to believe she was dead. He was still writing to her in
his journals as though she was alive. Perhaps the very deadness of the
body would help a belief in the life of the spirit. A modern writer has
said that "beside the corpse of the beloved were generated not only the
idea of the soul, the belief in immortality, and a great part of man's
deep-rooted sense of guilt, but also the earliest inkling of ethical law."
We do not know exactly what moved Emerson on this occasion, but we
do know that he had a powerful craving for direct, personal,
unmediated experience. That is what he meant when he insisted that
one should strive for an original relation to the universe. (Richardson,
3)
As Richardson states, we do not know Emerson’s own reasons for doing what
he did, since he left no record regarding these reasons. Even if he had left a record,
it would be (to us) a dead thing that we would have to interpret. Suppose, for
instance, Emerson had inscribed a journal entry, explaining that he wanted to see
his wife’s dead body in order to experience more fully her spirit moving through the
life of his present. Could we legitimately take him at his word in such a case?
Psychopathology often disguises itself with the mask of reason. What are our
choices here? Do we have to acknowledge that, after all, dead is dead, so any
12

attempt to find spirit where none abides is, in fact, pathological? Do we take
Richardson’s dialectical interpretation of Emerson as approaching the dead in order
to find “the life of the spirit” as itself a repression or avoidance of the meaningless
contingency of materiality itself? Or can we find a way to interpret Emerson’s
actions, insofar as they were directed towards spirit, like Richardson hypothesizes,
as sanely enlightened?
There is something within us, as moderns, that makes us see any invocation
of the spiritual within the material-historical parameters of human life as
ideological delusion or deception. Our sophisticated modernity requires us to leave
our soulful naivete at the door and practice hermeneutics of suspicion towards any
attempt to commune with the dead. When Bercovitch hears Emerson say, “Man
begins to hear a voice that fills the heavens and the earth, saying that God is within
him; that there is the celestial host,” how could he, as a modern (materialist,
historically oriented, critical) intellectual not hear this phrase as an ideological
edict, precisely designed to eternalize a present conception of life, whether of the
industrious capitalist producer or the patriotically-driven expansionist or
withdrawn bourgeois self-fashioner? How could Bercovitch not read Emerson
suspiciously, as misunderstanding what the ideological order of society requires him
to do as the divine transcendence of this very same social order?
When we analyze texts and actions in this modern critical-historical fashion,
we do so in the spirit of empiricism. We can define empiricism as an intellectual
doctrine in the following manner: the only truths that we can have are those given
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to us by means of the senses. The developments of this doctrine in the history of
critical thought are complicated and multi-faceted. They range from the turning
away from Aristotelian metaphysics towards the search for empirical evidence in
the sciences to the replacement of the idea of mind as a soul substance mirroring
essences with the mind as the site of the of the reception and synthesis of sensory
data to the understanding of meaning within language as being afforded by sensory
content attached to a linguistic vehicle. Importantly, however, all variations of
empiricism, by definition, involve the rejection of any metaphysical transcendence
(including all reference to metaphysical knowledge or metaphysical beings) in the
service of an affirmation of the immanence of human knowledge: human sensation
provides us with the only truths we have.
To say that human knowledge is immanent is to say that this knowledge is a
function of the sensory apparatuses of human beings, as well as the implementation
and coordination of those apparatuses within human historical practice: the
educational and technological directing of human bodies. For instance, Bercovitch’s
finding of Emerson’s appeal to “the celestial host” as “ideology at work” is nothing
other than an empiricist situation of professed transcendence within an earthly
environment, where appeals to gods and angels and divine imperatives become
identified with appeals to sensible things—powerful people and institutions and
laws, and the professed transcendence of these things actually serves to reinforce
quite mundane deployments of power. Ideology, in this intellectually empiricist
understanding, is the immanent domination of human beings that clothes itself in
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the garb of the transcendent: this garb itself not only hides this domination but also
intensifies it. Art, as the wardrobe of ideology, not only covers that ideology but
also, through this very aesthetic presentation, beautiful or horrific, inspires
reverence towards or fear of the forces of domination, pulling those within its web
even further into its consumptive center.
Was ideology at play in Emerson’s visit to Ellen’s tomb, if he did intend to
find there “the life of the spirit?” Does every minister, even one as theologically
liberal as Emerson was in his early pastoral career, trade primarily in ideology?
Was Emerson’s writing, yoked within a voice of divine promise, with its appeal to
ever-transcending circles and horizon-encompassing eyes and futures ever to come,
transmitted as nothing other than an ideological vehicle? Intellectually, insofar we
are empiricists like Bercovitch, we must answer these questions in the affirmative.
Furthermore, there is something underlying our capacity for intellectual
assessment that requires such an answer. In our practical bearing towards
ourselves and our world, as modern beings, we are concretely formed in the spirit of
empiricism. As empiricists, insofar as we receive our truths only through the
senses, we must already find ourselves appropriately positioned for this receptivity
to function appropriately. This empiricist positioning happens in every subjectforming dimension of modern society, with the most important of these dimensions
including the educational, the economic, and the aesthetic.
Educationally, it is not merely the fact that we receive our lessons through
seeing, hearing, and touching that forms us as practical empiricists. The necessity
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of sensory receptivity towards our environment has nothing to do with empiricism
as a driving orientation. Even the mystic who sits alone in her hut and reads
sacred texts in order to inspire visions of the gods uses her eyes to read, or her
fingers, if she is blind. We are trained from an early age not only to read but also to
do the following: 1. Quietly sit in place. 2. Passively receive all primary input from
an active source. 3. Mechanically reproduce and re-assemble what we have learned,
mostly through direct memorization and recall. 4. Restrict all spontaneous
imaginative activity to ever decreasing spaces, in the withdrawn zones of
daydreams and recess. Our hypothetical mystic may withdraw into her hut, but she
does this so she can encounter the gods in all her everyday interactions. As
educationally molded empiricists from quite non-progressive classrooms, we are
formed as reluctant to the point of being unable to engage situations inspirationally.
We are skeptical of forms of life that do not attend to their world critically and
passively and who do not understand themselves to possess subjectivity primarily
in virtue of these empiricist capacities.
Economically, this situation of passivity comes to be reinforced within
routinized labor carried out according to a system of bureaucratic rules designed to
mechanize individual production for maximal efficiency. There is generally more
freedom of decision-making and possibility of creation in white collar and academic
labor, but this bureaucratization of the individual generally cuts across the divide
between the rich and the poor, as well as between the educated and the uneducated.
This channeling of production simultaneously orders the individual to receive “work
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orders” and to respond to “the working environment,” while using as little
individual thinking as possible. Even producers of screenplays must employ
standardized formats and plots developments, so even in the most “creative” arenas,
the work required forces those creators to behave as functional intermediaries,
receiving given data and orders and outputting accordingly. This entire productive
process, in whatever job, accomplishes the “vanishing of the self” more effectively
than Zen Buddhism could ever hope to achieve, although somehow, even after the
self has vanished in these instances, pure suffering occupies the place of its
departure.
Aesthetically, outside of school and work, we are ordered to seek enjoyment
through the passive reception of media, eschewing the efforts of creative projects in
favor of a listing of the cultural products we have consumed as our entertainment
food. We are quite literally made into empiricists in the modern world, since most
of what we do involves interaction with digital screens towards which we stare
incessantly, and even our “surfing” upon the digital waves presented to us less
resembles actual surfing and more resembles the activity of a mouse, as it moves
from one box to another in a pre-planned maze, constantly in search of the same
food, day after day. When we do undertake criticism of what we have consumed,
this criticism itself mostly takes the guise of the expression of “likes” and “dislikes,”
where any radical departure from the norm of interpretation is dissuaded. If
something is bad, we say it is a “rotten tomato,” and if it is good, then it is “fresh,”
ready to be eaten again and again.
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These dimensions (which will be variously discussed in my reading of
Emerson), of course, do not stem directly from the theory that sensory impressions
are the basic constituents of the human mind or from a basic representational
theory of knowledge. And yet, these dimensions shape the embodied subject so that
it functionally affirms these theories within its lived existence, even if that subject
superficially professes transcendent spirituality or a commitment to creative
engagements with the world. The empiricism of the scientist, insofar as she prizes
the data of the senses over mere speculation, represents a less intensive empiricism
than that with which most people are involved, since she gets to affirm her
commitment to the senses self-consciously. The empiricism of the everyday
working, enjoying, learning person constitutes the focal point of its realization in
modern life. To put this in Bercovitch’s terms, in a paradoxical sense, on the one
hand, the appeal to the non-sensory transcendence of metaphysics is nothing other
than ideology, but the commitment to empiricism that funds the very critique of this
metaphysics as ideology is nothing other than ideology: empiricism is the primary
ideology of modern life.
There is an existential correlation of empiricism as ideology with the holding
of empiricism as an intellectual doctrine. Even though we must say, as empiricists,
that denying the metaphysical substantiality of subjectivity was for us an
achievement, this denial was possible only based on an operating ideology that
pacifies to the point of extinguishing subjectivity in its capacity for transcending
power. The understanding of the subject as “something constructed” through

18

culture and history and context, all of which avail themselves of sensory
confirmation, presupposes the a priori construction of the theoretical subject as that
which is beholden to these structures of pacification. Even though there is no
essential audience for any work (and as empiricists, we must make this claim), I
propose that a significant target of both Rödl’s philosophy and Emerson’s essays is
that audience of empiricists residing within us. In our everyday lives, proximally
and for the most part, we engage with each other and the world via empiricist
personae. Insofar as we find ourselves as an audience haunted by Emerson’s work
(and by Rödl’s), then this would presuppose that there is something within us that
can be spoken to that resists or differs from or transcends these empiricist personae
that we display proximally and for the most part.
C. The Writing of Spontaneity
A natural enough understanding of idealism, insofar as it counters the
passive receptivity of empiricism, is that it takes place as a writing of spontaneity
and, thus, bears witness to the a priori synthetic activity of the subject. But is
Emerson a writer of spontaneity? We must immediately further specify this
question, since every writer technically counts as “a writer of spontaneity.” All
writers are, by definition, capable of using language, and language use presupposes
direct engagement with spontaneity in its occurrence. More concretely, we could
ask, “Is Emerson a self-conscious writer of spontaneity?” All language harbors
implicit self-consciousness, but “a self-conscious writer of spontaneity” would be one
who makes this spontaneity explicit. Such a writer would mark the freeing
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projection of the “I” that happens within all writing through expressing this freeing
projection within an act of writing. This formulation, however, holds yet another
question: “Is Emerson a philosopher?” Philosophy makes explicit the implicit selfconsciousness within human activity, so all philosophers, to a greater or lesser
extent, are “self-conscious writers of spontaneity.” If we take this making explicit of
self-consciousness as a genre-defining feature of philosophy, then all “writers of
spontaneity” philosophize through their writing. Does, however, the activity of
philosophizing exhaust the possibilities for the making explicit of self-consciousness
within the deployment of human language? Could there be other genres or, at least,
other linguistic practices through which this making explicit might take place?
Poets, for our prime example, are highly “self-conscious” concerning the
language that they use within their writing. Might we reframe the question “Is
Emerson a writer of spontaneity?” as “Is Emerson a poet of spontaneity?” This
juxtaposition invokes the age-old question: “What is the relation between poetry
and philosophy?” Philosophy, through its self-consciousness, manifests itself as an
activity in perpetual opposition to the sensible: philosophy as the (self-conscious)
explication of self-consciousness is intelligible activity. Poetry has often been
understood as an artistic genre wherein the complications of “real-life” are sensibly
reproduced, through metaphor, simile, and other twists of phrase. On the surface, it
appears that an unbreachable divide separates the two genres. In the terms of our
initial question, given this superficial understanding of poetry, as a writer of
spontaneity (to the extent he is one), Emerson would have to be a philosopher of
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spontaneity (or merely “a philosopher”), since there are no poets of spontaneity,
other than the implicit, innocuous variety. Is, however, there no difference between
the ordinary implicit self-consciousness within everyday language and the “selfconscious” writing of poetry within which we find language meticulously attending
to its own unfolding? We can also ask, “To what extent is poetry, at a deeper level,
related to philosophy in its self-conscious activity?” or even, “To what extent is
philosophy, in its careful making explicit of self-consciousness, already related to
poetic activity?”
In this essay, I will not attempt to formulate general answers to these deeper
questions. I pose them to demarcate a horizon for investigating the initial question:
“Is Emerson a writer of spontaneity?” I must remark, however, that there could be
no general answers to these deeper questions, insofar as there are no such things as
philosophy in general and poetry in general. This does not mean that philosophy
does not essentially deal with the intelligible and poetry does not essentially deal
with the sensible. This does not mean that this genre division makes no sense
whatsoever or that we should immediately complicate or even jettison it. My
statement, rather, implies that philosophy and poetry only take place in concrete
instantiations during determinate historical periods. Philosophy, for instance, does
not carry out its activity of the making explicit self-consciousness “just so,” with no
prompting whatsoever. It is not as if someone, even Socrates or Augustine or
Descartes, strolled out one day and proclaimed, “We need to make explicit
intelligible activity within the world!” The making explicit within philosophy not
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only uncovers the self-consciousness within ordinary language, but it also is always
already provoked by local formations within that ordinary language which distort
even its implicit self-conscious understanding.
For instance, we find Plato structuring his narration of (many of) Socrates’s
dialogues as a series of interrogating responses to the Sophists, particularly
regarding their denial of the stable functioning of such terms as “better” or “worse”
within human life. Or we find Augustine in his Confessions responding to
Manichean distortions of the spiritual that divide people and things into simplistic
categories of “the good” and “the evil.” Or we find Descartes in his Meditations
responding to methodological skepticism, a necessary tool for the practice of
scientific inquiry, in its capacity to inculcate doubt concerning the existence of
external beings. We encounter philosophy, within its generic discipline, always in
the process of turning away from concrete misconstruals of the truth(s) of the soul
and back towards an explicit self-consciousness of this soul and its necessary
relations. If there were a poetry of spontaneity, then we can suppose this poetry
would have to be similarly responsive to distortion within human life, since the
writing of spontaneity, in any form, explicates self-consciousness in the advent of its
occlusion.
During the late eighteenth through at least the mid-nineteenth centuries, a
key misconstrual of the truth(s) of the soul took the form of empiricism. Kant
famously announced that he was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume’s
empiricism. Since this empiricism represented the totality of human experience in
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terms of the (interpretive) association of impressions and ideas, it left no room for
any objective (non-associative/non-interpretive) relation to any object whatsoever,
whether that object was the material world beyond the particular sensation of it,
the soul itself beyond its particular self-representation, or God beyond His place in a
particular theological narrative. Importantly, for Kant and the other German
idealists, this intellectual destruction of the possibility of objectivity had real
consequences: it threatened objectivity in the natural sciences, the possibility of real
knowledge of the human mind, and the stability of any foundation for moral
judgment. The movement towards the explication of self-consciousness as the
foundation for the possibility of objective judgment within German idealism was
provoked, to be sure, by the theoretical incoherence within Hume’s work, but more
importantly, it was provoked by empiricism’s threat towards the ordinary
certainties through which human beings operatively engage their experience: the
common-sense-certainty of the self, the world, and God.
A “chicken or egg” question, however, rests beneath this initial provocation:
Was empiricism’s fragmentation of the soul, the world, and the theological/moral
realm into particularized associative interpretations a cause of such phenomena as
a tendency towards increased mechanization of human relations, social skepticism
regarding the natural sciences, and discord within theological/moral institutions, or
was, to the contrary, empiricism itself merely the intellectual epiphenomenon of
these real, underlying processes? As with all such questions, this one is
unanswerable because both of its poles are hermeneutically interdependent. Social
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processes shape intellectual reflection and intellectual reflection shapes social
processes. The concrete provocations (misconstruals, distortions) to which
philosophy inevitably responds are (qua concrete) never purely intellectual: since
they have their effects within and from ordinary language (and the self-conscious
individuals who speak it), they are always bi-laterally embedded within a historical
form of life. Despite its status as unanswerable, however, this question of
empiricism’s fragmentation provides another horizonal line for our assessment of
Emerson’s engagement with self-consciousness as a writer of spontaneity.
In the introduction to Rödl’s idealism below, we find Rödl interpreting Marx
(in his “Theses on Feuerbach”) as implicitly responding to empiricism. Although
Marx presents himself as critiquing idealism as intellectual contemplation, this
contemplation shares the template of empiricism, as defined by Rödl: the passive
reception of the idea as opposed to its active engagement by the (a priori
materialized) subject. This is not the venue to assess the correctness of Rödl’s
reading of Marx. Instead, however, we can ask a more general question: “In the
modern age, can philosophy only be carried out as a response to empiricism?”
Assuming the affirmative answer, then insofar as he was a philosopher, even
though he predominately focused on socio-political material concerns, Marx had to
have empiricism in his sights, and he implicitly aligned himself with the idealists in
this fight, however reluctantly. Rödl believes that empiricism poses the principal
philosophical problem not only for modern philosophy but for us today. Thus, he
holds that the concerns of the German idealists who were directly responding to this
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problem are also our concerns, because the problem has never left us, even if it has
mutated into other forms than those which they encountered. Rödl attempts to
resurrect idealism in an analytic form because he believes that the idealist
strategies of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel (and Marx as an unwilling idealist) are still
crucial for us to address this problem today.
The questions of whether this is so and to what extent it holds true are
beyond the scope of this essay. Their pressing power, however, indicates the
pervasiveness (extendedness in geographical space, historical time, and structural
determination) of the problem of empiricism. Noting this power, we can naturally
ask, “Was Emerson, as a writer of spontaneity, responding to empiricism?” We
know that Emerson identified, to some extent, as a transcendental idealist, and he
so identified in a particularly strong manner in his early works such as Nature and
“The Transcendentalist.” In thinking about Emerson as a writer of spontaneity,
however, these self-identifications are only slightly helpful. If writing of
spontaneity directly involves the active making-explicit of self-consciousness as a
response to empiricism, then this activity in no way necessitates proclamations that
one is an idealist or that one is opposed to empiricism. To be sure, any and all
transcendental (or absolute) idealists are writers of spontaneity, and such idealists
write from the provocation of empiricism, but they cannot be legitimately said to do
so merely on the basis of professions and denials or on their historical inclusion
within or exclusion from various schools identified with idealism. As we will see in
the following explication of Rödl, the writing of spontaneity involves the formal

25

engagement with the “I” in the making explicit of the projection of selfconsciousness. Even though other idealists such as Kant or Hegel do not write as
Rödl writes (they do not formalize and make explicit in the same manner), the
formal articulation of their writing (insofar as they are idealists) determines their
thought, not the thetic content of their prose or the thematics with which they are
associated. If Emerson is a writer of spontaneity responding to empiricism,
therefore, we should be able to discover this within his writing rather than based on
his placement in relation to labels or schools or even in relation to his (purported)
professed doctrines. Such placements, in fact, are usually made within the sway of
empiricism, and therefore, we would be better off taking them as provocations for
the engagement with spontaneity rather than critical assessments.
In what follows, I will give ample time for concrete discussion concerning
such misconstruals, but here, I must emphasize this formal point. Suppose, for
instance, someone objected to my claims above in the following manner: “But do not
historical influences matter? It is well and good that we must engage Emerson as a
‘writer of spontaneity,’ but to understand him, we must place him within a
historical context. You, yourself, place Rödl, for instance, in relation to Kant.
Positioning Emerson’s work within a historical (thematic, doctrinal) succession is
necessary and certainly does not amount to ‘an empiricist misconstrual.”

There is

no denying that in making explicit of self-consciousness within language, one indeed
starts with language, and all language, whether recorded in past tomes or spoken
improvisationally in the moment is marked and remarked through and through by
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history and context. Any linguistic artifact or event can be endlessly investigated
and situated and have its origins traced. A primary means through which we
engage with texts as objects (where live speech is also a text) is to read/hear them
through associating them with other texts or events, inquiring into the biography of
the author, and understanding them on anthropological, economic, or political
horizons. Insofar as the writing of spontaneity involves the making explicit of selfconsciousness in language and/as life, without the historical being of language,
there would be nothing to make explicit. As Rödl argues (along with Kant and
Hegel in their various ways), idealism is always already simultaneously
materialism, which means it holds the subject to be always already materialized.
The “movement of self-consciousness” always already happens within a history, and
this history can be analyzed (or even changed) along any number of dimensions.
Even situating the problem of the distortion our relation to spontaneity through
appeal to empiricism is a “historical move,” appealing to the name of a historical
genre in order to demarcate the procession of a practice. Ultimately, the opacity of
ordinary language to itself resides within the articulation of its historical being, so
the very work of making explicit requires the non-formalized inheritance of selfconscious implication: without fossilized metaphors, we would have no truths to
uncover.
Thus, we can explore how Emerson’s ideas of individuality and freedom
resonate or fail to resonate with the freeing within the prior revolution of
independence or the upcoming one of emancipation. We can track Emerson’s
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relation to the historicizing movements within German theology (and the resistance
to this historicization through writers such as Schleiermacher) contributed to the
formation of his ideas concerning the divine. We can investigate the extent to which
Emerson’s understanding of idealism itself was distilled from the accounts of
commentators such as Carlyle or Victor Cousin. Such questions place Emerson’s
texts as historical documents within the limbs of their formative genealogy. And
yet, we can also ask whether any of these analyses touch that aspect of Emerson’s
work that would make it into a writing of spontaneity. In Marx’s sense (though it is
a sense he may resist) of “sensuous human activity,” the writing of spontaneity is
sensuous human activity and even communal sensuous human activity, and as
such, we can only engage, practice ourselves, extend, complicate, or even write in
opposition to it in order for it to remain what it is.
Even if we attempt to trace a lineage of influence from one writer of
spontaneity to another, for instance from Hegel to Rödl or from Kant to Emerson,
we could not do so, if we treated these as writers of spontaneity, without concretely
engaging the articulation of subjectivity within their work, but in so doing, we
would no longer involve ourselves in “tracing a lineage.” Instead, we would find
ourselves within a transhistorical conversation involving differing concrete
engagements within the space of reasons, and, therefore, we would concordantly
find ourselves mediating debates, responding for and against claims, translating
statements, improving each other’s arguments, and sharing in ends. Our noticing of
historical differences and similarities would occur as a residuum of this
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engagement, not its cause. We would have to encounter the thinkers in this
conversation from on the basis of their own thoughts, as we come to encounter the
entire conversation as ours. The work of history in this situation would resemble
the search for a reference on a cell phone to facilitate a dinner conversation, with its
appropriateness as rigorously cordoned, rather than resembling a terminus of
comprehension.
The empiricist will not understand this. She will either believe that
Emerson’s texts carry with them a hidden meaning, a meaning that we must glean
through historical-textual insight, or else, more probably, she will think that
historical-textual insight is all we have: when we have contextualized and
historicized enough to suit ourselves, then this produced contextual-historical
narrative will represent all the meaning the text has or ever has had. She will view
it as a nodal point within the dynamics of power, as a repository of affect, as a fossil
of the history of trauma, or as an emblem of identity. She will make no sense of the
imperative to “engage the text in the present.” She will not understand the call to
encounter the text not merely as an artifact to be interpreted and not even merely
as an assemblage of acts and judgments. The latter would supplant the former
through allowing the operative articulation of the “I” to shows itself working in and
through the text, an “I” that engages, carries, and extends a projective space of
reasons. Even if we stopped there, this encounter would be an improvement over
empiricist historicization, insofar as it would give the text a voice, beyond that of
the neutral(ized), perpetually displaced “author.” But the call to engage Emerson’s
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text in its spontaneity, a priori necessary for encountering him as a writer of
spontaneity, could not cease at this point. Not only would we have to encounter his
texts through the dimensions of act and judgment, we would also have to make
explicit the speaking to a you across time, the ministerial address to an already
responsive congregation, the transcending moment that would hold the past and the
present together in the futural projection of perfection. Such a freeing moment,
implicit within any linguistic interaction, distant or near in time or space, the
genius of ordinary communication, would remain opaquely unexplicated from the
passively receptive vantage of the empiricist, even as she actively reconstructs her
impressions in her own image. For her, the text will only appear as external and
bygone, hostage to the narration of its productive history.
D. Overview
The reader can expect the following in the two main chapters of this
dissertation:
1. In the second chapter, “The Idealism of Sebastian Rödl,” I interpret Rödl’s
work with an eye towards its resonance with Emerson’s idealist poetics. In
this interpretation, I will attempt to initiate the reader into Rödl’s
characteristic patterns of thought. I will not summarize the results of his
work, but I will rather interweave moments of citation, application, and
emulation in order to show how his thought works from the inside. This will
be necessary because in the following chapter on Emerson, I will be using
these characteristic patterns of Rödl’s thought in order to help me elucidate
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the functioning of Emerson’s poetics. This means that I will not be interested
in saying that this or that idea in Emerson resembles this or that idea in
Rödl, but I will rather be interested in disclosing their underlying structural
resonance. Although I will mention the work of Rödl in various places in the
Emerson chapter, as situating reminders, these mentions will not be doing
most of the work. Rödl’s idealism, and particularly his thoughts of the
subject and of infinite ends and objects, should be heard as sounding beneath
the surface of the entire chapter. Thus, even though the issues discussed in
the Rödl chapter may appear overly analytical and non-Emersonian at times,
the reader is advised to have patience, since the thought within this chapter
will inform what follows as a whole.
2. In the third chapter, “Emerson’s Idealist Poetics,” I use two interlocked
framing strategies in order to interpret Emerson’s work. First, I perform a
microscopically close reading of the first two chapters of Emerson’s Nature as
a frame for the entire dissertation chapter. Within this frame, I move within
and without Emerson’s corpus, providing readings of latter sections of Nature
as well as many of Emerson’s other essays and works, but all of my readings
take place in service of elucidating the primary interpretative frame. I do
this because I am interested in following the characteristic patterns of
Emerson’s poetic thought, his idealist poetics, and in order to do this, I have
to follow him thinking, just as I followed Rödl thinking in the previous
section. With a dense writer such as Emerson, this sort of following is
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impossible through the mere juxtaposition of distant passages. By
interweaving discussion of others works from Emerson’s oeuvre, along with
reference to historical and secondary sources, however, I will show how this
thought extends beyond the narrow confines within which I elucidate it.
Second, in the final section of this chapter, F., I perform an even more
microscopic reading of the sections preceding and following Emerson’s
“transparent eyeball” passage. Although this section is an extension of the
work of the preceding sections, it is also meant to show how the thought of
idealism, poetically articulated, can inform the meditative reading of the
Emersonian text. Although this section ends the chapter, it is not a
conclusion, since there is no conclusion to be reached within such meditative
reading.
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Chapter 2. The Idealism of Sebastian Rödl
A. Introduction to Rödl’s Approach
This is not a proper introduction to the thought of Sebastian Rödl. In one
sense, it is not proper because I will only focus on and explicate those aspects of
Rödl’s idealism relevant to our encounter with Emerson. In a more important
sense, however, it cannot be proper, just as no introduction to philosophers who
transform our relation to language as a function of their thinking (such as Hegel or
Wittgenstein) could be proper. The thought of these philosophers is bound together
with its concretely worked-out form within their writing, and the only way to
adequately understand them is to go “the bloody hard way,” to use Wittgenstein’s
phrase, and follow their dense prose and work through the articulations of their
thought. Literary theory often draws theses or conclusions from philosophical texts
where there are none, at least none that can be extracted from a path of thinking.
To some extent, such extraction is unavoidable when soliciting thoughtful works for
assistance in interpretive ventures, but the loss of thinking in extraction can be
marked and minimized, and I will attempt to do this here.1

1. One way I will try to minimize this loss is to avoid stating, as much as
possible, what Rödl thinks independently from showing how he thinks it. I will do
this through explaining key concepts by presenting them within microencapsulations of characteristic patterns of his thought: miniature inferential
chains. Sometimes I will use the examples and figures he deploys to populate the
world of his reasoning, and sometimes, if they promote the necessary brevity and
condensation required here, I will invent my own. As well, instead of always
presenting these illustrations accompanied by the customary “Rödl believes” or
“Rödl concludes,” I will sometimes translate my distilling explication into the first
person, allowing the reader to follow more easily the movements of thought that
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Idealism as a philosophical enterprise investigates ideas (concepts,
representations) and their synthesis within experience in order to understand the
production and ordering of those ideas by the human mind, as well as to understand
that mind itself.2 First person consciousness provides the most immediate access to
the experience to be analyzed and the mind that produces it. Therefore, supposing I
am an idealist, I attempt to understand my mind through investigating its final
product, my experience, by analyzing that experience to reveal its infrastructural
synthesis of ideas. In coming to know more about my ideas and their synthesis, I
come to know more about myself. Unlike Platonic or Berkeleyan idealism, Rödl’s is
a philosophy of self-consciousness: there is no metaphysical speculation on ideas in
the mind of God or Ideas inhabiting an intelligible realm of immutable souls. Many
critics often associate idealism with the thesis that the mind creates the world that
it knows, and the self, in knowing itself, knows the most basic things about the

necessarily involve the first-person perspective. I will act as if I am Rödl writing.
Thus, as well, when I quote Rödl in context, his usage of the first person will
sometimes quite naturally pass over into mine, in resonance with both of our aims
to draw the reader into the first-personal thought of spontaneity.
2. This is true of the classical German idealists Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, in
differing ways, and it is also true for Rödl. For Rödl, his innovation involves
understanding ideas originally based on their linguistic articulation within the
movement of reasoning. Rödl writes within the classical analytic tradition whose
implied dictum is “All philosophy is the philosophy of language” (which is also an
implied imperative: “Let us make all philosophy into the philosophy of language!”).
34

world, since the world is nothing other than the subject’s experience of it as a
constellation of ideas.3
Rödl’s first and primary question concerns the possibility of first-person
knowledge. By first-person knowledge, I do not mean merely knowledge about
myself as a singular person with a singular perspective, because this is too unclear.
Do I, for instance, want to know about my uniqueness as a living being, my history
leading up to the present moment in my life, my social role as an individual among
others, or my singular perceptual vantage on the world? As an idealist, I may want
to know such things about “the first person,” if it is defined in such a way to include
these phenomena in it. But first, as an idealist, I want to know about my unique
being insofar as it produces and orders ideas. As an idealist, I understand this
production and ordering as thinking. Thus, as an idealist, I seek to know my being
as a thinking subject.
But how can I do this? I can think (produce and order ideas) and then
attempt to know what I do and what I am when I think. But knowing is a mode of
thinking, so in order to know myself as a thinking subject, I initially must be able to

3. I will discuss this cosmological expansiveness in the final section of this
essay (on materialism and idealism in general) but exploring this part of idealism
first will not be helpful. Unless we first define words (ideas) such as “self,” “mind,”
“idea,” and “know” in idealist terms, any account of idealism as a cosmic ontology
would be vague tending towards vacuous. For now, I should apprise the reader that
Rödl’s idealism relies on an account of the underlying being of neither the self nor
the world as substantial in any transcendently metaphysical sense. For him,
idealism operates compatibly with a thoroughgoing non-metaphysical materialism.
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produce thought concerning thought.4 For Rödl, this self-reference is primarily what
must be explained to answer the question about the possibility of first-person
knowledge. Self-reference (as the original basis for self-knowledge), however, is not
a species of the much maligned “self-presence.” In order to refer to myself and,
hence, know myself, I neither do this through using the senses nor through some
internal process resembling receptive-sensory affection, whereby I mysteriously
“make myself present to myself.”
According to Rödl,
Unmediated first-person thoughts articulate knowledge I possess, not
by perceiving, but by being their object. If I know without mediation
that I am F, then I know it, not by perceiving that I am F, but by being
F. (Self-Consciousness, 9)5
Two pressing questions arise here, first regarding reference and then regarding
knowledge: “How does being an object enable me to refer to it?” (SC, 9) and “How
does being an object put me in a position to know how things stand with it?” (SC, 9).
Usually, we think about referring to an object in a mediated sense as dictated by a

4. When I say, “I think” and I attempt to know this I who is thinking, then I
must do more of the same: I must think about an I that is thinking. I must produce
second order thoughts that reference first order thoughts. To know myself as a
thinking subject, I must be able to refer to my thinking. But in creating both the
first and second order thoughts, there is an I that is doing the thinking, and selfknowledge aims at knowing this I. So not only must thinking be able to refer to
itself in a second order sense, it also must be able to refer to that which produces it
in either sense.
5. In Rödl’s text, oftentimes the terms “self-conscious” and “self-consciousness”
are not hyphenated. Throughout this text, including the quotes from Rödl’s texts, I
hyphenate the term in order to maintain stylistic consistency.
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relation of “aboutness.” The word “Mars” refers to the planet Mars through being
about the planet Mars. This “about” signifies that I have an external relation to
what I refer to.6 “Aboutness” is like an arrow directed towards the object, an arrow
whose “targeting” is afforded by some pre-access to the object that allows for the
aim. Knowledge about factual states of affairs (“how things stand”) presupposes
reference. If I know the moon is rock-strewn, then this knowledge is made possible
through my ability to refer externally to the moon and its rocks, so that I can
construct a knowing representation of their standing relationship in referential
space.
“Aboutness” seems to dictate that I receive information about the object
beforehand (characteristically through the senses), and so it seems to necessitate an
externalist (the object must be external to my mind), receptive (I must receive
information about the object across the mediating external distance between me
and it) theory of reference in order to account for my ability to transform receptive
acquisition into referential targeting. Such a theory, when reference is construed in
this way, seem necessary and sufficient to account for all cases of reference. In a
receptive-externalist-based mindset,7 it seems impossible that I could either refer to
6. Saul Kripke, for instance, puts forth a causal theory of reference in Naming
and Necessity (Lecture II), whereby this relation of aboutness is established through
external, material causation: the moon causes the light to bend thus and so which
causes impressions on my retinas which are linked to my utterance of the word
“moon” and, therefore, I can talk about the moon through tracing the reference of
my word back along a material, causal chain.
7. This is also an empiricist or materialist mindset, since empiricism and
materialism both require commitment to the priority of the senses. (There is no
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or know anything whatsoever through being that thing, which would directly imply
that immediate reference and knowledge are themselves impossible.8 Rödl,
however, directly states that such reference and knowledge are possible. He
designates “knowledge associated with first person reference ‘knowledge from the
inside’” (SC 9). For him, it is a provisional methodological designation to say that I
have knowledge from the inside, since usually, if I claim to have “knowledge from
the inside” (of my own body, for instance), then this knowledge still requires sensory
apprehension and, thus, is not immediate.
If I say “My stomach hurts,” I do this through my inner capacity to sense my
body’s states, and like every sensory claim, this one is not immediate, and it could
be mistaken (it might be my appendix and not my stomach that hurts). When I say,
“My stomach hurts” and claim to refer to my stomach, I do this only through neurointra-corporeal location (the targeting), but my inner neural pathways (or the
interpretation of their signals) might be crossed. This “inside” (the inside of a body
state) is not interior enough for self-knowledge. All sensory-affective claims, from “I
see Mars” to “My foot hurts” and even to “I feel sad” are not “interior” enough to
express reference through being.

such thing as an intellectual materialism, since if an intellect had to posit the
existence of matter independently of its revelation through the senses, then that
intellect would be prior to both that matter and those senses, and one would no
longer be a materialist but rather, perhaps, an incoherent dualist.
8. My utterances could not be about the moon by referring to the moon, to use
the example of Kripke’s causal theory of reference (as a paradigmatic externalist
mindset), unless that moon is external to my utterance and connected to that
utterance through some affective (in Kripke’s case, material-causal) relationship.
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According to Rödl, however, implicit within every one of my references to
anything outside, I also refer to myself, because I must express myself as so: “’I’ see
Mars.” Sensory claims depend on reference to this deeper “inside” (the deep I
referring to itself through being itself) in order to be put forth at all. I can show this
through drawing attention to the fact that in all such claims (in all claims tout
court), a prefatory “I think” is always already implied: “I think: my stomach hurts”
or “I think: I see Mars” or “I think: I feel sad.” (If the reader believes that sadness as
affect might be immediately known, then she should remember the possibility of the
response, “No you don’t feel sad, you’re just tired,” where I might have mistaken my
fatigue for emotional despondence.)9 Likewise, if I declare neutrally, “Mars is in
space,” it is implied, “I think: Mars is in space.” There is no avoiding the mystery of
immediate self-reference through escaping into the third person.
All mediated sensory claims presuppose immediate self-reference, whether
this self-reference is explicitly indicated within those claims or not. This selfreference, the reference of the “I” in the “I think” (whereby I refer to myself through
being what I am) is the strange target we are pursuing. But if this immediate

9. According to Rödl, “Reflection on the nature of sensation cannot reveal how
it is that sensation is represented in first person thought, because sensation is
present in animals that are not self-conscious” (SC, 11). This will be controversial to
some, although it should not be, but for Rödl, as self-conscious individuals, we are
not primarily animals. Animals, whatever they have, do not have subjectivity,
because they do not have the capacity to know themselves through being
themselves. Animals do not have self-consciousness because they do not have
language. Human beings, having language, (where all language use implies the
happening of self-consciousness) are not primarily animals.
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“reference through being” does not happen through perceptual (sensory, affective,
empirical, external) knowledge, then how does it happen? Rödl claims,
First person knowledge does not rest on observation, for perceptual
knowledge is of something as other and involves a demonstrative
reference to its object. We shall argue that first person knowledge of
action and belief springs from reasoning about what to do and believe.
So this is our account of the kind of knowledge that sustains the “I”reference in thought about thought: it is knowledge from reflection.
What action and belief, the will and the intellect, have in common, in
virtue of which both are thought, is this form of knowledge: selfconsciousness (SC, 13).
The most important phrase from Rödl in this passage is “first person
knowledge of action and belief springs from reasoning about what to do and
believe.” If this is true, then my “being” (which allows me to refer to myself and,
thus, know myself self-consciously) is not timeless “in-itself” being, a “state of beingitself,” such as a stone might be attributed within a non-temporal snapshot of its
existence. Rather, this being “takes place” just as “reasoning about what to do and
believe.” (For Rödl, the being of the “I” is tied up within “a happening” of reasoning,
though this happening is not a process: more on this later.) In reasoning about what
to do and believe, I refer to myself immediately and know myself self-consciously,
prior to any sensory or receptive knowledge. One might ask: “But does not one have
to be already self-conscious (to have conscious awareness, at least) in order to be
able to reason?” Does not my capacity to give and ask for reasons and draw
inferences not presuppose my self-consciousness rather than allow it to spring
forth? Furthermore, if my self-conscious being happens as reasoning without
reception, then does not this being float away into the metaphysical realm of the
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Cartesian Cogito ergo sum? If I am a being not primarily determined by my relation
to (material) affectivity, then is it not the case that I am an immaterial being, a
soul, and that Rödl’s philosophy is an antiquated philosophy of ghosts?
For Rödl, these questions rest on misunderstandings of basic human
relationships to self and world. To show this, we need to demonstrate that A) the
self-reference that manifests in the self-knowledge of self-consciousness arises from
the occurrence of human reasoning, B) this arising precedes rather than
presupposes what we call “conscious-self-awareness,” and C) such a wonderful thing
as self-consciousness occurs in the material world and does not require a spectral,
metaphysical realm. In order to carry out these demonstrations, after discussion of
some 1) preliminary methodological issues, we need to elucidate the nature of this
reasoning as it happens along 2) practical, 3) theoretical, 4) material and ideal axes.
Doing the above will reveal that human self-consciousness is what is primarily
known in any experiential encounter with self or world and that, therefore,
idealism’s aims and conclusions are true.
B. Preliminary Methodological Issues
Certain forms of reference must be understood in terms of ways of
knowing how things stand with the object, acts of which are
unmediated thoughts involving the relevant form of reference. This
applies to first person reference, and it is clear how to characterize in
the abstract ways of knowing that sustain it: I know in a first person
way that an object is F by being that object, i.e., by being F if and only
if I know that someone is F in a way that satisfies this formula, I know
without mediation that I am F. (SC, 17)
When he writes, Rödl uses a subtle technique of style involving verbs. This
technique is not just a rhetorical flourish but rather signifies a fact about all verbs,
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a fact that we normally overlook when we use verbs and gerundial forms.10 In order
to expose this trick, say to yourself the following sentences: “I know there is an
apple on the table.” “I am here in the room.” “I walk to school.” Now, say those same
sentences with the following difference: stretch out the verbs as if you were trying to
get someone to pay special notice to them, perhaps because this person is hard of
hearing or does not understand the language fully. “I ‘knooooooowwww’ there
‘iiisssss’ an apple on the table.” “I ‘aaaaaaammmmmm’ here in the room.” “I
‘waaalllllk’ to school.” What should be realized through these stretched
articulations is the fact that “knowing,” “being,” and “walking” are not
instantaneous, non-temporal events: they take time, even though their verbal
presentation within the first person present does not draw our attention to this and,
perhaps, even disguises it. In these second instances, we might say, the verbs have
been “temporalized.” In their usage, the fact that they all implicitly operate
through predicating (or, we might say, “‘opppperrraaate’ through
‘preddddicaaatinnng’”) temporally becomes explicitly marked. We would be quickly
annoyed if someone wrote this way for an extended period, even if she were merely
trying to remind us of something we might miss.11 Fortunately, Rödl does not write

10. Wittgenstein: “We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of
language: an order with a particular end in view, one out of many possible orders;
not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions
which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook” (PI 132).
11. Heidegger’s often uses middle-voiced neologisms to indicate such
temporality, and some people find them annoying, while others find them true and
beautiful. Perhaps, in some cases, finding such distortions of language annoying
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this way. Nor will I, but to accentuate how certain verbs are to be heard in this
discussion, I will now rephrase the relevant verbs (and gerundial derivatives, to
which this trick also applies) in the first part of Rödl’s second sentence quoted
above: “it is clear how to characterize in the abstract ways of ‘knoooooowwwinnnng’
that ‘suuustaaainnn’ it [first person ‘reffferrrennnce’]: I ‘knoooooowww’ in a first
person way that an object ‘iiiissss’ F by ‘beeeeeinnnng’ that object.” As well, I will
place a # next to verbs or gerundial words where I want to especially emphasize
their temporal character, although I would have to do it all the time when I write
about Rödl, if relevance were the only criterion.
For the empiricist,12 there are two paths to solving the Sphinx riddle of selfknowledge. In the first case, if I (the empiricist) have receptive knowledge of
myself, if I KNOW myself, then this knowledge must intrinsically involve
information received across an external gap (through the very meaning of
“receptive”). Normally, such crossing and receiving of information takes time. If I
perceive my corgi, Woogie, sitting one meter away from me, my knowledge about
the state of Woogie is at least 3 x 10^-8 seconds old (the time it takes light to travel
one meter), not counting the time from retinal reception to conscious awareness.
Suppose poor Woogie were suddenly transported to Mars, and I watched him appear

does not merely amount to grammatical obsessiveness but rather indicates a certain
relationship to time, one of avoiding its acknowledgement.
12. This is Rödl’s designation for anyone that approaches knowledge in a
receptive/affective mindset (on the basis of a receptive/affective epistemological
theory, whether the holder of that theory is a self-professed empiricist or a firstorder materialist (anti-idealist) or one who believes in intellectual intuitions).
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there through an advanced telescope. If I only received an image of him in the first
second after he arrived, before he started to succumb to the cold and the oxygen
deprivation, then I might say that I know Woogie is alive on Mars. Unfortunately,
however, it takes light 14 minutes to reach the earth from Mars, so when I received
this initial image, Woogie would have already perished, and I should have been sad,
as if looking at a photograph of someone dead. I did not know Woogie was still
alive: I only believed I knew.
Supposing the mind is the brain in process (a process involving very fast
neuro-electrical activity), then that mind’s “knowing itself”—representing what
state it is in—would not be immediate self-knowledge, but that knowledge would be
exactly as old as it took the sampling representation to form through the cascading
of neural impulses. Although I cannot imagine myself in the present as alive
representing my dead self in the past, as in the Woogie case (and why is this?), in
fact, on this empiricist account, I might be an entirely different “self” representing
the being of a past self that I had succeeded. Suppose, for instance, that it took 14
minutes for a sampling representation to form, but I underwent a horrific trauma in
the interval. Through what criterion of mediated, receptive knowledge could I claim
that I know that I am the same thinking, experiencing subject? Suppose this
sampling takes 5ms. Would the shorter time make any difference? Speculating
that there could be a mediated form of self-consciousness knowledge seems to
involve a category mistake, so problems inherent to this supposition cannot be
solved through the pragmatic shortening of temporal intervals.
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Fortunately, however, our criterion for self-knowledge, ex hypothesi, is
temporally IMMEDIATE self-knowledge, not mediated knowledge of the self in the
past. If we equate self-knowledge with self-consciousness, this hypothetical
criterion follows. In self-consciousness, I would presumably know that I am a
conscious self at this very instant, not that I was a conscious self at thus and such
time. Therefore, in this first scenario, as an empiricist who believes self-knowledge
as self-consciousness is possible, even via reception, I would have to postulate some
non-temporal form of information transmission, which seems self-contradictory in
its formulation. In order to understand self-consciousness in this manner, I would
have to believe in a very non-empirical miracle. Somehow, a consciousness
immediately in-itself would have to “get” information about itself in a receptive
manner that would involve no temporal mediation. The necessity of this immediacy
is implied by the very idea of instantaneous self-knowledge.
Receiving information involves externality. I can only have an external
relation to myself through representing my being in the past, “my past self.” Thus,
in order to “know myself” in this way, I would have to represent my past self in a
way that takes no times whatsoever (otherwise who I am might have changed, even
in the course of producing this representation) and then have some miraculous
manner of recognizing that this representation is identical to who I am now. (But if
I know who I am now in order to make this comparison, then why did I undertake
the task of memory to begin with?) Remember, this empiricist still believes in selfknowledge, not in probability of self-identity, so we cannot solve her problems
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through gerrymandering the meaning of “to know.” Verbs such as “get” and “know”
would have to be used by her as if thought took no time at all. To take the example
of knowing Woogie is on Mars to illustrate how these non-temporal verbs would
have to be deployed in a “real-world” case, if I immediately and receptively said, “I
see Woogie alive on Mars through the telescope,” and I actually knew that what I
saw was true in the immediate present, then this “see” would have to involve some
sort of transcendent vision, whose metaphysical light does not take time to travel
from thing to eye to mind.
Those who follow the second course, the path most travelled by empiricists,
deny the existence of a self and of genuine self-knowledge, because any represented
state of the self would have to be retroactively constructed in a model or narrative.
These empiricists bite the bullet and acknowledge that epistemological verbs and
the information transfer that funds them take time, and they, therefore, reasonably
conclude that there is no self-consciousness. Every bit of knowledge about myself is
the same as a third person account, since it is about the “he” who was and not about
the “me” that I am. This predicament implies that “knowing myself” means
creating a narrative about my past, not something that ever overlaps with the
occluded present. These empiricists, therefore, could readily agree to the working of
temporalized verbs in Rödl’s account (although they would understand them
differently than Rödl would), but they would do so at the cost of denying the very
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sense of the reality or pursuit of “actual” self-consciousness.13 They would deny the
validity of Rödl’s inquiry entirely, not merely offer an alternative answer to his.
According to the idealist, on the contrary, I can immediately know myself
(and thus refer to myself) as a being in time just and only through being# myself.14
Here is an introductory statement of the issue from Rödl:
What I know receptively is not the same reality as my receptive
knowledge of it. It is an independent object, which must be given to me
and which I must receive. By contrast, my spontaneous knowledge and
what I thus know are one reality When 1 know an object through
spontaneity, the idea of the object`s affecting me, and being taken in by
me, does not apply. There is no room in this case for something that
connects me with the object and through which I know it. (SC, 13-14)
As we can quickly see, Rödl contrasts primary knowledge from receptivity
(empiricism) with primary knowledge from spontaneity. The entire enigma we are
dealing with in this introduction to Rödl (for the purposes of reading Emerson) is to

13. Or, as a “third” alternative (although it is really only a semantic variant of
the second one), the empiricist ascribes non-temporal self-knowledge to a fictional
subject as a function of an ongoing “self-narrative,” and then she refers to this
narrative as “the actual self.” This means, functionally, that for her “I am here” and
“my fictional self-narrative is here,” although they have different Fregean sense,
would have the same referent, with the “I” having an imprecise sense (like “the
morning star” for the peasant) and “my fictional self-narrative” having a more
precise one (like “the planet Venus” for the scientist). It is not surprising that
empiricists in the philosophy of mind sometimes believe that our ordinary mental
language (including words like “I” and “self” and “you”) amounts to a “folk
psychology,” might be replaced with one omitting such subjectivist terms. Perhaps,
communication after such an elimination would involve exchanging neural
diagrams.
14. One of the things that Heidegger, writing in the idealist tradition (as
defined here), means when he delivers pronouncements of the form, “The being# of
Dasein does not have the character of a being” is that one must switch temporal
gears when one is thinking about the subject (although for Heidegger, Dasein is not
exactly a subject).
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account for what knowledge from spontaneity is, how it is possible, and how this
spontaneity comes to be articulated in language. Supposing such self-consciousness
exists, though, the reader should be immediately able to see that it avoids both the
mystery and the denial of self-knowledge that the empiricist must choose between
in one deft move. With emphases, the middle sentence from above would be
inscribed so: “By contrast, my spontaneous knowledge# and what I thus know# are#
one reality When 1 know# an object through spontaneity, the idea of the object`s
affecting me, and being taken in by me, does not apply.” I am not an eternal, static
thing. Knowledge is not an eternal, static thing. To know myself would have to
involve the temporality of the subject and the temporality of knowing. To have
actual self-knowledge and not either metaphysical nonsense or self-denial disguised
as self-knowledge, this knowledge would have to take place non-receptively, which
is to say spontaneously, which is also to say immediately, but this immediacy would
be temporal, something more like going over a waterfall than sitting by a lake.
We must also, however, note the following, even if it partially undoes the
work of the similes at the end of the last paragraph. If I speak about the
temporality of doing# or believing#, then I do not understand this doing# or
believing# as a process. I watch an ice cube melt. This is a process that I know
receptively through watching it. My body is getting older as I watch the ice cube
melt. If I had a precise enough measurement device, it could chart the deterioration
of my cells, and I would then know this deterioration receptively through indirectly
observing it through its effects. I would see the process of aging. If I am cutting a
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piece of cake, however, then this spontaneous action is something that is first and
foremost done# by me, not receptively known by me. Even though I or any outside
viewer could represent any action I carry out as a process, a changing of states over
time, the time of the process is not the same as the time of the active subject (which
is a pleonasm, since subjectivity is activity). In my present language, it would be
“ungrammatical” or just plain wrong for me to write, “the butter melts#,” since the
subjective temporality indicated would not apply, because butter melting is a
process and not an action. The correct, snarky English professor response would be,
“The butter melts what?”
Correspondingly, the “time” of these temporal verbs is neither objectivephysical time nor involves the subjective experience of time. My doing# does not
merely take place in time, as a process among processes, and my doing# is also not a
process that I experience as mine through subjectively apprehending it from the
interior of a consciousness. I might say, “I know# that it objectively took me twelve
hours to write# that piece, but to me, it only seemed# like an hour,” indicating that
I fully understand the difference between objective and subjective time. That
know# or that write#, however, does not take place either in objective or subjective
time, if I understand that knowing# and that writing# to involve the spontaneous
self-consciousness of the subject. For now, though this must be explained and
qualified, we can say that these acts of the subject take place in/as the time of
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spontaneity—enactive time.15 The occurrence of enactive time can only be made
explicit in the living through of the articulations of a subject. A subject only
encounters enactive time in projects of self-knowledge.
C. Practical Self-Consciousness
Rödl approaches spontaneous self-knowledge first through giving an account
of practical self-knowledge, the self-knowledge that I possess implicitly (and which
can be made explicit in philosophical moments) in doing anything whatsoever as
myself, which means the self-knowledge implicit in action. Rödl’s placing his
explanation of practical self-knowledge before his explanation of theoretical selfknowledge (unlike Kant, who chose theoretical knowledge first) is wise, given the
emphasis on the importance of the temporal above, since we normally understand
action as something that takes place in time, though Rödl will reveal it as temporal
in another sense than the ordinary one.
Here is Rödl’s conclusive statement concerning the essential link between
practical knowledge and self-consciousness:
Knowing that one is doing A by reasoning about what to do and doing
A intentionally are one reality. This is a character of the form of
predication “I * do A”: that subject and action-form are joined in this
way includes the subject’s representing them as so joined. The facts are
not prior and dictate. They are not prior and cannot dictate, as they
include and are included in the subject`s knowledge of them. (SC, 62)16

15. Rödl does not use these phrases. Rödl’s thinking of time is here implicit in
his thinking of self-consciousness. I make this thinking explicit.
16. The “*” in this quote formally represents the joining of the subject (I) with
the action-form (do A), indicating that the action is not independent from the
subject’s self-conscious knowledge.
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We are seeking a way to establish the identity of the being of an I and its selfconsciousness. If, ex hypothesi, I automatically know that I am doing something
(and, therefore, thinking something, insofar as doing presupposes reasoning) when I
do it, then merely by doing anything at all, I demonstrate the possibility of selfconsciousness. In practice, I should reach my hand towards my coffee cup and
Rödl’s treatise would be unnecessary, since self-consciousness is not the result of a
long and detailed argument. It happens all the time for every person. In theory,
however, this self-conscious knowledge is not conceptually explicit. Philosophical
reflection makes conceptually explicit what is implicit within human life and does
nothing more than this. This making explicit of being/doing and self-consciousness
is the establishment of the necessary identity, and in so doing (#), it removes
confusion and self-misapprehension, but it does not give us new information about
ourselves. In a similar manner to that of the so-called ordinary language
philosophers, such as Wittgenstein and Austin, Rödl seeks to solve philosophical
problems through recalling and analyzing ordinary deeds and words. In his work
that treats many of the issues discussed here, but from the vantage of their relation
to the field of epistemology, Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to
Absolute Idealism, Rödl describes his method as follows:
. . . a curious character of the present essay: it propounds no theses,
advances no hypotheses, does not recommend a view or position; it
does not give arguments that are to support a view, it does not defend
a position against competing ones, it does nothing to rule out contrary
theses. It does nothing of the sort because it is—it brings to explicit
consciousness— the self- consciousness of judgment. As it aims to
express the comprehension of judgment that is contained in any
judgment, the present essay can say only what anyone always already
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knows, knows in any judgment, knows insofar as she judges at all. It
cannot say anything that is novel, it can make no discovery, it cannot
advance our knowledge in the least. Echoing Kant, we can say that its
work is not that universal knowledge, but a formula of it. Its work is
its language. Again, echoing Kant, we can say that this is no mean
thing. In the formula we think clearly what we know; the formula
shields us from confusion, which, being a confusion with respect to the
knowledge in which and through which we are subjects of judgment,
must do the most pervasive damage. (SCIAI, 12-13)
Here, we hear Rödl echoing not only Kant but also Heidegger (“always
already”) and Wittgenstein, who made many similar sounding methodological
claims during his career, such as “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the
actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it” (PI, 124) and “If one tried
to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because
everyone would agree to them” (PI, 128). More similarly to Heidegger or less
similarly to Wittgenstein here (but only a bit more or less), Rödl believes that the
practice of philosophy results in certain formalizations: the work of philosophy
leaves behind positive results. For our purposes here, this process of formalization
is crucial, because it has the following implications. Suppose I analyze an action
such as riding a bike (I will do this later). Per my project here, I will, through this
formal analysis, make explicit the implicit self-consciousness that resides within
this activity: I will remind us what we already know, since self-consciousness is selfknowledge, so riding a bike is not only a practical activity but also (implicitly) an
epistemological one. My ability to do this “reminding” implies the possibility of its
formalization as containing self-conscious knowledge was already included in the
activity of riding the bike. There are different ways the implications of this insight
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can be paraphrased. One is that “Riding a bike” is not (only) a series of discrete
events (brakes pulls, foot moves, etc.), but rather, it is (or has) a form that we can
bring to conceptual light. Another is that “Riding a bike” is not (only) a physical
process but it is also a manifestation of intelligence in the world,” an incarnate
brilliance that we can intelligently formulate in language. Yet another is that
“Riding a bike” is an activity that carries not only my body with it but more
importantly both sustains and is sustained by my subjectivity in its occurrence, and
this mutual sustenance is also borne in the “I do A.” In order to establish his claims
about the relative superfluity of philosophy and the existence of formal selfconsciousness within activity, Rödl must show that we always already bear a
knowing relation to intelligence within the world and this intelligence maintains us
as we maintain it.
When I lived in Regensburg, Germany for three years, I rode my bike
everywhere. I became very good at negotiating tight corners around narrow streets
over bumpy cobblestone roads. I suppose it is an average day, and I plan to go to
the grocery store to get sausages and bread and cheese for dinner. I get on my bike
and start riding. When I am riding, I am performing an action. If someone puts me
in a cart against my will and pushes me down a hill, the cart carries me down the
hill, but there is no action involved. There is an intrinsic connection between my
intending to do something (ride a bike) and my doing it that makes it into an action.
Likewise, in any action there must be an I (“my riding”) that makes it possible.
Finally, any action must aim at some end or set of ends. I am riding to the store to
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get food and bring it back. The retrieval of food is my goal. Even if I just went out
riding, without getting groceries, I would have been riding to get some air, riding for
the enjoyment of riding, or riding for exercise. Suppose I wake up on the bike going
downhill in a frightening case of somnambulant behavior. This would be terrifying
because no intentionality would be involved. I would not know immediately what I
was doing nor why. I would feel completely out of control. There would not have
been an “I” that was doing this, not would there have been an intention to do it, nor
would there have been a goal. There would be no action of riding, only an
uncontrolled process of my being moved, no matter how sophisticated those
movements were. This feeling of control, of course, would be part of self-knowledge
that would happen in the immediate activity of my trying to regain control, as I
grasp for the handlebars and try to deploy the brakes.
I am riding my bike to the store. The whole action is one thing, as it were one
long action-orchestration. I am also, for instance, swerving to avoid a pothole along
the way (a sub-action) and drifting out of control (daydream driving) and stopping
at lights (a sub-action) and checking my phone while waiting (another action), but
these are all unified through my riding to the store, classifiable as what they are
only in relation to the whole. If riding to the store did not unify the sub-components
in advance, then I would have to make a new decision to go to the store with each
peddle push: there would never be anything in general that I was doing. We can
describe my trip as a series of discrete events unified within a narrative a la Hume,
but then what I am doing disappears as my action and becomes an infinity of
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deterministic surges of ocean waves in the world. Thus, the “I” that maintains and
is maintained within the action of riding must always carry and be carried along as
the basis of its unity.
What is this “I” that carries and is carried along as the basis of the ride’s
unity? From the empiricist’s perspective, this question has an easy (second path:
type 2) or hard (first path: type 1) answer. For the type 2 empiricist who denies real
self-consciousness, there is no I and there is no unified action. She must describe
everything from a third person perspective that allows for a fictional attribution of
the unity of the action and the action of a subject performing it. But really, there are
no unified rides and subjects; there are only events in the world. This type 2
empiricist17 would accuse the Rödlian account presented here of an essentialism,
one which finds metaphysical origins, forms, and groupings in a world where there
are none. “Riding a bike to the store,” for her, amounts to a cascade of discrete
events/impressions that we can group as necessity requires; they do not come preordered within observable intelligible projections. From Rödl’s perspective,
however, this type 2 empiricist makes a category mistake. As an idealist, when I
speak of the unity of riding a bike, I am not thinking of this unity as having
objective criteria that are observable in a third person sense. Rather, I am
primarily attempting to understand the action of MY riding a bike. Even if in the
course of riding, I were somehow wasting my time in making backwards

17. Most historicists or primary materialists also presuppose, support, or think
in unison with this sort of empiricism.
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attributions (“Yes, indeed, I was and still am riding a bike!”), from Rödl’s vantage,
there would remain an “I” that makes such attributions while it continued on its
way to the store. This debate involves conflicting characterizations of action, with
the empiricist aimed at the reduction of an activity like riding a bike or playing a
game to parts plus narrative and the idealist aimed at a holistic understanding of
that activity, in terms of my intrinsic involvement in it.
The type 1 empiricist, to the contrary of the type 2, believes that there is an I
who is riding the bike. This empiricist claims that I have a receptive awareness of
myself and the bike and my surroundings that serves as the basis for my knowledge
of the ride. It may have sounded like I meant something like this in the previous
paragraph when I said, “intrinsic involvement,” but nothing could be further from
the case. This type 1 empiricist holds that there is an “inside,” first person
knowledge within an activity, but she has the same problem talking about activities
as the type 2 empiricist. If I am a bubble of conscious awareness (perhaps a sort of
quasi-physical cartesian substance roaming around in the world?) and I am
receiving impressions of my riding the bike, then even though I am purportedly
riding the bike, there is no intrinsic connection between my awareness and any
event that happens as a function of my intentionality. I see myself move the pedal.
I even will my foot to move the pedal. There is a pedal and a foot and a seeing and a
willing, but all these phenomena are external to one another. This type 1 empiricist
would have to resort to the non-temporal miracle indicated earlier (she sees all the
discrete events and selves together and recognizes that they are linked somehow
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outside the passage of time) or else she would have to convert into a type 2
empiricist and say that, after all, even from an interior perspective, we just
construct fictional narratives of ourselves and our activities, because that’s what
they were all along anyhow. The empiricist, whether type 1 or type 2, has no
possible grasp on the intrinsic connection between subjectivity and action and
outcome: there are only a set of neutral events in a neutral world groupable
however one wishes.
I am riding my bike to get groceries in Regensburg. “I” am intrinsically
involved in this ride. Why? I am so involved because I am going to get groceries.
“I”/“ride”/“to get groceries.” In relation to my act of riding, these are not three single
words, as if the sentence could be broken apart into atoms. These are three
positions or modalities of a whole activity: the subject, the action, and the aim, all of
which are then condensed into the synecdoche of “the action of riding.” Regarding
the aim, it supplies the reason for the ride, hence giving an answer to the question:
“Why are you riding your bike?” Such aims also apply to sub-actions within my
ride: “Why did you swerve to avoid the pothole?” “To avoid crashing and injuring
myself so as to be able to continue riding to the grocery store.” There are no actions
without aims, and when the finite end of a ride to the grocery store is fulfilled (I get
to the grocery store) or a ride to get groceries (I arrive home with them), then the
action ceases.
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Viewed “from the inside,”18 the end, in a subjectified Aristotelian sense, pulls
the action forward, the activity of riding efficiently delivers me towards the end, and
the “I” formally unites the whole, as the being for whom the ride takes place.19 The
activity as a whole is unified because it is for the purpose of fulfilling my end. “Why
are you going to get groceries?” “For me.” (Even if I get them for someone else, I do
so because I want to, and therefore I do it, in the end, for me.) The verb (ride) and
aim (to get groceries) are unified with the subject (I) through being for me. Here, I
can give a provisional formulation of how practical action is related to self-conscious
knowledge. Every “part” of the action, every pedal push and swerve, are referred
(through being what they are: a push to move forward, a swerve to avoid a pothole)
back to my end and implicitly back to me. Furthermore, my initial formulation of
subject and action and end (“I am riding my bike to get groceries”), as well as every
pedal push and swerve are part of my reasoning that is involved in solving the
problem of “how to get to the store.” Every sub-action that plays a part in getting
me to the store is a manifestation of my thinking in action.
Every action involves continual self-reference through my being-active (in
reasoning forward) towards an end, referring to that “I” who is being active towards
that end. And since I am the singular source to whom the action refers, as it takes
place through my acting it out, in being referred to me from out of my doing it, I

18. And now we begin to discuss the intrinsic nature of action, as well as its
intrinsic temporality.
19. There is also the material cause, which we will discuss in section D.
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simultaneously know that “I” am doing it and I, therefore, possess self-conscious
knowledge of myself. For Rödl, I have this self-conscious knowledge from
spontaneity (immediately, from the inside) rather than receptively, because I know
my “I” through its action: in enacting myself as a being I thereby know myself as
the being that I am. Without the unity of subject, action, and aim directed back
towards the I, in the spontaneous intelligence of the directed action, there would be
no “I.” There are no persons without the actions of persons.20
For Rödl, this unity is primeval. Any time the empiricist attempts to get
between the “I” and what it is doing through setting up a mediating veil of
reception, the empiricist starts playing another language game, in Wittgenstein’s
sense of this term. The empiricist switches from the language game of intentional
action involving implicit self-knowledge (our usual one) to a language game of
psychological correlation, for instance, between perceptions of sensation,
perceptions of desire, perceptions of motion, and representations of goals. Then,
this empiricist must put Humpty Dumpty back together again through a narrative
or claim that there was no Humpty Dumpty, like a guilty child. Ordinarily, I think
I know what I am doing when I am doing it, as well as knowing the I, in the most
basic sense of this term, who is doing what he is doing. If someone questions what I
am doing, in a skeptical way, I might reply with the common response: “I know
what I’m doing.” If a person answers this way, it means that she can give reasons

20. I attribute personhood to myself while I was asleep or when I am in a nonvolitional fog just like I attribute personhood to infants who cannot yet engage in
intentional (active) behavior. I attribute bodies with the power of personhood.
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for why she is doing what she is doing. This commonsense wisdom can be
formalized in Rödl’s tripartite unity of subject, action, and aim. For anything that
is an action, I can automatically say what I am doing and why, even though I can
always expand upon my reasons in various ways upon further reflection.21
There is an even deeper sense to the unity of subject, action, and aim that
enacts both the being of the self, along with automatic self-reference and selfknowledge. We require the distinction between finite ends and infinite ends to
comprehend this deeper unity. I ride my bike to the grocery store. Why? To get
groceries. Why? So, I can eat. Why? So, I can stay alive. Every action containing a
finite end holds within it, as well, an infinite end or a host of infinite ends. I am
riding my bike to the grocery store. I do this ultimately, for instance, for my health
(as opposed to using a car, neglecting my health). I do this to sustain my life (as
opposed to starving). I do this to keep my mental acuity sharp (as opposed to staring
at my cell phone on a bus, ruining my perceptual coordination). What is the
difference between these infinite ends and the finite ends that host them?
According to Rödl,
Infinite ends are time-general; this distinguishes them from desires. I
may one moment feel like going to the movies, the next moment feel
like staying home, and a minute later again think that going to the
movies would be nice. But it makes no sense to say that, one moment, I
cared about my health, was completely indifferent to it the next
moment, and a bit later again cared greatly about it. If I want health,
then this manifests itself in actions at various times; wanting health is
21. And the fact that I could become confused about what I was doing on
reflection does not mean that, weakly, there was no action in the particular case, or
strongly, that there is no action at all, since the very meaning of “becoming confused
about an action” presupposes its prior unity.
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time-general and not tied to a moment. . .. Desires are impotent to
explain an ongoing action, since they are changeable states. An infinite
end, by contrast, is neither a state, nor is it a movement. It is timegeneral and thus manifests itself throughout an action and up to its
end. In this way an infinite end contains the whole temporal extension
of actions it explains. Infinite ends have the right temporality to be the
principle of progress of an action. (SC 37-38)
When I carry out an action, it starts, and it ends in a certain limited time. If
we were only to characterize actions in relation to finite ends, they would be
processes. The subject/action/end would involve a movement to the end and that
would be it. If this were the case, there would be no I outside the finite existence of
aims, and “my” “life” would be a series of disconnected monads.22 As Rödl states,
“Infinite ends are time general,” and this means that they are not time specific or
finite. What does it mean for an end to be time general, and how does time
generality relate to infinitude? I am riding the bike to the store. I say, “the bike is
carrying me.” But in a more important sense, it is not the bike but rather the
infinite ends for which I ride that propel and carry me to the store. But they do not
just carry me to the store this time. The same infinite ends carry me to the store
every time I ride, as well as propel me towards an entire host of other finite actions.
Ends involving health or survival or cognitive protection, for instance, pervade all
aspects of everyday life. These infinite ends are time general in the first sense that
they unify the time of the whole ride, as what it is really for, rather than being
manifested only at specific temporal points along the ride. The swerving and the

22. A position curiously similar to that of the empiricists, even though we
arrive at it differently here. What unites this breaking up subjectivity into a series
of events is the absence of infinite ends in both.
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stopping and the daydreaming all become means (reasoning towards) or obstacles
(stopping reasoning) relative to the time generality of the infinite end, which
connects each sub-action or diversion a priori.
These infinite ends are time general in a second sense in that they do not
refer themselves or me to one time but rather to my being in general. They are
general because any specific implementation of an infinite end refers implicitly to a
life project. As Rödl indicates in the quote above, I cannot reasonably claim that
“one moment I cared about my health, was completely indifferent to it the next
moment, and a bit later again cared greatly about it.” A parallel way of
understanding this also shows the meaning of the “infinite” within infinite ends,
one that explicitly draws on their time generality. Infinite ends always project (me)
towards some form of perfectionism. Above, Rödl maintains that an infinite end is
neither a state nor a movement, and he later (implicitly) contrasts this
characterization with an infinite end being “the principle of the progress of an
action.” Infinite ends are infinite insofar as they are indefinitely (temporally)
progressing towards an endless goal, either perpetually or unreachably. If my
infinite end is improving my mind, which seems like a good infinite end to have,
then I can, through my pursuit of finite ends, do better or worse in aiming towards
this infinite one. Sometimes, “progress” is just maintaining the status quo
perfectly, if the end is “eating enough to keep myself alive.” The perfection here is
found in the maintaining of the “enough” against the perils of the world.
Sometimes, even though they are time general, an infinite end may drop out of my
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life, since certain life changes may make “being the best athlete I can be” irrelevant.
And yet, who I am always already relates to a constellation of these infinities that
are operative for me, across my life, as well as across the lives of every other being
who is a subject.23
Through being the time general unifiers of actions (subject/action/ends),
infinite ends always refer ultimately back to the being of the I who maintains and is
maintained through their pursuit. First, they are always about my good (in an
Aristotelian sense, an end is a good), insofar as these ends maintain me in my
maintaining of them. My life as such makes no sense without the pursuit of infinite
ends, so understood in the right way, these ends are “the meaning of my being.”
Furthermore, since these ends are pervasive principles rather than movements or
states, these ends implicitly refer me to my self’s past and future in every one of
their implementations, and this reference is a priori. I am riding my bike to get
groceries (IE: to be healthy), but this “being healthy, ” in a retrojection and
projection to both my past and future states of health as well as my past and future
pursuits of this infinite end, strings me out across time, almost as if I had left the
time of the finite ride and entered a timeless pursuit. In fact, the implicit
involvement with infinite ends pulls the projecting “I” back into its intrinsic

23. Infinite ends are not only “time general,” but they are also “space general”
insofar as they can exist for any subject, and any given group of subjects can share
the same infinite end. More on this in the final section. Differing infinite ends may
relativize finite ends in the following way: an architect and a hungry person both
may be “going to the grocery store,” but grocery store has a different meaning for
both (building and food source) relative to the infinite end.
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projective involvement with its being, simultaneously making it what it is and
giving it a “time of its own”: the time of its life’s utmost pursuits.
Now, we can clarify what “riding# a bike” would signify in Rödl’s sense.
Riding a bike (in empiricist’s terms) can either be read as a timeless event (not an
action) or as a process occurring in objective time or for the subjective experience of
it (not an action). Riding# a bike, in Rödl’s terms, must be read in relation to the
internally projective temporalization in the crossing between the I and the action
and the end, all bound within the eternity of an infinite pursuit. This time is not
the time of happening but the time of the progress of (a) human life. Infinite ends
carry out an “existentialization” of subjects and actions and finite ends, drawing
them into the nodal point of the I that binds them as they bind it. This nodal point
is not to be found anywhere in the world, and it is not something sensed by anyone
else or me, but rather it is something that is known within the enaction of the
action itself as I carry it out and it carries me out.24
We may seem to have strayed far from the philosophical formalization
(making explicit) of self-conscious knowledge found within any action, but we are
actually directly on target. First, the preceding elucidation of the binding of

24. The Heideggerian fleeing from death as the possibility of impossibility (an
infinite end) is no more or less ultimate than seeking to be a perfect singer or
avoiding bodily debilitation or developing better social skills. Death neither
outstrips nor founds the meaning of the being of human life, which is perhaps one
reason why Heidegger left this formulation behind after the period of Being and
Time. As well, all infinite ends pro-ject in a middle-voiced sense, since I am not
actively wanting to pursue the infinite end directly in any action and neither am I
passively caused to do what I do by an infinite end. The pursuit of infinite ends
enacts me as I enact it: enactment enacts.
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subject/action/end just is a philosophical formalization, albeit a long-winded
explanatory one, that moves thought away from its obstacles (empiricism) and
towards the thought of the intrinsic spontaneity of the subject in the projection of
goods within its life. Secondly, however, our elucidation allows us to situate the
sentential configurations such as “I ride to the grocery store” in two ways: A. in
terms of their non-subjective placement (such as in empiricist language games)
where this really means “this series of body states moves across time points in the
direction of the collection of phenomena known as the grocery store,” or B. in terms
of the subject’s self-conscious knowledge, where this really means “I ride# to the
grocery store.” In this instance, the # really serves as an abbreviation of the
discussion above that allows one to think what one already thinks, in knowing what
one does when one goes to the grocery store.
But this formalization shows something else. It shows that all action, insofar
as it directs itself and moves towards and away and plans and explains and predicts
in order to reach its proximate and ultimate goal is always already intelligently
structured like a language. In a “sense” weirdly related to (though very different
than) Derrida’s (non-)concept of arche-writing: every action is always already
written in terms of subject/action/end in their timed yet timeless projective unity:
there is no human being outside the intelligible text of human progress, and this
text is nowhere and not ever to be located in any present: it exceeds in projecting
out of and into spontaneous being, always beyond itself. This spontaneous being
has a deeper “inside” than any Cartesian interiority in its spontaneity, through the
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infinite end always referring to me, and yet, this deeper “inside” is not a
metaphysical substance or soul, travelling no farther from the surface than the
implicit or explicit articulation of the word “I” in someone doing something. For
Rödl, action is only possible for beings who use language, who reason and plan and
regret and hope in regard to their being, and so the “formalization” of action that
takes place as a reminding making-explicit merely allows the resonance of the
ordinary sentence “I am riding to the grocery store” and the action of my riding to
the grocery store to become visible in a philosophical sense (#) as a prophylactic
against distortion: words such as “intrinsic” and “infinite” should vanish in the
reaching of my hand.
They, however, do not. This is because neither philosophy nor life allow for
any essential purity, which follows from the being-beyond-itself through being itself
of the subject in pursuit of its ends: progressive perfection, by definition, never
completes, and in the gaps, obstacles, deference, missteps, etc., there are always
temptations for shortcuts and opportunities for misapprehensions: fallibility lures
us into either believing in a total perfection transcending the temporalized pursuit
of ends (metaphysics) or else into an empiricism that disavows the pursuit in favor
of (both) a fiction of discontinuous events and a return to metaphysics in their
implied non-temporal reception. Suppose, again, I am riding to the store to get
groceries. Through pursuit of my finite end, I am implicitly committed to infinite
ends. These infinite ends stretch and combine my leaving the house and my riding
and my shopping. For example, the infinite end of personal well-being may unify my
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ride as well as my shopping list, since I ride for my health and I shop for my health
when I get to the store. But I can always fail. I can go to get groceries and be
tempted to buy the frozen pizzas. But if infinite ends cease to operate, as I now
reflectively see they can (as can anyone, when they realize they are doing the wrong
thing: the very idea of a wrong thing to do implies an infinite end), then I may
despair of their being any purpose at all to doing anything, and instead of reasons
for my behavior, I may seek excuses. In her denial of the operation of a prefiguring
space of reasons, the empiricist comprehends every action, successful or failed, in
terms of an excuse, desiccating it of its active quality entirely. It seems as if I do
one thing, seeking my good, and then I do another, out of a random temptation, so I
step out of the movement of life’s purposive pursuits entirely, thereby showing there
is no final purpose to anything (unless it is contained within the mind of God).
Actually, however, in my disconsolation at failure, seeing it break the
perpetual unifying of the subject/action/end as the carrying of the I (and this should
be heard in a double-genitive sense, the ends carry the I that carry the ends), I
radically misconstrue the situation. I should be healthy, and therefore I go to the
grocery store to get healthy food. I see the pizza. I am tempted. By what? By a
random desire? How did this desire stand in the way of a propulsive carrying as
dignified as an infinite end? Was this infinite end (of being healthy) also just a
desire, one which was trumped by another desire? Is life a series of conflicting
desires? This is what the empiricist believes. In fact, however, things are just the
opposite, since desires can explain behaviors, but they cannot either justify or fail to
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justify actions. When I grabbed the pizza, I was pursuing the (possible) infinite end
of maintaining pleasure within my life (along with various others). Thus, what is at
conflict in such a misstep is neither a conflict of desires nor a conflict of desire and
infinite end but rather a conflict of possible infinite ends. If I am committed to
being healthy, then I am committed to being healthy. But I can also be committed
to maintaining pleasure within my life. These ends are not “in themselves”
incompatible (since there is no “in themselves,” infinite ends always manifest in
finite ones), but they can be incompatible within any given situation: if they show
themselves as incompatible for me, however, they both cease to operate as infinite
ends. Suppose, for instance (I know people like this, though I do not understand
them), someone loves salad more than she loves pizza. This person may have gone
to the grocery store to get seafood and broccoli, but instead, to my dismay, she
brought home a salad for dinner. She might say that she was tempted by the salad
in the same way I say that I was tempted by the pizza. Yet, in her case, there was
no conflict because there was a unity of infinite ends. She still rode to the store to
get groceries to be healthy, and she managed to concurrently fulfill her end of
having a pleasurable life, though not mine.
So, who is right? Her or me? Is it okay to be inconsistent? How often? Is
this a question of quantity? And even if it is, what determines when permissive
excesses must cease? Can I, for instance, imagine a life where I am always
inconsistent, choosing one situation that contradicts another, setting infinite ends
against one another? Why not?
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According to Rödl,
. . . an infinite end contains a reference to a unity of infinite ends, That
an action cannot manifest one’s being X and yet manifest one’s failure
to be Y, if X and Y are infinite ends, defines a sense in which X and Y
are one thing, a thing that may be described as X and as Y and is
manifested in actions that manifest X as well as in actions that
manifest Y. We shall call such a thing a practical life-form in view of a
logical analogy. Statements that describe an animal life-form form a
system the principle of which is the life-form they describe; judgments
that describe an animal as exemplifying a form of behavior
characteristic of its life-form presuppose a grasp of this life-form as a
unity of forms of behavior. On the current account, infinite ends form a
system in this way: thoughts that represent an action as exemplifying
an infinite end presuppose a grasp of a unity of infinite ends because
an action manifests an infinite end if and only if it manifests the
practical life-form that includes this end. (SC, 43)
Just as a plant cannot be a plant without coordinated processes of growth,
nutrition, and reproduction, a subject cannot be a subject without the projection of a
unity of infinite ends. To understand this, although once again we seem to have
strayed and yet have not, we need to return to the formalization of action in
subject/action/end. As we have shown, everything in this original formulation is
already doubled, so that it could actually be formulated in the following way:
subject/action/end—subject*/action*/end*, where the first trio represents the finite
situation of action engagement and the second set represents the implicit
engagement with the infinite.25 The first formulation does not merely represent,
however, a single end and action: every action and end encompass sub-actions and
sub-ends, along with the divergences and recoveries that happen in the
maintenance of their pursuit. Every action and the nodal points along its way

25. I am using the “*” here differently from Rödl’s use of it in his text.
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correspond to the questions that could be posed regarding its specific articulation.
Why did you swerve? To continue riding to the store. Why did you turn left?
Because it was the fastest way. Every subject/action/end implies a space of reasons
through which it can be reasonably explained. This space of reasons is the horizon
of the finite pursuit. The end and the action of the I both bind and allow to
manifest as such this space of reasons: this “space” is not an independent thing—it
has no being apart from the finite pursuit.
The second formulation gives a representation of the deeper meaning of the
action in its coordination within an infinite pursuit. But it does something else as
well. It gives the representation of the subject not in terms of its life here and now,
but rather in terms of its life in general, in terms of what is valuable for it to be#
what it is#. But this subject*, in being exposed in the generality of its existence, is
thereby also exposed to the existence# of its existence, its having been and coming
to be a subject: its being# what it is. This being#, its practical life-form, involves its
having carried on pursuits of its good and its capacity to continue carrying on
pursuits of its good. But what bears the expansiveness of this good for the subject is
a unifying host of infinite goods to which it is intrinsically committed. Just as the
finite action commits one to a space of reasons that fund its articulation (both
practical and verbal), the infinite within finite action commits the subject to its own
good, which folds outward onto a plurality of goods that must be equiprimordially
maintained. Since these goods are good for me, intrinsically referred to me
(implicitly) through my finite pursuits, they must be unified and coordinated within
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this reference, as I am implicitly committed, from out of my being, to unify and
coordinate them. This reference to and from the “deep” general subject and the
infinite goods that maintain it in a coordinated, unified sense is# nothing other than
the practical life form of the human person, a lifeform every bit as integral and nonrelative and non-fragmentary as the lifeform of a plant.
It may seem, at this point, that Rödl’s idealist articulation of the subject in
pursuit of its ends finalizes itself in a transcendental moralism: that he (or I or
someone) could articulate the necessary and sufficient set of infinite ends and their
appropriate unity that would allow any subject whatsoever to “be all she can be.”
After all, with a plant or an animal lifeform, one could articulate ideal sets of
conditions under which these organisms could optimally thrive, as well as articulate
the characteristic dangers that threaten this thriving. This, however, is not true for
the “practical life-form.” Because infinite ends are not first and foremost referred
back to a set of organisms living in the wild but rather to me, as I exist#, there
could never be an ultimate determination of the ultimate, since this arises and is
maintained only through the perpetuation of action as enaction (the subject’s
projecting itself through its ends). On the one hand, I am committed to the unity of
infinite ends within each finite act, and if that finite act falls beyond this unity,
setting end against end, I find myself a priori convicted, the ultimacy of my ends
falling apart, as I await a possible realization, perpetually subject to question,
always having my shadow cast in the light of perfectibility. On the other, however,
since action enactively refers to my pursuits, these pursuits are always already
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being orchestrated from a subjective “inside” that precludes objective knowledge of
what the good is, for me or anyone.
Suppose, for the last time, that I am riding to the store to get healthy
groceries. This may seem to be for my good all around, such that it could be
mandated for any subject in a similar situation. Suppose also, however, that I am
doing this not only for my good but also doing it because it is mandated: it may be
forced upon me by law or even by a health-zealot keeping me at gunpoint. In this
case, I seem to be pursuing my good in both finite and infinite senses, and I seem to
be maintaining and maintained, but simultaneously, the pursuit of my infinite end
of health is being dirempted from me. In this case, it is no longer an infinite end
but rather just an order I must follow, since both it and I have broken down in the
face of a gun.
The infinite end of enaction itself, the maintaining of the intrinsic character
of the reference to and from an I, shows itself both as that for which the infinite
ends are for (the ground of their unity) and as itself an infinite end. I stand before
the pizza and I tell myself that I know that it is unhealthy, but I also know that I
will not make my life into a militarized zone of healthiness, since biological life is
not the whole of human life. Because I must balance the good of my human body
with the good of my human autonomy, necessary for the preservation of my being as
a practical life-form, I am often in the position of not quite knowing what to do. I
may engage the various spaces of reasons, and I may seek the guidance of others in
terms of their assessment of these spaces, since as a human among humans, I share
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ends with them. Ultimately, however, I must do what I must do, there can be no
rational calculus for the maintenance (and improving) of autonomy, beyond a leap
into the subject’s freedom, a leap for which it is (also) a priori responsible to justify,
to itself and others. As the subject finds itself outside itself in the
subject/action/end—subject*/action*/end*, at that very moment, in the coalescing of
its unity in being what it is as it refers to (and knows) itself, this subject is thrown
back into itself in its commitment to freedom, including the freedom to pursue other
ends or balance the ones it has otherwise, for the unifying maintenance of this very
commitment. Notice, however, that within this intrinsic undecidability at the heart
of self-perfecting life, I am still always already referring to myself through the
question of the good, sustained, sustaining. Sometimes, the self-knowledge in selfreference through being# what one is# amounts to the knowledge of selfuncertainty.
D. Theoretical Self-Consciousness
Judgment (the activity of theoretical knowing), while intellectual and not
practical, is still very similar to action, sharing the same basic tripartite structure
as practical knowledge. Thus, as one might expect, for Rödl, judgment bears the
subject as the subject bears it in a likewise hermeneutically encircling fashion. The
subject/judgment, however, culminates not in something that is done but rather in
something that is believed: an object. The end of any judgment is an object of
knowledge, and, therefore, our basic structure is subject/judgment/object, as in “I
/believe/ that Woogie is in the next room” (or “I /think /that Swedgin (my kitty) is
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hungry” or “I /know /that it is raining outside”). In the last section, I indicated the
temporalized nature of the “verb#” in the indissociable tripartite structure, because
even though we very readily associate action with time, this time is usually not
clarified regarding its enactive occurrence. In this section, however, for the
subject/judgment/object, this making-explicit becomes much more important.
Because of our metaphysical and empiricist inclinations, when we reflect on
judgment, we do not usually represent judgments as situated in time at all. This
de-temporalization of judgment happens largely because we so readily dissociate
our intellectual lives from our practical lives, due to many complicated series of
diremptions that have long and studied histories.
Unlike in the previous section, where I started with “elements” of action,
building up to a synthesizing encompassment, modulating the implicit Aristotelian,
Kantian, and Hegelian moments within Rödl’s thought along the way, here I will
forgo drama and begin at the end, considering the final circle of judgment first and
then elucidating its modalities, often with contrastive reference to those of practical
knowledge. Rödl explains matters in the following manner:
When I determine what to believe in this manner, I represent my
believing it as an act of a power to gain knowledge by means of the
senses, a power of receptive knowledge. Such a power is an infinite
ground: it is a ground of beliefs that manifest their subject’s possession
of this power. . .. A power knowledge not only is the source of its acts;
it is the source of the unity of its acts. This unity characterizes the
form of generality of the power. We found that doing something cannot
manifest one infinite end and frustrate another. Acts of infinite ends as
such exhibit a unity, which we called “practical life-form.” In the same
way, it is impossible that a power of knowledge manifests itself in
believing something and yet also manifests itself in believing the
contrary. One cannot perceive that p is the case and yet have perceived
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that it is not the case that p. A power of knowledge confers a necessary
unity upon its acts. . . .There is neither need nor room for a calculation
that unifies acts of a power of knowledge. The unity of all answers to
the question what to believe of this form is contained in the form of
each answer. Hence, the unity is necessary and necessarily
represented. (SC, 82-83)
To explain this, let us begin with the doubled structure paralleling the double
structure of practical self-knowledge: subject/judgment/object—
subject*/judgment*/object*. When I make a theoretical knowledge claim
(henceforth, just “knowledge claim” or simply “claim”—they are the same thing), I
judge that an object (whether simple or a configuration of objects—they are likewise
functionally the same) exists. I say “Woogie is on the mat,” implying “I judge
(believe, know, think—once again they are functionally identical) that Woogie is on
the mat.” Woogie’s being on the mat, that which I claim, is a state of affairs in the
world. I, as a finite subject, being here where I am, claim that things stand thus
and so—therefore, that a certain object exists (and that my judgment is true—there
is no judgment that is not a priori held as true).
As a subject, I exist# only through thinking# that things exist and that I can
know# them. Even when we discussed the exemplary action “I’m riding to the
grocery store” in the last section, this presupposed already a host of implicit beliefs,
including: “There is a grocery store to ride to.” A subject as such cannot continue to
be# what it is# without reasoning-acting# for its maintenance, but simultaneously,
this reasoning-acting# always already references beliefs (and the activity of
judging# they presuppose) that populate the space of reasons within which any
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possible action occurs.26 So, likewise, a subject cannot be# what it is# without
judging# within its active pursuits. In practical knowledge, of myself in my action, I
am referred to myself through my finite actions and finite ends, insofar as they are
for me in relation to my infinite ends. But our question here is: how does
theoretical knowledge refer me to myself in a similar manner? Does it only do so
through a parasitism in providing content for the pursuits of ends? Are human
beings fundamentally practical creatures, such that their knowing is only an
epiphenomenon of their doing? Other than its practical advantages, what is the
role of knowledge in human life? Can a human being be#, at least for a time,
merely contemplative and curious concerning the world? Should the “merely” have
been included in the last sentence, or was it, to the contrary, pejoratively necessary?
In the preceding sections, I have carried out an ongoing critique of the
empiricist drive to make receptivity the foundation of the human relation to the self
and world. This may seem to imply that I/Rödl dismiss receptive knowledge
entirely in virtue of the affirmation of the subject’s spontaneous practical relation to
this self and world. Nothing could be further than the case. The human being, just
like any other form of animal life, senses its environment, and it is, thus, passively
affected by what lies outside it.27 Unlike animal sensation, however, human
26. In fact, I acquire beliefs in the pursuit of ends, and the beliefs I acquire
lead to the revision of old ends and the formulation of new ones, which then require
the acquisition of further beliefs, and so on.
27. Even though this “passive affection” happens through highly evolved
pattern-recognitional capacities that structure both sensory physiology and the
neural processing of the received input: in relation to spontaneity, it is still passive.
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sensation is taken up into a space of reason/reasoning, insofar as human beings can
ask for and give reasons for what they claim on the basis of sensation. All sensation
and the responses given to this sensation, whether by animals or humans, are
“intelligent” to a degree, in relation to the sophistication of the structuring
manipulation of these inputs and outputs. But only human beings have sensation
that is a priori conceptually structured, which means that its data are a priori
taken up within the sway of a power to give grounding (linguistic) reasons for why
these data appear the way they do, which is to say that they are a priori taken up
within what Rödl calls “a power of receptive knowledge.” The working of this power
is a function of both our representational apparatus (sensation, memory, associative
ability, etc.) and our capacity to use language: the hallmark of our human
intelligence.
I say, “Woogie is on the mat.” This is a judgment. I make this judgment
because I see Woogie there. Merely stating that I see Woogie there already finds me
appealing to my “power of receptive knowledge,” since I am giving a reason
grounded through the power of perception for believing what I have claimed.
Someone might ask, “How do you know Woogie is there? Are not you now typing
and have looked away? Might not Woogie have left the mat?” To counter, I might
respond, “Because I hear Woogie snoring there.” Here I give further reasons for
what I believe, while I simultaneously expand my judgmental space into the

A paint by numbers canvas may determine where paint goes, but it still awaits its
input of paint.
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auditory realm (through inferentially associating information from remembered
sight with current information from hearing). Just as my riding to the store
encompassed a manifold of “whys” (Why did you take your bike? Why did you
swerve? Why did you get broccoli instead of pizza?), the simplest knowledge claim
enfolds an entire network of reasons for belief that no animal, save a linguistic one,
could master, with various perceptual inputs inferentially coordinated through her
language. My “seeing Woogie sitting on the mat” is not just a static perception of
Woogie sitting on the mat, but it is also the thinking within this space of reasons,
with the concomitant witnessing of this power of knowledge itself in the act.
Within any judgment, there is an appeal to this power of knowledge, with the
indefinite capacity it gives me to justify (and seek and criticize) further and
onwards. So just as subject/action/end extends into subject*/action*/end* via the
passage through infinite ends, subject/judgment/object extends into
subject*/judgment*/object* via the passage through (the power of knowledge in its
capacity to supply) infinite grounds. Here is how this works: I, as subject, usually
through having been asked by another or having asked myself,28 make a claim.29 I
say, “Boo-Boo (my Goldendoodle) needs a bath.” I judge X. But also, I judge# X,
insofar as I spontaneously articulate, while looking, seeing, thinking, verbalizing,

28. Thus, already within a space of reasons, although I would have already
been within this space if I just made the claim out of the blue, as we say (and why?),
“for some reason.”
29. I will here only consider concrete claims, although general claims have the
same logic.
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and planning regarding the X that I judge#. This judging# stretches out already
within its articulation, a priori referring to me as the one judging#, responsible for
judging#, with this “me” likewise extending through its assessments#. Saying that
Boo-Boo needs a bath implies a “Why? Because (already a reason) she is dirty,” but I
am also reasoning within a space that involves me checking her coat and skin (How
do you know she needs a bath? Is it a real need?), remembering what I have learned
about dogs (is it proper to bathe her now?), and making inferences involving
appropriateness, etc., reasoning through, in media res. This reasoning refers to me
as it sustains me as a reasoning being who is in the process of determining the
facts: I am maintained and maintaining in questioning#/responding#. According to
Rödl,
Belief, or theoretical thought, is a reality that includes its subject’s
knowledge of it, which knowledge therefore is unmediated first-person
knowledge. For, beliefs essentially figure in belief explanations, and it
defines this form of explanation that, if a belief can be explained in this
way, its subject is in a position thus to explain it. Her knowledge that
and why she believes what she does, which she expresses in giving the
explanation, is not a separate existence from what it represents. It
includes and is included in the reality of which it is knowledge. (SC,
101)
This belief# gets to be put forward as knowing#, as well as being further
referred back to my “deep I,” (my being# in general, as opposed to my being in this
specific act of judgment, even though my “being# in general” only takes place in the
concrete act) through my appeal to my powers of knowledge (unified as “the power
of knowledge), including my memory, my differing senses, my ability to form models
of situations, etc., as they are taken up within inferential activity. It is only
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through this power that I am# what I am#, and I reinforce it as it reinforces me in
the activity of cognition.
Just as infinite ends are time general, infinite grounds are time general,
though in a different manner. Infinite ends are always already good, but they
might not be good until a specific determined time. Eating for my health, as an
infinite end, destroys itself along with me when it is carried out while I am sitting
on the interstate. Infinite grounds, however, are time general in a more literal way,
since the knowledge they produce is supposed to be always true. Rödl claims, “If it
is right to do something, there may be a time when it is right to do it; what is right
to do now may be wrong to do later, one may fail to act well by acting too late or too
early. By contrast, there is no such thing as a time when it is right to believe that
such-and-such is the case; there is no such thing as a time when something is true”
(SC, 79). If I know “Woogie is sitting on the mat,” not indexed to “now” but rather
to a specific time—Woogie is sitting on the mat at 10:46am on Sunday, June 16,
2019—then this claim, if it is true, should be true for all time, it should have been
true for the future from the vantage of the pharaohs and it should be true for the
past from the vantage of our future robot overlords. I project the possibility of
grounding this claim towards any time whatsoever.
To judge that something is true (which already happens when I believe
anything at all) means two things. First, it means that along with this claim, I
project an infinity of perceptually funded reasons that are inferentially linked that
will establish this claim (infinite grounds). I commit myself to going on and on, if
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called to, in the grounding of what I have said. Insofar as the claim is directly
grounded through an appeal to the power of knowledge (“I see Woogie on the mat”),
I may find it unreasonable if someone keeps asking, like the skeptic does: “But how
do you really know this?” “Because I see him there” might be my final answer, and
I will give this final answer because, in appealing to sensation as a ground, I am a
priori committed to endorse its ability to provide adequate reasons for belief.
However, this does not mean no one may question my statement. Suppose, for
instance, I am informed that Woogie was in fact replaced by a similar Corgi earlier
in the day, as a joke by a friend. I laughed at the skepticism regarding my claim,
but it turned out that I was the one who was wrong. My error, however, does not
validate the general doubt of the skeptic: rather it opens onto the propagation of a
specific chain of doubts that would re-invoke the movement of the grounding of the
claim. These would not be overarching doubts about my senses (although I may
caution myself to be more vigilant next time) but rather doubts about whether I can
trust my friends, in this case. The possibility of such invocation of uncertainty can
never in principle be ruled out, even as it also can never be taken as a ground for
doubt in and of itself. This portends that the simplest knowledge claim protends its
tendrils into the future, along with me and my responsibility, through a potential
reactivation of grounding: I temporalize even in the simplest timeless statement.
Second, however, claiming that something is true, in a manner parallel to the
unity of infinite ends in practical action, invokes and commits me to a unity of
infinite grounds, as the truth of the true. The truth of the true is nothing other
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than the being# of the world: the objectivity of the object* unifying and unified
through the subject’s* judgment*, as it stands revealed within the claim of reason.
I say, “Woogie is on the mat.” This implies I judge# the object “Woogie on the mat”
to be# the case. I* make this claim by virtue of my power of receptive knowledge (as
the claim refers to my intrinsic capacity as a subject.) The judgment# happens in a
space of reasons/reasoning whereby I can give grounds for what I claim, both direct
and indirect, extending as the situation of doubt or need requires. The judgment is
not only about the finite object: “Woogie on the mat.” It is also about something in
general: an object* in the world. My power of knowledge as a subject* allows me to
know objects* in the world. But the phrase “in the world” also implies a totality of
objects, in Wittgenstein’s sense from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “The world
is the totality of facts.” The most important part about the phrase “totality of facts”
is not the “facts” but rather the “totality,” insofar as this totality requires the
projection of a unity. If Woogie is on the mat, then Woogie is also two miles from a
specific location in Baton Rouge, a certain distance from Paris, lighter than
Jupiter’s moon Europa, etc. and all these facts must be the case if Woogie is where I
say he is. As I give grounds for how I know where Woogie is, even in making the
initial claim, I unify myself as a subject through appeal to my power of knowledge
(my knowing always already knowing*#). Through so doing, I implicitly establish a
relation to Woogie and the rest of the universe, a projected unity of truths in
relation that all must hold if any of them do
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From the vantage of the empiricist, this will seem either a naïve subjectivism
or else a naïve objectivism, depending on whether this empiricist is type 1 or 2. The
type 1 empiricist is committed to the immediacy not only of self but also the object
as datum of the senses. For her, when I know the world, I do so immediately, not
through being a priori referred to it as it is referred to me in projective movements
of unification. For her, I know the world through immediately being presented with
“what I see,” the impression wearing its truth on its sleeve in the power of its
presentation. As argued earlier, this “seeing” would have to be timeless, with the
establishment of reality passing through an unavowable eternity (the type 1
empiricist wears her mask over a metaphysician’s face). According to her standard
of truth, the grounding of the true in projective unities of self and world amounts to
deferring truth into oblivion, with its final decision resting on a subjective whim.
For the type 2 empiricist, “truth” becomes a function of narrative utility or
coherence or affective resonance or whatever allows the seeker to live with herself
in endeavors of inquiry. Rödl’s talk of “powers of knowledge” and “projective
unities” would seem to her to be fantasies of objectivity where there can be none,
since these projections seem functionally indistinguishable from good stories with
self-congratulatory titles. Both empiricists, as such, however, never think from the
vantage of knowledge#. Since they do not think the enactive projection of the true
in the self-enactment of the subject as immediate self-consciousness in knowledge#,
which is also the embeddedness of reception in reasoning, they can only determine
the idealist’s account as another receptive representative of the way things are.
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The idealist, however, is not giving any account whatsoever, but rather she makes
explicit that which is implied within the subject/judgment/object form from the
vantage of its inner operation. Both empiricists implicitly mechanize knowledge on
the model of the imprint or the digital depiction, rather than (though living in
thinking) thinking# knowledge# as a function of our intellectual form of life.
In the course of her reasoning, the idealist will construct coherences and
respond to need in a quite utilitarian/pragmatic fashion, given that the very
temporality of her activity and spontaneous situation means that she does not unify
everything at once or respond to every objection before it is made. This might seem
to make the truth of her claims a function of these situational contingencies, but
this gets things entirely backwards. For her, the declaration of truth amounts to a
commitment, the promise of a projective enactment, a debt that will be continually
collected with interest. Truth based on receptive knowledge (nested within
inferential projection) can, by definition, only be “provisional,” though since such
provisionality has no opposite save in incoherent fantasy: this label “provisional”
could only function to appease those who dream of an inhuman knowledge. Any
claim to truth is fallible, as a function of its very temporal positing in the
judgment#, and it could not be otherwise, and yet, in the invocation of fallibility, a
space of better and worse reasons for believing is cooperatively invoked, as the
human mind returns to itself, in the referential endorsement of its own power.
Since within its judgment, the subject effectively affirms its power, as adequate, in
an affirmation that is a function of existence#, not a form of faith or self-belief, the
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question of fallibility explicitly arises in a diminishing number of instances. The
aura of fallibility, however, perpetually obtrudes in the timely finitude of human
cognition, which is why human beings go on talking and reasoning about things
they already know.
It may also seem as if the Rödlian idealist is committed to some form of
scientism: that the only statements that are true describe states of affairs in the
objective, nonhuman world towards which the interests of the natural sciences are
directed. This suspicion might appear plausible, for example, given my continuing
example of “Woogie on the mat,” which, after all, depicts an instance of Canis lupus
familiaris on Gossypium hirsutum, where the humanized terms “Woogie” and “mat”
can be directly associated with their natural origins. This would be a very odd
outcome, given that the unifying hermeneutic movement of the
subject*/judgment*/object* directly situates the object* within its spontaneous
positing as true in the perpetuation of the subject’s rational life, but it also seems
like a possible outcome, given that the object* is the non-spontaneous opposite of
the subject, unlike ends, in the case of practical knowledge, which exhibit a weird
drawing power out of their projection.
Again, however, something quite the contrary holds. Because the object, in
its projective truth, gets to be projected only within the enactment of reasoning in
the intellectual interest of the subject, this object manifests as a “whatever the
subject might make a claim about and give reasons for this claim.” For instance,
above I considered the reasoning chain “Boo-boo needs a bath: Why? Because she
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is dirty.” I do not know any scientific way of determining when an animal or person
is dirty, but I do know that “I know it when I see it,” and I could reason with myself
and others in the determination of what counts as dirty and what does not. It does
not matter if a consensus is reached: what matter is that the claim implicates me in
projecting its grounding. And the commitment to grounding also implicates me in
the establishment of better and worse reasons for the establishment of the claim. In
making an aesthetic claim, I am obligated to believe that someone could be right or
wrong concerning human aesthetic assessments, just as much as she could be right
or wrong about the existence of a material object in the world.
For instance, similarly to when giving grounds fails in the “natural” case (I
say Woogie is on the mat when he is not, and thus the claim is false), if someone
were to maintain that Wallace Steven’s “Emperor of Ice Cream” expresses an
astrological prediction, this statement would be equally, even more preposterously,
false. I would be as committed to this assessment of falsehood as I am to a direct
perceptual claim, as would anyone who has read this poem seriously. “Someone
feels blue,” “the water has a transcendent effervescence,” “this horizon shimmers
like a star,” and an indefinite number of other objects belong to the ontology of the
object* in the tripartite projection. What separates science from art is not the
implicit projection to truth in claims made on its behalf but rather the route of
reasoning in its technical-methodological configuration (scientific method versus
humanistic deliberation, for instance), as well as the difficulty of mounting
challenges when these configurations are deployed. Insofar as any enaction of the
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power of receptive knowledge is always already conceptually structured within the
reasoning of the subject, there can be no “basic appeal” to brute sensation, as if
there were any such thing for human subjects, to give us the elementary reality of
the physical world. Anything that one can give reasons for claiming, whether of the
nonhuman or the human sphere, is elemental. Like other animals, we have
immediate sensory access to our surroundings, but unlike all other creatures, except
those sapient robots or aliens we one day might meet, our sensation is also
immediately related back to subjective-rational projection, as a function of
immediate self-knowledge, and so is therefore always already “de-naturalized,”
whether its object is a sun or a sonnet.
This de-naturalization, along with the expansion of the natural in the pursuit
of scientific knowledge, gives an answer to the question of the supposed priority of
the practical over the theoretical: there is none. Because the directing of
knowledge# towards the objects refers back to the life of the subject, the mere act of
inquiring into the world and seeking knowledge for its own sake never takes place
just as “the neutral acquisition of information.” All pursuits of knowledge# expand
the space of reasons within which the subject finds itself imbricated and out of
which it creates itself, along with new reasons for being, anew. If this “expanding of
the space of reasons” is an action and an instance of practical knowledge, then
practical knowledge is the more elementary form of being in the world, but this is
just sophistry, since the particular activity of intellection, disavowed in our modern
era with an almost religious-ascetic fervor, represents a peculiar form of end-in-
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itself as an infinite end: it singularly folds reason back onto itself within an intrinsic
self-perfecting, practically withdrawing into an interior time beyond the world of
deeds, contemplating what can be known before any response is required. Without
the world of deeds, the subject ends in having no ends, so the idealist, as committed
to the unity of infinite ends, could not rationally support a Schopenhauerian
withering of the body for the benefit of the spirt, but neither could she support
something like the priority of “the lived body,” formulated in opposition to a
Cartesian ghost no one believes in anyway, at the expense of the maintenance of the
contemplative life.
E. Materialism and Intersubjectivity
From the conclusion of the preceding section, it may now appear as if our
dialectical pendulum has swung too far away from the material world for us to
recover it: Rödl’s thought, as promised, is a true idealism, and as such, the interplay
between the “human mind” (as the spontaneous “I”: subject/subject*) and its
representation (object/object*) undergirds any receptive relation to a material
world, existing beyond possible knowledge. This undergirding yields the
consequence that any subjective/human construction enjoys the same possibility of
truth as any natural object washed upon the cosmic shores, and this outcome
appears to imply that even physical states of affairs are merely human
representations, of and for the subject in its circling projection. Thereby, if this
were the case, any notion of a real material world would flee before the subject’s
freeing power. In its temporalization, the subject encounters those things that arise
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in the course of its actions and its knowing, and within this knowing, it gives an
account of those beings that impinge upon it from “the outside” by virtue of its
power of receptive knowledge.
Those things and that “outside,” however, appear as always already
conceptually ordered towards the being of a subject that seems little more than a
nodal floating point within the articulative happening of reason. No one could
mistake this subject for a ghostly sphere surveying phantasmal contents upon an
inner theater screen of being’s presentation (as either a sort of Cartesian or
Berkeleyan idealist), but this spontaneous subject seems, somehow, to inherit the
unreality of these passive, metaphysical subjects and the contents they behold.30
Likewise, this unreality seems to spread virally from this nodal projector to the
ends and objects it projects: the world gets pulled into the Charybdis of the subject’s
spiral of self-consciousness, its reality drained into the central void. And yet, within
these meditations on Rödl’s idealism, I have implicitly carried reference to a
materialism pervading and even binding his thought. Naturally, this is neither a
rationalist materialism, where the subject somehow deduces a material reality
behind the veil of the intellect, nor is it an empiricist materialism, where strong
senses communicate with an outside through the force of its thrusts or weak senses

30. Rödl explicitly notes this objection, and he considers his explication of
materialism as a response to it: “First person knowledge is spontaneous; it is not an
independent reality of its object and therefore does not spring from sensory
affection. It is tempting to conclude that the object of first-person knowledge can be
nothing other than thinking, and in particular that it cannot be a material reality,
as a material reality can only be known empirically.”
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construct an outside from the regular irruptions of their data. But if Rödl, as a
philosophically reflective subject, neither deduces nor receives nor constructs this
implicit materialism, then exactly what form does his access to it take?
We normally associate “the material being” with its reality: it is not a merely
an idea but rather something substantial. What, however, constitutes the
“realness” of this reality—the substantiality of this substance? Formally, we could
say that this real substance has the capacity to make true statements about it true:
“There is a chair” is true if and only if there is a chair that makes (and thereby has
the capacity to make) it true. This, however, requires “capacity” and “make” to do
all the unexplained work. But starting from this provisional point, we can
understand that the reality of the material must somehow resonate with its causal
power: we can identify the materiality of the real with its capacity to cause truth in
the formal sense and with its capacity to manifest causal force, in the pragmatic
sense, whereby material things causally affect and effect other material things. In
Rödl’s thought, we have had the occasion to explicate two sorts of power: the
subject’s power to act in projecting towards its ends within actions (doing#) and the
subject’s power to know through receptively claiming truth in the activity of
justification (knowing#). Although neither of these two “powers,” on the face of it,
closely resemble the brute power we usually associate with materiality, they
provide our most proximal means of access to the truth of material power.
Rödl explains his materialism through situating it in relation to that of Marx
in his “Theses on Feuerbach.” In the “Theses,” Marx maintains,
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The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach
included), is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in
the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous-human
activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, the active side was
developed abstractly in opposition to materialism by idealism—which
of course does not know real, sensuous activity as such. [Translation
Rödl’s: (SC, 122))
Rödl immediately paraphrases Marx’s text in terms of his own project:
All hitherto existing materialism is flawed by its empiricism: it
conceives of material reality exclusively as an object of intuition, or as
to be known receptively. Idealism shares this flaw, wherefore it
develops spontaneity (“die taetige Seite” [“the active side”]) in contrast
to the material. According to Marx, true materialism reveals
spontaneity and its knowledge to be of, and thus to be, a material
reality. Our account of self-consciousness aspires to being materialist
in this way.
This implies two significant things. First, Rödl determines the spontaneous
powers of the subject to act and know as species of “sensuous-human activity” or
“practice,” in Marx’s terms. Second, Rödl reads Marx as a sort of idealist through
placing him on the other side of the empiricist/idealist dialectic. Rödl here commits
himself to the thesis that Marx confuses the problems of empiricism (only knowing
“the form of the object” in contemplation) with the problems of idealism, while
replicating the position of the Kantian idealist: either Kant was already Marxist, or
Marx is still Kantian. This will be impossible to see unless one thinks idealism
from the “inside” of the enactive subject, instead of depriving it of spontaneity
through understanding the “production” of its object merely in terms of third person
representation. For the Rödlian idealist, the experienced world happens for the
subject as a function of its active involvement with it, rather than through a scission
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between subject and predicate in the shift from articulation into receptive
apprehension.
If the “power” of the subject functions within and as “sensuous human
activity” or “practice,” then how does this provide a true materialism for Rödl? The
first thing to note here is that for Rödl (as for Kant and even Marx, with the
appropriate provisos), the fundamental relation to the material world must be one
of rational commitment to its existence (not custom or habit in the Humean
sense).31 The subject’s knowledge of it is “communicated” via an existential
engagement that includes its acknowledgement. This means that I need neither
“pick out” a specific item as material—“The rock that hit me sure was material!”—
nor associate a phenomenal presentation with a material substratum—"The
shimmering blue means that my perception was caused by the material H2O”—but
rather (pre-)understands whatever gets to be presented in terms of a nexus of
material relatedness. The subject implicitly projects this nexus as undergirding
and providing the connective tissue of the causal power of materiality as it

31. When, for instance, I serve a ball in tennis, I am committed to the
possibility of the ball either being in or out. This commitment is implicit in the
“being” of the serve: there is no serve without it: serving within the sway of this
commitment does not require any additional belief to make it so. I, for instance,
cannot serve the ball and then claim that I did not intend the ball to be either out or
in (perhaps because I was trying to hit a roach on the court, for instance), since in
that case, a priori, it would not have been a serve, even if it went in and point was
scored by a referee. I would be obligated to self-report and invalidate the point, just
as much as if the referee had given me a point for doing nothing. When I speak of
commitments here, I understand them in this “existential” manner, rather than on
the model of the agreed upon contract or the followed rule (these presuppose
“existential commitments”: they are formalizations of ordered activity, not its
cause).
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propagates across time. According to Rödl, “‘I’-thoughts represent a material
substance only if they include the application of a material substance concept and,
therefore, of criteria of identity. And so they do. The criteria are not applied in
identity judgments.” In terms of our tripartite formalizations of the
subject/action/end or subject/judgment/object, within their circling references, a
material substance concept (an ordering via commitment to material substance)
must implicitly operate, if there is to be any relation to materiality at all. After all,
the only entities that get represented within these tripartite forms are particular
ends and particular objects of knowledge, so if the subject did not pre-apply a
“material substance concept,” then it would only encounter an incoherent
nominalism of disconnected particulars (the actual plight of empiricism). Rödl’s
approach to the problem of idealism is fundamentally Kantian, insofar as he holds
materialism to be only understandable as such in terms of idealism.
One principal site of the application of the committal material substance
concept happens within the recursion of action/action# during practical knowledge#.
According to Rödl,
Thinking first person thoughts representing movement, “I am doing
A”, I apply a material substance concept to myself. In the fundamental
case—the one without which there would be no first person thought of
a moving substance—I know from spontaneity that and why I am
doing something. We have uncovered the source of this nonempirical
knowledge of movement: the unity of action explanation and practical
reasoning. (SC, 130-131)
“I am walking Woogie and Boo-boo.” I am doing this in order to get exercise
and to allow them to relieve themselves: for health*, to take care of my

93

companions*, etc. I project myself in this walking: I am also “getting walked” while
walking the dogs and not just because they are pulling me along, out of their nonrational animal spontaneity: “I” am extended in the reasoning-through of walking
as I negotiate corners and rein in the dogs and perform many other sub-actions. In
so doing, I project myself (spontaneously think myself) toward my ends within my
action, as this action calls me forward in perpetual enaction. Once again, my
“spontaneous thinking myself” does not need to involve a separate cognitive
production of an explicit thought, such as “Gee, I want to continue walking the dogs
now,” although it may. The “thinking” happens within the self-conscious recursion
implicit within the rational activity. But insofar as this “projection” in thinkingwalking “takes place,” articulating me along the way, this implies that I am a
material substance changing across space and time, in relation to other things such
as the sidewalk, where these things stay stable as I walk. Without both the
materialization of the “I” in relation to the moving-through-acting body and the
horizonal background, as it remains relatively stable,32 there would be no walking,
no more than there would be a serve in tennis if the ball vanished mid-swing. The
“I,” in its being extended out and articulated in actions and sub-actions finds itself
always already rationally reticulated within a host of material identities and
divergences. Moving/stable substance, as that which becomes orchestrated and re-

32. Some things may change, but most do not in relation to my walking: the
houses do not appear and reappear, and the sky does not trade places with the
water. If they did, I would no longer be walking. I would not know what was
happening, but even in this incomprehension, I would still be referring to the
possibility of stable materialization in its apparent loss.
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directed and consumed and repelled within the projective fulfillment of ends, finite
and infinite, counts as the “primary matter” of being, the material cause
accompanying reasoning-through that separates the subject forever from the world
of ghosts.
The metaphysician or empiricist, through intellectual or sensible intuition
divorced from reasoning-through, attempts to represent this material ground as if it
were a specific object rather than the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever,
attempting to know it as a finite thing, which also implies that it might not be
known, creating the perpetual possibility of skepticism. But when I know this
material substance as the basis for all action, however, I know it immediately, as
spontaneously as I know myself. Hence, Rödl explains,
It turns out that thereby we have explained how I represent a material
substance otherwise than through a receptive relationship with it. I
have spontaneous knowledge of the kind of substance I am, the kind of
substance that the concept designates that is contained in my firstperson thoughts that represent my intentional actions. I know that I
fall under this concept not by perceiving a substance that falls under
it, but by being a substance that falls under it, or, shorter, by falling
under it. (SC, 131)
In this sense, I am# of my world as it is# of me, arising for me, projected back before
me and projected forward after me, as a function of my acting-reasoning through.
In a similar manner, in the pursuit of theoretical knowledge, within and as the
power of receptivity, implicit within its grounding occurrence, I perpetually appeal
to “material grounds” as the ongoing solution to the problem of my “Why’s.” The
projected unity of the true in the truth of the world is nothing other than the
implicit commitment to the materiality of the material. The very “receptivity” with
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the power of receptive knowledge already places an immanent (material) sensation
in relation to an immanent (material) object that it progressively knows through
coordinated acts of interrogation. Since this interrogation co-occurs with the
problem solving involved in practical knowledge, as the knowing “what” will
complete or hinder intentional pursuits, and since the movement of interrogation,
as extended activity, always involves itself in the end of grounding, their
commitments to the materiality of the real interlace and reinforce one another,
before any philosophical question can be asked about the “basis” of being. The goals
of getting the hammer to build the house or avoiding the pathogen to preserve my
health bind me both to the materiality of those specific objects, as well as that of the
nexus that founds them.
For the Rödlian idealist, the subject “produces” the world (to address the
cosmological question posed in the first section) just insofar as her world arises for
her only on the horizon of acting and knowing. Since this acting and knowing
extends into the infinite, with the subject always already projected beyond its
limits, the material world towards which one is addressed extends beyond all
bounds as “the universe” (even if this turns out to be a universe of multiverses: they
are functionally the same). Reasons for being and reasons for acting invoke this
cosmological extendedness, without at the same time emptily representing this
universe as “a thing in itself,” which means treating it (incoherently) as an object of
knowledge independent from the subject’s spontaneous involvement with it. To
claim, as is sometimes claimed in objection to idealism, that the world existed
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before there were any subjects co-involved with it would be beside the point, since
the world as horizon given through (and only through) the material substance
concept implicit within subjective projection is always already both before and after
the subject. The world as horizon, therefore, is always already before and after the
subject; this is what it means to be# in the world. What the metaphysician or type 1
empiricist who wants to make this objection does is to demand (incoherently) not
knowledge of the world before the subject but rather knowledge of the world
independently of the subject, a knowledge that would involve eternal
communication with an unreachable outside. For the type 2 empiricist, who might
claim that the “world” is a social construct and that matter is a representational
myth, the response here would be a bit simpler and would involve throwing a bean
bag at her head, in good Johnsonian fashion, and seeing if she ducks, plans, and
pursues an intentional plan of self-preservation or revenge: commitments to the
causal connectedness of the world in deed and knowledge happens as rational
involvement, not as professed belief.
To continue the discussion from the last section on the ontology of the
object/object*, Quine’s dictum “To be is to be the value of variable” holds. Anything
that can be known or used or avoided or speculated upon counts as “a material
thing” and has an equal status of “materiality” as every other material thing. Just
as logic does not discriminate regarding what can be the value of a variable, Rödl’s
materialism does not discriminate regarding what can count as material. In this
sense, Rödl’s materialism amounts to a non-reductive physicalism, where there
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exists no elementary order of derivation from one material thing or region to
another. Boo-boo is just as basic a material thing as a neutrino is, and the imagined
jay is just as basic a material thing as a real one. If “materiality” gets deployed only
within the commitment to the material substance concept, then things are assigned
the status of material origins, outcomes, substrata, symptoms, etc. only in relation
to the projections of objects and ends in which they appear. Certain disciplines such
as physics or cognitive psychology enjoy a universality in their pertaining to every
representation of a physical object (and notice the two meaning of “representation
even here), but that does not mean that the reasons/reasoning involved in physics or
psychology can translate the reasons/reasoning in poetry, religion, or expressions of
human affection through the media of their shared psychological or physical
interlacing. In the commitment to the material, one is a priori committed to
acknowledging the more rational derivation/assignment of whatever one confronts,
but this more “relativizes” in relation to particular ends and objects (even as it
commits one to the pursuit of the good and true in the projections of these ends and
objects). I will explain why one bike is better than the other through reference to
gears and brakes rather than reference to atoms and neutrinos, and I will explain
why one novel is better than the other through reference to plot and characters
rather than to molecules and neurons. What counts as an object of knowledge or an
end for the projective subject becomes established only on the horizon of this
subject’s self-maintaining projection, and although sometimes these objects and
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ends are demarcated by the ontology of the basic natural sciences, usually they are
not.
Based on the account so far, the “universality” of disciplines such as physics
and psychology, however, seems hard to defend, since universality requires more
than reference to a material world that provides the basis for nomological
statements concerning natural phenomena. Over and above this, it also requires
reference to a shared material world, a world that would make natural laws (and
their kin) valid not only everywhere but also for everyone, for you as for me. In the
order of explication, Rödl details his idealism beginning with articulation of the selfconsciousness of the “I,” since formally, it is only through this “I” that we can first
think the “interiority” of spontaneity independently from the self-presence, whether
pure or dissipated, of empiricism. But he is committed, in the articulation of the “I,”
to give an account of the second person, the “you.” The third person is always a
derivative form of the first person: “Woogie is on the mat” = “I judge: Woogie is on
the mat.” In order, however, for this statement to have anything resembling
objective validity, we would also have to be able to derive this statement from the
second person: “You judge: Woogie is on the mat” (and the synthesized correlated
“We judge: Woogie is on the mat”). This “derivation from you” needs to take place
both in the sense that my claim formally needs your reasoning perspective to
confirm it, as well as the sense that I must be able to directly receive this
confirmation from you.
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If I find myself always already giving and asking for reasons, it follows that I
am giving reasons to someone and asking for reasons from someone, but that
someone (formally) could merely be myself, as I judge# across time, almost as if I
were composing a contra-punctual subjectivity. However, insofar as the “reasons”
situate me as a human subject, they would a priori have to be addressable to the
other human, not merely across times but also at the same time. This implies that
two subjects composing a “we” would have to be able to think together the same
thing simultaneously, to engage in (what Rödl calls) “thought for two.”33 This
implies that I have an immediate (spontaneous, intellectual) relation to the
subjectivity of the other, not a merely sensuous, receptive one. If it is possible for
me to address a you as a “you” at all (rather than an “it” transcribed as a “you”), I
would have to do this in a manner that is as “interior” as my own self-address# in
the articulation of self-consciousness. Rödl’s account of “yourself-consciousness” is
essentially bound together with his account of self-consciousness, because it is
required for the objectivity of judgement, the true (human) infinity of infinite ends,
and for the possibility of actual communication between one subject and another (or
host of others).
For the empiricist (and this empiricist is always inculcated within us, as a
function of the psychologization/historicizing of the subject in modern life), Rödl’s

33. Rödl: “We said the nexus to me by which your second person thought refers
to me consists in my thinking a second person thought about you. Since the relation
is symmetric and my second person thought reaches you through yours, we can say
that second person thought is thought for two.” (SC, 190).
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account will be difficult to understand. For the empiricist, intersubjectivity
happens, if it does, through “recognizing” the other subject as such, where this
recognition involves some form of receptive knowledge of the interior life of this
other. For the empiricist type 1, this takes the form of a directly recognitional
knowing of the other, whereby one subject somehow immediately encounters the
essence of the other through received “meanings.” In some fashion, through
language or gesture, the other manages to express her self-present consciousness
into sensible forms such as movements or words. I receive her meanings through
extracting it from (or re-constituting it within) her transmissions. I know the other
through receiving magical impressions of her being through the medium of my
senses. For the empiricist type 2, my relation to the subjectivity of the other
amounts to a practice of educated guessing, where I attribute an intentional life to
the other based on her various sophisticated behaviors. Since for this empiricist,
there is no true subjectivity, I functionally attribute subjectivity to the other,
through constructing a “you-narrative,” in the same pragmatic manner I attribute
continuing identity to myself.34 As is obvious, none of these empiricist accounts,
whether direct or gerrymandering, provide for real immediate knowledge of the

34. Sometimes, either type of empiricist will add the formal (useless)
appendage: “I can only know myself through knowing the other,” implying that the
unfathomable mechanism of self-presence or self-construction requires the prior
operation of the unfathomable mechanism of other-presence or other-construction.
Sometimes, either empiricist may maintain that I know myself, only or also,
through comparative negation, but this comparison requires the exact same
knowledge of the other that I would have first applied to myself: empiricism leaves
subjectivity as a mysterious, unfillable hole in being.
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other, the sort we regularly presuppose when we chat over coffee. When I say “you”
to the other ordinarily, I neither automatically appeal to a process of receptive
recognition or hypothesis formation, nor do I believe that I, as an abyss within
being, am confronting you as an equal but opposite abyss. I merely reach out with
my voice towards you as if I were extending my arm in an action. For Rödl, our
ordinary language use is prescient, even though he does not rely on a mere appeal
to ordinary language to establish intersubjective contact.35
But if I am not dealing with merely myself in the interiority of my
articulating projection in action# and judgment#, then how exactly do I engage the
other, if not through the medium of reception? How can I reach the other from the
non-substantial intimacy of my own spontaneity? Suppose I am playing chess with
my friend Jeff. I say to Jeff, “It’s your move.” I address Jeff directly. On the one
hand, this is a claim: “I judge: It’s your move.” I could be wrong, for instance,
because it may be my move. I do not mean merely, however, that it is the move of
“the person named Jeff sitting across from me.” I do not mean merely, “I judge:
there is a move that needs to be made by Jeff.” I am speaking to Jeff about the
game we are playing together. In this case, posed in terms of the structures
outlined earlier, my relation to Jeff can be formalized as follows:

35. This ordinary language appeal would provide no response to the empiricist.
She would immediately reply that the recognition or hypothesis formation
postulated by empiricism happens sub-cognitively or very quickly. Therefore, she
would argue, the self-account of the ordinary speaker is merely a “folk” account, a
primitive hypothesis that needs to be replaced by a more philosophically informed
one.
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subject/judgment/object/judgment/subject (henceforth @SJO). In projecting that
there is a move to be made, it is not only the case that I am making a judgment, but
I am simultaneously thinking that it should be Jeff’s judgment too: I think in
relation to his thinking. Perhaps we disagree about whose move it is. In order even
to disagree, however, an @SJO would have already to be invoked, where the object
would be “it’s somebody’s move,” an object that we would implicitly co-share and cothink within our discussion.
I am not simply telling Jeff about a state of affairs in the world when I say,
“It’s your move.” In proclaiming, “It’s your move,” I am also telling him to move; I
am asking him to engage in the pursuit of a finite end. Our complementary
practical structure, therefore, is subject/action/end/action/subject (henceforth
@SAE), with my performance of a request and his projected action of a move all precontained within the address. I am already thinking the possibility of his
intentional action in my address to him, as well as already thinking the possibility
of his assessment of an object in the world. I could have made no sense of sitting
with another person across a table, or both of us playing on the same board, or of
playing the same game together without the precedent engagement with a “shared
space of subjectivity,” where this “space” involves a coordinated projection of
subjective interaction. Within this interaction, we may diverge in a multiplicity of
ends and perceived objects, but in order for there to be interaction at all, we would
also have to share a multiplicity of objects and ends, and therefore, we would have
to be able to think them together.
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My “thinking together with Jeff” does not require me to project myself into
his perspective through a feat of imagination, as if I had to take over the vantage of
his receptive knowledge of the world, although I may try to do this at times. I am,
rather, committed to his sharing the power of receptive knowledge with me, 36 as
well as the power of practical action37: thus, I am also committed to the pair:
@SJO* and @SAE*. The shared object* would be, in this case, the reality of the
game, and the shared end* would be the pursuit of perfection in playing. In
projecting my object* and end*, in playing a game, I am simultaneously projecting
his, not the ones that he empirically imagines (he need not explicitly think anything
at all—he may just play) but rather the ones to which I find him already cocommitted through being my playing partner. When I address the other person or
play a game with her or have an argument or engage in any other form of
interaction, I am committed to a host of co-implications and co-thoughts and coobjects-and co-ends, of the sorts that one might expect if multiple people
communicate within a shared world. Rödl expresses the reciprocity that I have here

36. Rödl: “So the same power of receptive knowledge accounts for my
explanation why, and thus for my knowledge that, you believe what you do, and
accounts for your believing it. The power whose presence in you accounts for your
belief is the same as the power whose presence in me accounts for my knowledge of
your belief.” (SC, 185)
37. Rödl: “Second person knowledge of action, too, has the same ultimate cause
as its object. In the fundamental case, I know that someone is doing something
intentionally by explaining why she is doing it in a way that reveals it to be good to
do in the sense defined by our practical life-form. (We can now say “our”, as we have
excluded that I bring someone under a practical life-form that is not mine.)” (SC,
186)
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formalized with the “@” structures as follows: “So our result is this: your nexus to
me by which I am the object of your second person thought consists in my thinking
a second person thought about you. Your second person thought reaches me through
my thinking back at you in the same way, second personally” (SC, 186). Since my
thought about you is a thought about you thinking something that I also think, we
are bound together in a projective# encircling relation of reciprocity.38
Any given person may fail to treat the other as a subject at any given time: to
avoid distraction in her work, a doctor may train herself to focus on the leg instead
of the whole patient. If I am running down a path and you walk out in front of me, I
might move to avoid you, in a way no different than I would have moved to avoid a
falling tree limb: for me in this case, you would be a thing among things. There are
a thousand different obstacles and pitfalls along the path of human interaction.
The skeptic towards other minds, a creature born of empiricism, takes these
possibilities of severed relation and attempts to make them into the rule, requiring
and never receiving adequate evidence to heal the supposed original wound. The
other may become a mere perceptual object, so the other is always a perceptual
object unless proven otherwise, an automaton who simulates subjectivity rather
than having it.

38. This means that the @SJO and @SAE are not to be read linearly but rather
bi-directionally, as they involve the spontaneous circling interaction between two
subjects, where this spontaneous circling interaction is also sometimes called
conversation.
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But as in the case with skepticism regarding the existence of objects in the
world, individual failures do not imply failure of the whole but rather just the
opposite. If I were not a priori committed to thinking with the other as such,
reasoning in the same world as her, I would never make sense of anything that
might be lost through skepticism. My original relation to the other subsisted
neither through a theory or a habit or a belief but rather persisted through the
cooperative enaction of a shared situation. According to Rödl, “Second person
thought requires and includes first person thought, for I apprehend a self-conscious
subject through an order under which I subsume my own acts and that I represent
first personally. . .it is equally true that first person thought requires and includes
second person thought. The same power is exercised in both ways of thinking” (SC,
192). In this sense, just as I project# enactively from an extending# inside, there is
always already a co-projecting#/co-extending# where our world complicates for us
together, in the transcending articulation of joint reasoning.
For Rödl, the spontaneity of reasoning-through yields both the immediate
address of the other and the requisite intersubjectivity for the external assessment
of objective claims. This happens not only contingently, when I encounter others in
the course of daily activity. The subject/judgment/object and the subject/action/end
already necessarily pre-figures the @SJO and the @SAE. These active projections,
as they are referred back to me, also refer back to human powers of action and
knowledge in general, powers that hold the grounding capacities of the space of
reasons in place. These “powers in general” require that other human beings could
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also hold and evaluate my ends, and they could accept or reject my claimed objects
as true in the activity of giving and asking for reasons. @SJO* and @SAE* imply a
meta-subjectivity which a priori involves a possible host of other subjects, and any
deed or claim, no matter to what extent privately articulated, always takes place on
the horizon of this meta-subjectivity, almost as if these events were receptacles,
awaiting fulfilment by partners in universal reason.39
Without this implicit meta-subjectivity, we could only understand science in
an empiricist fashion, as being grounding through the indoctrinated regularity of
communal responses, and we could only account for communicative addresses by
explaining them as being funded through bio-socially imprinted habits of
interaction, with the pursuit of real objectivity and real contact given the statuses of
politely tolerated (or relativistically rejected) illusions. As spontaneous and
intellectual, however, the human powers of reasoning-through, in their interactive
dimensions, transcend these sensible veils, behind which the truth of the world and
the truth of the other lie hidden. These powers yield immediate social involvement
with an immediate social world, an involvement not dependent upon culture but
rather founding it, giving selves within the material world things to differ over, as
they engage whatever arises in the pursuit of everyday human life.

39. Rödl: “A formally represented order that sustains first person thought and
its way of knowing as such sustains second person thought and its way of knowing.
An order that is a source of self-consciousness as such is a source of mutual
knowledge of its instances. Subjects united under an order of reason know each
other through this order.” (SC, 194)
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Chapter 3. Emerson’s Idealist Poetics
A. The Opening of Nature
Emerson begins his work Nature as a writer of spontaneity responding to
empiricism. Nature’s “Introduction” commences as follows:
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It
writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations
beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should
not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not
we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a
religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs? Embosomed
for a season in nature, whose floods of life stream around and through
us, and invite us by the powers they supply, to action proportioned to
nature, why should we grope among the dry bones of the past, or put
the living generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe? The
sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and flax in the fields. There
are new lands, new men, new thoughts. Let us demand our own works
and laws and worship. (TCRWE I, 7)
Above, we saw Rödl helpfully paraphrase Marx’s first thesis from the “Theses
on Feuerbach” to show anti-empiricist commitments synchronize with commitments
to materialism and sensuous activity. In reading the opening paragraph of
Emerson’s Nature, I find it similarly felicitous to transpose Emerson in terms of the
opposition between spontaneously (en)active idealism and receptively passive
empiricism:
Our age is empiricist. It passively fixates on external, bygone origins.
It constructs historical narratives to account for its being. Previously,
human beings engaged God and nature spontaneously. We do this
through their recorded accounts. Why should we not also enjoy a
spontaneous relation to the universe? Why should we not have a
poetry, philosophy, and religion of spontaneous insight and not one
passively received from historical tradition. Given that we are
materially enacted within nature, powerfully projecting in response to
its powerful demands, why should we historicize or construct
ourselves based on impressions? The pervasive objects and ends
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towards which we think and strive never vanish. Let us demand
enactively projected spaces of reason to pursue them.
Importantly, this transposition loses the nuances of Emerson’s phraseology, eliding
images of being “embosomed for a season,” streaming “floods of life,” and our
“groping among dry bones,” etc. Unlike with Rödl’s translation of Marx, which
required only a slight conceptual shift, a movement from one abstraction into
another, the above transmutation involves, along with its even more slight
conceptual shift, a significant loss of the poetic dimension of Emerson’s writing.
What, however, do we lose by translating away these images? Other than lending a
lyrical sheen to his demands, what does the irruption of such grand figurations
contribute to Emerson’s imperative?
Emerson utilizes a host of poetic strategies that resonate with the
philosophical practice of the making explicit of self-consciousness, sometimes
directly complementing this practice, sometimes momentarily resisting its
intellectualization, or sometimes moving together with it in an interwoven
fashion.40 These strategies deploy sometimes more personal language, sometimes
more viscerally affective expressions, sometimes more painterly figurations, and

40. In Orestes Brownson’s 1836 review of Nature, he makes a similar point,
maintaining, “This book is aesthetical rather than philosophical. . .. Yet it touches
some of the gravest problems in metaphysical science, and may perhaps be called
philosophy in its poetical aspect” (BR 9/10/1836, 2). It has not been the case that
careful readers of Emerson have been unaware of the issues of the relation between
poetry and idealism in Emerson’s work raised in this dissertation. Yet these
writers did not have the technical apparatus of Rödl’s linguistic idealism to utilize
in order to elucidate the precise conceptual structure of these relations.
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sometimes more rhetorical gestures in the service of resisting/overcoming more
mundane concretions of empiricism than those normally occurring (argued for
explicitly or diagnosed as implicit) in philosophical language. The “writing of
spontaneity,” as it takes place in Emerson’s work, operates in a fashion
complementary to the philosophical explication of self-consciousness. “The
complementary,” however, is not “the identical”: in Emerson’s work we find the
crossing of ambivalent relations between a philosophy of self-consciousness and a
poetics of self-consciousness. The question of the poetic writing of spontaneity in
relation to the philosophical writing of spontaneity is the question of the nature of
this ambivalent complementarity.41 In order to investigate this, we must first
attend to Nature’s opening passage. On its basis, we can discover crucial aspects of
Emerson’s essential orientation:
1.) Emerson begins Nature from the self-conscious vantage of the active subject,
which means that he opens Nature with a commitment to idealism, as
characterized above. Idealism is not for Emerson a doctrinal term that will
show up sporadically in his work, divorceable from the rest of its content.
Idealism is woven into Emerson’s style as a practice of making explicit, even

41. Long before the term ‘prose poem’ gained currency, in 1838 Elizabeth
Peabody wrote the following in an anonymous review of Nature from The
Democratic Review: “In We have said that ‘Nature’ is a poem; but it is written in
prose. The author, though ‘wanting the accomplishment of verse,’ is a devoted child
of the great Mother . . .” (I, February, 1838 319-321). She recognized that
Emerson’s work is a site of crossing where the conceptual is perpetually turned
towards a practical transcendence that can only be reached through the figurative
twisting of the straightforward idea.
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if Emerson does not carry out this activity in a rigorously philosophical sense.
Emerson’s promptings towards “original relation,” “insight,” and “revelation”
and his imperatives for self-reliance aim at drawing the reader into the
spontaneity of the projective moment, while they also require reasonable
action to secure the subsistence of this moment. This prompting happens
here primarily through Emerson’s use of the imperative “should,” which calls
for the transition from passive retrospection into the present activity of the
subject and her community. This call from passion to action takes the
powerful form of a demand. Even, perhaps, an ethical one.
Later in Nature, in the chapter “Spirit,” Emerson details the end of
this imperative, which is not an imperative towards a concrete
transformation of the world but rather an imperative towards a certain form
of self-consciousness. Within this self-consciousness, spirit turns towards
itself, but in so doing, it learns that it is a circulating flow of possibility:
But when, following the invisible steps of thought, we come to
inquire, Whence is matter? and Whereto? many truths arise to us
out of the recesses of consciousness. We learn that the highest is
present to the soul of man, that the dread universal essence,
which is not wisdom, or love, or beauty, or power, but all in one,
and each entirely, is that for which all things exist, and that by
which they are; that spirit creates; that behind nature,
throughout nature, spirit is present; one and not compound, it
does not act upon us from without, that is, in space and time, but
spiritually, or through ourselves: therefore, that spirit, that is, the
Supreme Being, does not build up nature around us, but puts it
forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth new branches
and leaves through the pores of the old. (TCRWE I, 38)
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One might get the impression here that Emerson, like the type 1
empiricist, is thinking of the soul as a sort of substance to which the mind
has special access.42 On such a reading, the trunk of the soul would give
birth to a branching host of impressions, including the beings of nature, and
we would intellectually “sense” ourselves through knowing this impressive
substance within a special interior apprehension, a paradoxical immediate
self-relation. But immediately following this metaphor of the tree and its
branches, Emerson immediately relativizes this trunk on the horizon of a
higher/lower ground:
As a plant upon the earth, so a man rests upon the bosom of God;
he is nourished by unfailing fountains, and draws, at his need,
inexhaustible power. Who can set bounds to the possibilities of
man? Once inhale the upper air, being admitted to behold the
absolute natures of justice and truth, and we learn that man has
access to the entire mind of the Creator, is himself the creator in
the finite. This view, which admonishes me where the sources of
wisdom and power lie, and points to virtue as to
“The golden key
Which opes the palace of eternity,”
carries upon its face the highest certificate of truth, because it
animates me to create my own world through the purification of
my soul. (TCRWE I, 38)

42. In 1837, Francis Bowen had exactly this sort of interpretation of Emerson.
In a review in The Christian Examiner, he argues, “But he [Emerson] brought no
arguments to disprove the existence of any thing exterior to mind. . .. The belief
still exists, and its universality is a fact for which the idealist cannot account. This
fact puts the burden of proof upon him, and it is a load he cannot support” (CE XXI
01/1837, 371-385). Bowen believes that Emerson is positing the mind as an
independent self-supporting substance that hosts the external world, and he
believes Emerson fails to demonstrate this independence. But, as argued here,
Emerson is not trying to show that the mind is a self-knowing substantial container
but rather exposing its projective operations of thinking its world.
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Here, we find both that a.) the soul is not the original basis from which
nature springs but rather the “bosom” of God. We do not have direct access to
a transcendent God but rather to that which emanates from this oddly
maternal bosom— “unfailing fountains” and “inexhaustible power,” and these
fountains and that power represent “the possibilities of man”; and b.) the
human herself is “the creator in the finite,” so that which would be the
original source, the ground of the trunk of the soul, is itself a synecdoche, the
creator become a part of creation, finitized without the possibility of
metaphysical transcendence.43 Thus, “creation” becomes nothing other than
an interior circulatory flow whereby I “create my own world,” not through
shaping the world through the force of will but rather through a “purification
of the soul” whereby I recognize this “palace of eternity” within the infinite
possibilities of the given world.44

43. In American Spaces of Conversion, Andrea Knutson provides a succinct
statement of this paradox wherein a projection of the infinite is maintained within
finite human life, transforming into a productive, well-lived life: “Emerson claims
divinity for humans, but this does not imply that the method for “confront[ing], face
to face, the image of a blinding divinity” is any less necessary for remaining in
productive touch with experience” (104).
44. In a 1937 letter to Emerson, Thomas Carlyle called this purifying
movement, “the true Apocalypse: this when the ‘open secret becomes revealed to a
man. I rejoice much in the glad serenity of the soul with which you look out upon
this wondrous Dwelling place of yours and mine, --with an ear for the . . . “Ewigen
Melodien” (TCEC 1964, 157). Both the philosophical and poetic making-explicit of
the truth of idealism have the form of the revelation of a secret rather than the
representation of a fact. Whereas knowledge of a fact gives a new piece of
information, the revelation of a secret bursts the bonds of the hidden and brings
forth a new set of relations.
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2.) Although Emerson does not mention empiricism explicitly in the passage
opening Nature, his urgings towards spontaneity structurally commit him to
oppose empiricism, and he fulfills this commitment through propelling the
work of spontaneity against some of empiricism’s distorting guises:
retrospective memorials (passively received in the fashion of the type 1
empiricist) or constructed textual impressions (conjoined into a fictional
narrative order in the fashion of the type 2 empiricist) of past life. These
figures include “sepulchers” and “biographies” and “histories” and “tradition,”
structures that bind us to a fundamentally passive relation to existence.
These are vehicles of ultimate passivity—vehicles of death. Emerson’s
judgment on these retrospective constructions, at least initially, may seem
harsh. We might ask, “Cannot we actively and self-consciously construct a
sepulcher or write a biography?” Tombs and biographies, after all, provide
some of the greatest art from our past. Emerson, however, is not exactly
denying us these opportunities: we can engage with any constellation of
objects and ends within the living-thinking of life. Emerson is not
problematizing “relations to pastness” for the service of a specious present.
Otherwise, supposing he is consistent, he would not go on to write such works
as Representative Men, engaging the actions and thoughts of the great
departed. Emerson understands the works of memory in this passage (such
as histories and criticism) as implicitly inflected (or even infected) with the
distorting passivity of empiricism. These works not only hold the echoes of
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things that have died, but such recordings, when impressed in the
retrospective spirit, morbidly share in their demise. Empiricism, in this
sense, is not merely a philosophical doctrine but rather a distorting manner
of the subject’s engagement with its world. In relation to these more concrete
instantiations of empiricism, Emerson’s admonishments and encouragements
would have to be heard, in their making explicit the problem and the loss
implicit within it. They would also have to be apprehended as bio-graphed
counterexamples, exhibiting the possibility of a living mode of creation in the
articulation of their critiques: a poetic writing set against, as an antidote to,
the deadly prose of the past.
Although the empiricist, in fact, believes that the impressions upon
which she rests her projections, constructions, and representations are more
solid than the ephemeral presentations of projective consciousness, in fact,
the opposite is the case. In his essay “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson
shows this through his critique of “the materialist,” who for our purposes is
nothing other than a version of the empiricist. This materialist, after all, has
no metaphysical proof for the existence of an external realm of extended
substance. Rather, she precisely rests her “proofs” on the naked evidence of
the senses as they provide singular bursts of the given real:
The materialist, secure in the certainty of sensation, mocks at
fine-spun theories, at star-gazers and dreamers, and believes
that his life is solid, that he at least takes nothing for granted,
but knows where he stands, and what he does. (TCRWE I, 202)
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This security and certainty of the materialist, however, is short lived,
since it is “easy to show him, that he also is a phantom walking and working
amid phantoms, and that he need only ask a question or two beyond his daily
questions, to find his solid universe growing dim and impalpable before his
sense.” For his example of a materialist, Emerson chooses a capitalist who
precisely believes in the foundations of his banking house, the “Quincy
granite” on which this house rests. Emerson claims that these foundations,
that granite, is not set on the solid “cube” of substance but rather on a set of
unknown intellectual relations. Since the materialist as empiricist seeks the
firm impression as the ground, the flowing field of projective relations
enacted by the subject as it creates its world and its world creates it are
invisible to her. Therefore, for her, since “real” matter outside the mind is
unprovable, her foundations come to rest “on the edge of an unimaginable pit
of emptiness.” Furthermore, even her mind, that from which she
distinguished the supposedly solid granite foundations itself, from her
vantage, seems just as “strange and quaking foundations as his proud edifice
of stone.” Whether through retrospective memory or prospective digging, the
materialist/empiricist disavows idealist engagements with the world, seeking
to stabilize it beyond projects of finite human creation, only to find that
retrospection and prospection lose the grounds that they seek to find.45
45. In her 1838 review, Elizabeth Peabody quotes Emerson precisely where he
shows that empiricism/materialism loses the very substance of human life in its
attempt to maintain substance against idealist ephemerality: “Many philosophers
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3.) Along with drawing the reader into the demands of the “should” and away
from passive retrospection through his juxtaposed words, Emerson’s voice
enacts the demanding turn away from the passive reception of the world.
Emerson deploys a practically, if not an actually, ministerial voice in calling
together the congregation into the communion of the “we” and the “us.” The
call to each member also implicitly resides within this convocation, a call that
demands that I address Emerson as he addresses me in our shared world
together. We can transpose the polite yet urgent imperative “Let us demand
our own works and laws and worship” into an imperative for “enactively
projected spaces of reason,” because in receiving this imperative itself, we
find ourselves already within the extending space of this reason. Emerson
impels us, in the terms from the discussion on intersubjectivity above, into
the @SAE(*): we are brought into the shared projection of finite and infinite
ends. We may reject these ends as such for us or we may accept them, but in
either case, Emerson brings us to reason about them together in the present,
if only for a moment. Emerson’s formulation of the demand for “our own
laws, works, and worship” does not make explicit the shared space of reason
these things carry with them in the abstract way Rödl does. This space,
however, is made explicit (or its implicitness is strongly insinuated) precisely

have stopped at Idealism. But, as Mr. Emerson says, this hypothesis, if it only deny,
or question the existence of matter ‘does not satisfy the demands of the Spirit. It
leaves God out of me. It leaves me in the splendid labyrinth of my perceptions, to
wander without end. Then the heart resists it, because it baulks the affections, in
denying substantive being to men and women’” (319-321).
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in the juxtaposition of icons of death and passivity with the required actions
for life.
For Emerson, these demands and provocations are not external rhetorical
ornamentation appended to a transcendental argument. Rather, Emersonian
imperatives employed within the ministerial voice intensify the purifying movement
of the soul back into itself and its projective world. Concerning the speakers of such
a voice, we hear Emerson’s commendations in his “Divinity School Address”:
The divine bards are the friends of my virtue, of my intellect of
my strength. They admonish me, that the gleams which flash
across my mind, are not mine, but God’s; that they had the like,
and were not disobedient to the heavenly vision. So I love them.
Noble provocations go out from them, inviting me to resist evil;
to subdue the world; and to Be. And thus by his holy thoughts,
Jesus serves us, and thus only. … The world seems to them to
exist for him, and they have not yet drunk so deeply of his sense,
as to see that only by coming again to themselves, or to God in
themselves, can they grow forevermore. (TCRWE I, 83)
Within this address, we can see these largely Rödlian characteristics of Emerson’s
idealism, transformed into a practically poetic turning of the soul. I resist the world
as externality through turning into myself, “to Be,” and I, like Jesus, in hearing
these words turn towards the divinity in myself, not in a movements towards
Platonic permanence but rather so that I can ceaselessly project and “grow
forevermore.”
Empiricism as a philosophical stance obfuscates or destroys the subject of
action and judgment. Empiricism, as concretized within historical retrospection,
obfuscates or destroys the activity of life. We can counter empiricism through the
making explicit of self-consciousness in its circling enactment. This making
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explicit, however, is an activity unto itself, and in order to pursue it as an end, we
must remove obstacles that stand in the way. One way of doing this is through
criticizing concepts of passivity and replacing them with concepts of activity: this is
the work of philosophical critique. Another way of removing such obstacles is
through transforming the practices that embody retrospective concepts into
practices instituted through prospective concepts. In the overcoming of empiricism,
we must both abstractly and concretely turn our focus towards projecting from
historical existence rather than retrospectively receiving a dead past. Like
philosophy for Marx, writing for Emerson is “revolutionary activity,” although not
in the same sense that Marx gives this term. Emerson, in demanding “our own”
practices, places the implicit emphasis not on acquiring the newly created
possession, but on exchanging our practices for ones that are self-consciously
marked by ownness. This exchange would require us, insofar as empiricism inflects
our lives, to reclaim that which is given, our history itself (abstract and concrete) in
the name of the projective subject. There is a natural transition between the
overcoming of empiricism, a doctrine that presupposes dependence on external
affection and grounds, and the movement into self-reliance, where the soul becomes
the center and founder of itself in its projective activity:
. . . there is a great responsible Thinker and Actor working
wherever a man works; . . . a true man belongs to no other time
or place, but is the centre of things. Where he is, there is nature.
He measures you, and all men, and all events. Ordinarily, every
body in society reminds us of somewhat else, or of some other
person. Character, reality, reminds you of nothing else; it takes
place of the whole creation. The man must be so much, that he
must make all circumstances indifferent. Every true man is a
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cause, a country, and an age; requires infinite spaces and
numbers and time fully to accomplish his design; — and posterity
seem to follow his steps as a train of clients. A man Caesar is
born, and for ages after we have a Roman Empire. Christ is born,
and millions of minds so grow and cleave to his genius, that he is
confounded with virtue and the possible of man. (TCRWE II, 35)
Once again, we have what might be called the classic Emersonian movement
whereby the finite individual becomes “confounded with the virtue and possible of
man,” so that the projective possibility of the soul becomes exposed within the
individual engagement. Note that this does not mean that the individual
megalomaniacally believes herself to be the overlord of existence: in exposing itself
as possibility, this soul also becomes swallowed up within this possibility that
outstrips it, possibility that it must project from and into. The lesson here is not
that the individual should occupy the position of Caesar’s power or Christ’s
authority in their substantive (external) dimensions but rather that the subject
should own its possibility, whatever it is, and project from it with a trueness of
character like that of Caesar or Christ.46

46. Denis Donohue provides the following cynical objection to Emerson’s
formulation of individual human possibility: “The offer Emerson's essays make goes
somewhat like this: ‘Wouldn't our lives be much as I describe them, if we took
seriously the sufficiency of the private man, exerted mind and will together as
power, and regarded the whole world as having been given to us for our instruction
and use?’ It is not surprising, then, that Emerson was just as readily available to
Pragmatism as to Transcendentalism: the vocabulary of property, commodity, use,
exchange, instrumentality” (Emerson and His Legacy, 1986 26). This is cynical
because it presupposes that the “property” of character is a priori commodified as a
form of private ownership, even if it is garbed in clothes of the transcendent. But
for Emerson, the private is not the personally owned but rather the secretly shared,
so that in coming into one’s own, one exposes oneself as being already involved
within the projective community of the human.
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We find this imperative (from Nature’s first paragraph) calling life to resist
empiricist retrospection confirmed within Emerson’s essay “History.” That essay
does not commence with the explicit imperative to resist retrospective passivity: in
its opening, Emerson’s words affirm the positive pole of a dialectic that has
practically forgotten its other half. But during his encomium of history, in a
transitional pause, Emerson demarcates the distinction between active and passive
history that provokes his accentuation of the positive:
These hints, dropped as it were from sleep and night, let us use
in broad day. The student is to read history actively and not
passively; to esteem his own life the text, and books the
commentary. Thus compelled, the Muse of history will utter
oracles, as never to those who do not respect themselves. I have
no expectation that any man will read history aright, who thinks
that what was done in a remote age, by men whose names have
resounded far, has any deeper sense than what he is doing today. (TCRWE II, 5)
This passage tells us that we must resist interpreting history as something
passively given in books and, instead, understand it as the active unfolding of our
own living. When we comment on the recorded annals of history, we do not
comment on history properly. In so doing, we merely comment on commentary,
exhausting our efforts in the service of the dead. Such commentary involves a
disrespect of the life of the present as a fulcrum of history. Therefore, the proper
reading of history will avoid giving overarching significance to echoes of dignified
ancestry carried from foreign lands. Emerson prefaces this argument with the
implications that this passive relation to history already ensnares us and that the
“hints” in the preceding encomium, along with the making explicit of our problem in
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this very passage, allow us to see the true relationship between the active and the
passive “in broad day.”
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B. The Problem of Our History
What is the relationship between history as passive commentary and this
darkness in which we, as readers of Emerson, find ourselves, such that we need to
be awakened from it by him into broad day, if we take his Platonic rhetoric
seriously? We need search no further for a source in which to find answers than a
typical history textbook for use in school. For instance, a characteristic history
textbook from Emerson’s time, History of the United States, From Their First
Settlement As Colonies, To The Close Of The War With Great Britain. To Which Are
Added Questions, Adapted For The Use In Schools, published by Uriah Hunt in
1835, embodies this passivity and darkness in its very title. The schoolbook
commences with its lessons as follows in the opening paragraph:
The continent of America was probably unknown to the ancients. If
once known, as some have supposed, to the Carthaginians, the
Scandinavians, and the Welsh, all knowledge of it was afterwards lost.
The discovery of this extensive region, constituting nearly one half of
the habitable globe, was the accidental result of the attempts, made in
the fifteenth century, to find a passage, by sea from the ports of Europe
to the East Indies, whose precious commodities were then transported,
over land, by a long, dangerous, and expensive route. (AH, 7)
This list of successive facts put together in the form of a paragraph, we might
imagine, failed to engage the nineteenth century eighth grade pupils required to
learn them. But we do not have to imagine being children in the eighth grade in
nineteenth-century America to understand the boredom such passages inflict. We
were those children in our own time, forced to study similar textbooks, even if our
more modern textbooks were also more historically accurate and politically
nuanced. The passive commentary and its surrounding darkness shaped the child’s
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entire experience of education in Emerson’s era, and it largely continues to do so in
ours, despite our advances in technology and cultural erudition. These textbooks
are paradigmatic examples of history in its utter diremption from the life of the
subject. The trained passivity of students mirrors the passivity of the textbooks
imposed upon them. In the essay “Education,” Emerson complains, “It is ominous, a
presumption of crime, that this word Education has so cold, so hopeless a sound. A
treatise on education, a convention for education, a lecture, a system, affects us with
slight paralysis and a certain yawning of the jaws” (CWRWE X, 133-134). He goes
on to proclaim, “I call our system a system of despair” (136). Receptive knowledge of
the world, including the knowledge of our past, is the only knowledge that we have,
and yet, if this passive relation to knowledge becomes primary, obscuring the
activity of a subject who poses questions and seeks answers on a horizon leaning
towards truth, relevance, and a better life, then this knowledge contains enough
untruth, irrelevance, and banefulness to outweigh its advantage.
In our education (and I include in the “our” both those nineteenth century
pupils and our younger selves), there is an obvious empiricism of content in the
prosaic listing of impressive events found in history textbooks, but more crucially,
there is an empiricism incorporated within the institution of educational life—in the
passive positions of pupils constrained to desks, in the droned delivery of
unchangeable information, and in the institutional requirements that reward
detailed accuracy of response while punishing inspirational engagement. A direct
link, we would be required to say, connects Emerson’s concerns with education and
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Dewey’s call for progressive schooling in such works as Democracy and Education,
and yet, we should inquire why we naturally seek out this link rather than
engaging in the action of educational reform.
In a manner directly parallel (and probably directly referring to) the opening
of Nature, in Democracy and Education Dewey critiques the retrospective model of
education, seeking to replace it with a prospective education that engages the
present for the sake of the improvement of future experience.47 Dewey directly
follows Emerson’s rejection of empiricism in criticizing retrospective education for
focusing on disconnected, bygone contents. In its place, prospective/progressive
education would precisely gear itself towards the improvement of the child through
shaping her capacity to engage the present and expand its possibilities in the
pursuit of knowledge and ends:
Education may be conceived either retrospectively or
prospectively. That is to say, it may be treated as process of
accommodating the future to the past, or as a utilization of the
past for a resource in a developing future. The former finds its
47. Naoko Saito, in The Gleam of Light, expertly draws the intimate
connections between Emerson and Dewey (and Cavell): ‘Dewey in this book
[Reconstruction in Philosophy] explicitly uses the term ‘perfection’ in an
Emersonian way. The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. . . . Not
perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfection, maturing,
refining is the aim in living. . . . Growth itself is the only moral ‘end.’(177) Growth
is perfection; and perfection is perfecting. This echoes Emerson’s message, ‘Success
treads on every right step’ (‘AMS,’ 46); and his use of the natural metaphor of a
rose: ‘There is simply the rose; it is perfect in every moment of its existence . . .
[Man] cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present,
above time’ (‘SR,’ 141). Like Emerson and Cavell, Dewey does not reject our natural
sense of happiness (and shame) as the ingredient of such perfection. He does,
however, emphasize that happiness is not ‘a fixed attainment’ but resides in the
process of searching—‘succeeding, getting forward, moving in advance’ (RP, 179–
80)” (62).
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standards and patterns in what has gone before. The mind may
be regarded as a group of contents resulting from having certain
things presented. In this case, the earlier presentations
constitute the material to which the later are to be assimilated.
Emphasis upon the value of the early experiences of immature
beings is most important, especially because of the tendency to
regard them as of little account. But these experiences do not
consist of externally presented material, but of interaction of
native activities with the environment which progressively
modifies both the activities and the environment. …Isolated
from their connection with the present environment in which
individuals have to act, they become a kind of rival and
distracting environment. Their value lies in their use to increase
the meaning of the things with which we have actively to do at
the present time. (DE, 84-85)
We (who were not educated in a Deweyan system) readily empathize with
Plato’s chained cave-dwellers, as they helplessly track shadows on the wall, not
primarily through realizing our allegiance to the sensible over the intelligible but
rather because of our time in school. Out of this instituted darkness, always
looming as the background of our intellect, Emerson drops his “hints” for their use
during daylight. These hints commence in response to our shared plight as
students of history, past and present.
There is one mind common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet
to the same and to all of the same. He that is once admitted to the
right of reason is made a freeman of the whole estate. What Plato has
thought, he may think; what a saint has felt, he may feel; what at any
time has be-fallen any man, he can understand. Who hath access to
this universal mind is a party to all that is or can be done, for this is
the only and sovereign agent. (TCRWE II, 3)
Without understanding these hints as such with an awareness of Emerson’s
critique of passive commentary (retrospection, empiricism), this initial opening to
“History” will sound utterly foreign to what we normally comprehend as history.
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This foreignness is an integral part of its purpose. Nothing sounds more ahistorical,
in the sense of an absolute metaphysics beyond space and time, than the statement,
“There is one mind common to all individual men.” The empiricist within us will
interpret this “one mind,” perhaps, as a globular infrastructure upon which rests
singular windows on the world, as if we were each an individual facet on the eye of
a great bee.
Notice, however, with the advantage of reading it on the basis of Emerson’s
critique of empiricism, even this simple paragraph moves us into an engagement
with history “from the inside.” The vantage shifts to the singular facet rather than
the encompassing eye, so that “every man is an inlet to the same.” From within this
facet-inlet, not the protoplasmic interior of common substance but rather the “the
right of reason” (where we hear both as the propriety of reason and as the
inalienable right of its possession) engages us. In taking over this right, we will
become emancipated from darkness (the bondage of retrospection) and will each
gain the status of a “freeman of the whole estate,” which implies that we may
wander about it at liberty. We can infer that reason as a “whole estate” is not
merely a structureless mass but rather an articulated expanse, a domain in which
we move freely but also a domain that keeps us free through allowing us ordered
possibilities of locution. In so moving within, we can also relocate elsewhere within
the whole, which implies that we can also transport ourselves into the other facetinlets. Therein, we can encounter differences of apprehension: thinking what Plato
has thought, feeling what a saint has felt, understanding what has befallen anyone,
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living historical difference from a reasoning interior. Indeed, this “universal mind”
is not the actuality of a globular substance but rather the possibility of “all that is or
can be done” and thought and felt, a space of reason that we projectively inhabit.
As “the only and sovereign agent,” this space provides individual agency with its
being, and yet, as possibility, it has no more being than the individual agency it
upholds.
The empiricist within us will not have understood this on an initial reading.
She will make no sense of rational possibility whatsoever, since rational possibility
could never fund an impression, passively perceived by the mind. Even for someone
like Hume, for whom the mind constructs the world through chained association,
even as it constructs itself, this mind cannot encounter the world except through a
strict determinism, one whose attribution is governed ostensibly by psychological
habit but really by the exclusion of freedom qua possibility a priori. Just as Hume
both excludes causation as a real power and yet re-inscribes it as the (materialist)
organizing principle that binds any narrative concerning the world, he likewise reinscribes it as the (materialist) organizing principle that binds any narrative
concerning the mind. According to Hume from An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding,
We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary
connexion, in all the sources from which we could suppose it to
be derived. It appears, that, in single instances of the operation
of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any
thing but one event following another; without being able to
comprehend any force or power, by which the cause operates, or
any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same
difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on
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body; where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon
the volition of the former; but are not able to observe or conceive
the tye, which binds together the motion and volition, or the
energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of
the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more
comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not,
throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion, which is
conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate.
One event follows another; but we never can observe any tye
between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And
as we can have no idea of any thing, which never appeared to
our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary
conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any
meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings, or
common life. (AECHU, 53-54)
Here, of course, Hume dictates the entire anti-idealist metaphysics of
empiricism, one that will exclude any account of the enactive, projective, living
subject a priori, with every account of the coherence of experience (along with its
possible internal perfection). One intellectually possessed by this metaphysics will
never understand the subject as giving the possibility of its own history, as it
discovers itself in its past as the present projection of its future.
Likewise, the more mundane pupillary empiricist cannot conceive history as
proceeding from this possibility, since her desk and her commentary habitually
chain her to history’s inevitability within passive reception. Thus, she will not
understand, as Emerson commences,
Of the works of this mind history is the record. Its genius is illustrated
by the entire series of days. Man is explicable by nothing less than all
his history. Without hurry, without rest, the human spirit goes forth
from the beginning to embody every faculty, every thought, every
emotion, which belongs to it in appropriate events. But the thought is
always prior to the fact; all the facts of history preexist in the mind as
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laws. Each law in turn is made by circumstances predominant, and the
limits of nature give power to but one at a time. (TCRWE II, 3)
The empiricist will take “This mind” to designate an empty metaphysical
impossibility, rather than finding it to open onto possibility itself. She will
understand “all his history” as if this history were the submerged part of an iceberg
supporting the tip of a present human being, rather than the imminent possibility
of intelligent living, the “genius” of historical being, with which she is always
already immanently engaged. We encounter any historical being within Emersonian
history on the horizon of its reasons for existence; the thought of this being “prior to
the fact,” with that being-as-object post factum understood as subject to laws given
power to explain its concrete existence. Another way of saying this is that the
historical object, whether human or acorn, never appears apart from the subject’s
engagement with it (as “the human spirit goes forth”) within a field of rational
possibility. The explanation of this object by this subject, whether positioning it
relative to other subjects and objects within a rational nexus or determining its
movement in relation to a predictive end, is a function of this engagement, not a
relationship established by an interior (passive) subject between exterior (passive)
objects.
Emerson proclaims, “This human mind wrote history, and this must read it.
The Sphinx must solve her own riddle. If the whole of history is in one man, it is all
to be explained from individual experience” (3). Since she will not glean the
meaning of this “one mind,” in its productive inscription of history, neither will the
empiricist apprehend this same mind in its involvement with reading what it has
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written. She will not gather the sharing of destinies, in both senses of the word
sharing, as co-inhabiting and as communicating, since for her, either every soul is
separate, awash in an alien succession of tides, or else there are no souls, only
islands of interpretation. She will not understand, for instance, what Frederick
Douglass asks of his listeners in the great address of 1852 recorded as “What to the
Slave Is the Fourth of July?” When Douglass orates this speech to the Rochester
Ladies Anti-Slavery Society, he attempts to enter the perspectives of his listeners,
however improbable this seems, and he entreats them to enter his, however
improbable this seems:
I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your
high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between
us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in
common. — The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and
independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me.
The sunlight that brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes
and death to me. This Fourth [of] July is yours, not mine. You may
rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand
illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous
anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. (LWFD 5)
In this speech, we find Douglass reading his audience in the context of
American history, Douglass reading his own history, Douglass providing his own
history for reading by the audience, and our own reading of both Douglass and the
silent women in his audience. For the empiricist, in relating to this history of an
event, since there are only passively received facts, including facts of perception and
audition, none of this “reading” takes place, if reading involves the understanding of
thought. For her, there are, at best, grouped, historically formed narratives that
some can share but not all, where incommensurability cuts rigid borders, and at
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worst, there are only singularities, atomized vantages, perhaps no vantages at all,
from which communication and construction are indistinguishable. She will lay
stress on Douglass’s “immeasurable distances,” to the point where these distances
break into unbridgeable abysses. But when Douglass says, “The sunlight that
brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me,” he assumes
that he and his listeners share the same sunlight (both of the sun and its metaphor
of American liberty), despite the refraction of this light in a Pharmakon-like
manner. He also assumes that these polar consequences, “life and healing” and
“stripes and death,” speak in a universal language of health and suffering (the
general possibilities of human life). In reading his speech from this Emersonian
vantage, we find Douglass reasoning together with us and his audience, even as he
carefully demarcates the great divides that we must overcome.
For Emerson, such gathering-in-reasoning takes place in all historical and
transpersonal relations as the human mind speaking to itself. In delivering his
speech, Douglass does not intend to do what the empiricist takes him to accomplish
(to place an utter sphinxlike abyss at the heart of understanding), since if this were
the case, his speech would be futile, and he would not deliver it at all. The
empiricist will find in his words a perpetual war of biological and social and
subjective identities, rather than engaged communion within a projective expanse,
even if this expanse is littered with dangerous obstacles and frightening occlusions.
Though Douglass does not make explicit the projection of shared ends, particularly
infinite, with his communicative event (since he addresses the ordinary listener and
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not the philosophical empiricist), such shared ends animate, from an illuminated
Emersonian perspective, the orchestration of the whole. Douglass, of course, was
not a transcendental idealist, whether Kantian or Emersonian, and yet, we can find
within his practical idealism, idealism as understood in the more prosaic utopian
sense, a resonance with Emerson’s account of the projective life of the spirit.48
We hear the empiricist within us say, “No one that was not subject to slavery
themselves could understand the perspective of an emancipated slave from 1852,
not the wealthy white women whom Douglass addressed then and certainly not the
bourgeoise readers from our time.” Or even, we may hear her announce, “Further,
we could never ‘reason ourselves’ towards a shared perspective with Douglass, since
we could never translate the suffering of a racially-dominated body in a time of
terror into rational terms that were not themselves tools of domination.” When

48. In Frederick Douglass and the Fourth of July, James A. Colaiaco quotes
Douglass as he frames this projective life in the following manner: “Before
proceeding with his narration of the highlights of the American Revolution of 1776,
Douglass declared that America was not beyond redemption. It was not too late for
the nation to fulfill its promise. There was hope because ‘your nation is so young....
You are, even now, only in the beginning of your national career, still lingering in
the period of childhood.’ He continued: “There is hope in the thought, and hope is
much needed, under the dark clouds which lower above the horizon. The eye of the
reformer is met with angry flashes portending disastrous times; but his heart may
well beat lighter at the thought that America is young, and that she is still in the
impressionable stage of her existence’” (38).
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Emerson says, “What befell Asdrubal49 or Caesar Borgia50 is as much an illustration
of the mind’s powers and depravations as what has befallen us,” how does he
imagine that we might share in the singular feats, the singular horrors, and the
cultural-historical differences with which these cases confront us? (TCRWE II, 4)
We can takes this apparently rhetorical question, however, and transform it into a
real one, noting that we too bleed, fear death, summon courage, encounter despair,
court destruction, and we do all of these things in the projection of ends and the
judgment of objects, no differently than Douglass or Hasdrubal. Why not, rather
than keeping these alien cases as inert black boxes to be put on a shelf and held at a
distance from engaged empathy, would we not endeavor to engage their history and
make it our own, seeing how far we can allow their suffering (and hopeful and
violent and ambivalent) experiences to project our own ends and objects? The error
of our interior retrospective empiricist is that she understands these historical
relations as the receptions of impressed identities, bleakly held apart by historical
forces, rather as differences to be overcome within moving projects of identification.
In an Emersonian spirit, we can counterpose a question: does this internal
empiricist, the master of retrospection, even understand her own perspective?
From a strictly Humean empiricist standpoint, the self quite literally cannot

49. Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, ran into battle during his army’s
retreat and was promptly beheaded by the Romans, his head delivered in a sack to
Hannibal, his brother.
50. During a siege, Borgia outran his own army and encountered a group of
Navarrian knights who fatally speared him and stripped his corpse.
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understand itself, since it can assign no cause to the procession of impressions
beyond the internal narratival ordering of those impressions themselves: anything
resembling Cartesian self-substance as an object of knowledge vanishes from the
scene, as does self-identity over time. If, as such an empiricist, I attempt to “reason
myself towards my own self,” then this reasoning could only amount to a form of
manipulative violence against the flow of ideas. Our inner empiricist, however,
disavows self-knowledge in a more important way for Emerson, since she only
attempts to know herself through (retrospective) introspection, rather than knowing
herself through the making explicit of her own intelligence by acting and thinking
in her own name, an acting and thinking that always resonates with the reason of
history.
For Emerson, therefore, she stands as “a Sphinx who must solve her own
riddle.” This metaphor does not imply that I find myself as a problem to be solved
but rather that, in my present state, the riddle that I pose to myself is in principle
unsolvable, and, thus, I must fundamentally change my orientation (awaken from
darkness and sleep), so that the (historical) knowledge of myself can first become
possible. A Sphinx, beyond the complex etiology of this creature in Greek myth and
even in Oedipus’ story in Sophocles, was also for Emerson (as it remains for us) a
mysterious figure, animal and human, carved into dead wind-worn Egyptian stone.
Our riddle for ourselves is that we pose questions to ourselves, as we would to the
living Oedipus, when we are not yet (or no longer) alive. How can an inert being,
one whose relations to itself and everything past and future are themselves inert,
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know its own history? In order to do so, that thing would have to wake up, knowing
itself in the process.51
Emerson implements the following rhetorical strategy in “History’s” odd
opening: because of our passive relation to our historical being, one inculcated not
only through our ideas but also through our concrete historical education itself, we
must be shocked out of inertia. The move out of inertia and into historical
reasoning being (which is also the uncovering of the selves that we already were,
from beneath the cloth that has draped our understanding) does not happen
automatically. It must be provoked. This is part of the function of the provocative
ministerial direct address in Emerson’s essays, but we see this provocation in
“History” take the form of a poetic reverie, wherein Emerson reveals what he has
been doing only after he has been adequately misunderstood. 52 The voice that
51. Later in “History,” the Sphinx will reappear, precisely in the figure of alien
stone brought to life: “Belzoni digs and measures in the mummy-pits and pyramids
of Thebes, until he can see the end of the difference between the monstrous work
and himself. When he has satisfied himself, in general and in detail, that it was
made by such a person as he, so armed and so motived, and to ends to which he
himself should also have worked, the problem is solved; his thought lives along the
whole line of temples and sphinxes and catacombs, passes through them all with
satisfaction, and they live again to the mind, or are now.” (TCRWE II, 7) So not
only are “the temples and sphinxes and catacombs” brought to “live again in the
mind,” they do so only through Belzoni’s engaged activity (digging, measuring),
until he finds works that are resonate with his own work, made in the service of
“ends to which he himself should also have worked.” The difference between the
monstrous and Belzoni collapses not merely in his making the alien object alive, but
also in his becoming less monstrous himself through engaging in an intelligent
human project.
52. Andrea Knutson analogizes Emerson’s requirement for experimental
reading: testing—failure, reformulation, and retesting—precisely on the model of
concrete investigation in the sciences. She states, “Anyone who ‘reads’ Emerson
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speaks to us with utter self-certainty of “one mind,” flowing through Shakespeare
and Solomon and “a slip of a boy” announces what its speaker has heard
prophetically, imply that he has seen something transcendent that we have not, and
this functions not to make us take what he says as empirical or metaphysical
doctrine but rather to allow its strange light to expose our shadows as such,
attempting to elicit us to squint towards its vision. (TCRWE II, 5)
C. On Emerson’s Idealism
Here, though we have moved from the first paragraph of Emerson’s Nature
into his essay “History,” we have travelled where he has taken us, since in apparent
paradox, Nature begins with a discussion of history rather than its named topic.
Like any poetic writer, Emerson deals in the unexpected, and he brings the reader
into meandering chains of association rather than into linear arguments and
presentations. In the terms of what I have discussed above, the idealist philosopher
of spontaneity makes explicit the projective activity of the “I.” She does so through
A.) displaying the inner vacuity of empiricism and B.) formalizing the relation
between the subject and its object or end in order to allow one to think “inside” the
animating activity that holds this relation in place. Although this philosophical

understands how his sentences force his audience into a certain mode of
experiencing his ideas that disrupt familiar reading habits. One needs, in the spirit
of the “metaphorizing power,” to figure them out, as it were. One cannot read them
in the standard linear fashion. Instead, his audience must become habituated to a
thinking process enacting the process of discovery described by Reed and
Herschel—becoming readers/natural philosophers who turn to their powers of
reasoning and imagination to make meaning out of what often feels like the chaos of
his sentences” (119).
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making-explicit is not mechanically or mathematically linear, like a theorem or
proof, it follows the ancient Platonic logic of the movement of thoughtful vision as it
transcends the sensible realm. It requires, furthermore, a certain knowledge of the
history of thought losing itself, for instance in skepticism and dogmatism, and it (re)enacts the overcoming of these losses to address (ever-)present distortions in
thought.
I designate Emerson a writer of spontaneity because Emerson’s writing, at
least somewhat, participates in this philosophical activity, an activity in our time
that we cannot dissociate from (the inheritance of) idealism. In Emerson, however,
we find no progression up Diotima’s ladder of Eros, no ascension up the divided line,
no regression towards an unmoved mover, no tracing backwards along the links of
the chain of being, no proof of the priority of thinking to being, no deduction of the
fundamental categories of mind or language, and no progressive logic that allows
thought to enter into and comprehend the history of its being. Emerson’s writing,
for instance in its beginning Nature with history and “History” with an apparent
ahistorical solipsism, is, at best, haphazard from a philosophical vantage. One,
particularly the empiricist (always in us), might be tempted to say this because
Emerson’s writing opposes philosophy, interrupts philosophy from within,
eviscerates philosophy through exposing it to its poetic outside, inscribes philosophy
within material history, or replaces philosophy with a poetized thinking beyond it,
yet none of these things are true. There is no general critique of philosophy within
Emerson’s work, only general respect for philosophy. This is so primarily not
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because Emerson holds figures such as Plato and Kant in high regard (although he
does) but rather because he shares in their revelatory ends of exposing the truth of
reason.
We can only regard Emerson’s writing within his great essays, because of its
twists, (dis)associations, metaphors, lyrical reveries, and performative subtleties, as
poetic writing or even as a form of poetry. It is no mystery that poetry, insofar as it
can enfold any mode of speaking or thinking, can enfold philosophy within it,
miming for a time the movements of its thinking. Emerson’s relation to idealism in
his writing, however, is more resonant and complementary than mimetic: it is not
as if he seeks to contain philosophy’s power or usurp its role so much as to work
together with it. Work together with it towards what? Perhaps we can
acknowledge the conventional division between poetry as the unsystematic and
philosophy as the systematic through noting that the difference between Emerson’s
writing and the writing of philosophy is the lack of system within his work. The
imperative towards the systematic always conditions philosophical thought, even
when philosophy disavows its own systematic nature: Emerson’s work is too
unsystematic even for such a dialectical disavowal. The similarity between
Emerson’s work and the work of philosophy, however, lies in both of their
commitments to the restoration of thoughtful life in the advent of its (always
threatened) loss. But this means that Emerson’s work, precisely because it does not
engage thought by virtue of system (for instance, as Rödl engages various forms of
philosophical empiricism through a recovery of idealism within the practice of
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linguistic analysis), will have to restore this thoughtful life by other thoughtful
means, involving more concretized, singular, idiosyncratic deployments of language
to direct his readers past equally concretized, singular, idiosyncratic moments of
thought’s darkening.53
Empiricism, for Rödl involves the (hypocritical) theoretical separation of the
subject from its own engaged immanence in the projection of its objects and ends,
which means that this subject distorts its distinctively human cognitive life through
disavowing its own self-consciousness while living it. This is no small problem. The
(self-)characterization of subjectivity as a passive receptacle or as non-existent, first,
is not merely “a philosophical idea.” This empiricist mode of thinking animates
much of contemporary philosophical discourse, shaping the intellectual interests
and the direction of energies of some of the brightest people in the world, effectively
allowing a significant repository of the intellect to turn against itself: projecting,
living thinking attempting to ground itself either within the inert immanence of
conscious experience or the equally inert immanence of material reduction. This is
not as apocalyptic as it sounds, since even in doing such things, these individuals

53. Elizabeth Peabody makes a similar point in her 1838 review: “Minds of the
highest order of genius draw their thoughts most immediately from the Supreme
Mind, which is the fountain of all finite natures. And hence they clothe the truths
they see and feel, in those forms of nature which are generally intelligible to all ages
of the world. With this poetic instinct, they have a natural tendency to withdraw
from the conventions of their own day; and strive to forget, as much as possible, the
arbitrary associations created by temporary institutions and local peculiarities”
(319-321). In withdrawing from the idiosyncrasy of “temporary institutions and
local peculiarities,” the poet must create other idiosyncrasies and peculiarities that
yet communicate something that should be generally intelligible, in a paradoxical
mode of singularized universality.
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remain engaged with thought and life, teaching others to live and think through
their embodied examples, even if they spend a preponderance of their intellectual
being disavowing their own engaged cognition.
Certain philosophical ideas and modes of argumentation, though, are not
merely contained within texts and talking heads in disciplinary enclosures.
Philosophical empiricism, distilled in various ways, spreads far and wide. For
instance, the famous essay by Thomas Nagel “What it is like to be a Bat?” (which
works directly from an empiricist type 1 theory of passive, mysterious
consciousness) informs the discussion of consciousness in areas such as empirical
psychology and animal rights discourse. According to Nagel, when we try to
understand the experience of a creature such as a bat,
The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less
success one can expect with this enterprise. In our own case we
occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as much
difficulty understanding our own experience properly if we
approach it from another point of view as we would if we tried to
understand the experience of another species without taking up
its point of view. This bears directly on the mind-body problem.
For if the facts of experience-facts about what it is like for the
experiencing organism-are accessible only from one point of
view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences
could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism.
(“WLBB,” 442)
For the idealist, however, there are no such things as “facts of experience about
what it is like for the experiencing organism” or a “true character of experiences,” if
these phrases imply that there are any discoverable entities associated with
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experience as such.54 For this idealist, experience “as such” has a form, not a
content, and one makes explicit this form in movements of self-consciousness.55
There is nothing that “it is like to be a bat,” because bats cannot have experience
because they cannot have self-consciousness because they cannot use a language
that would give their experience an articulable form. In creating his comparison,
Nagel radically misunderstands human experience as an animalic impression,
leaving us with a false idea of both human and animal awareness.
Furthermore, even though Nagel’s essay involves (relatively) abstract
philosophical theory presented in a (relatively) abstract philosophical form, Jennifer
Schuessler, in an article in the New York Times, has shown that Nagel’s work has
been widely endorsed by a variety of fundamentalist creationists, despite his quite
liberal political leanings (NYT 2013/02/07).56 Insofar as it is read, the work of
philosophy shapes intellectual lives of all sorts, and the work of (self-)distorting

54. We can see how pervasive this idea of consciousness as an inner (self)presence through Knutson’s description of its historical expanse. She claims, “what
these writers continually return to is the idea of consciousness as an “inner sense,”
a view Antonio Damasio argues has been held by as diverse a group of thinkers as
Locke, Kant, Freud, and William James, as well as himself” (114).
55. Robert Pollock maintains, “Emerson attributed so much independence to
the human spirit in its power to apprehend nature’s deeper meanings, that at times
he sounds like a subjective idealist. But his real intent is merely to stress the
profound interiority of the human spirit” (Emerson in the 21st Century, 16). But on
my reading, there is little difference between a subjective idealism and a thinker of
“the profound interiority of the human spirit,” at least in comparison to a thinking
of projective transcendence on the horizon of infinite objects and ends.
56. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/books/thomas-nagel-is-praised-bycreationists.html
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philosophy also shapes lives of all sorts, even if it does this through further
distorting already distorted ones. Insofar as the philosophy of Sellars,
Wittgenstein, and Rödl combat empiricism effectively within proper philosophical
venues, they also give us resources to address, transform, and explicate beyond this
empiricism in its diluted cultural forms.
In my reading of Emerson, I am not interested in the way in which Emerson
responds to philosophical empiricism directly, because he does not. In his work, he
rarely mentions empiricism, and when he does, he is merely concerned with the
over-valuation of singular cases in relation to general law or possibility, not any
philosophical theory. When he mentions Locke or Hume, it almost always takes the
form of general praise, usually directed towards an entire list of personages in
which one or the other is included, although he does once denounce the shallowness
of Hume’s abstractions, immediately before doing the same with Johnson’s
(TCWRWE V, 138). Emerson was not one to engage in any form of extended
philosophical debate or argumentation. His work, however, continually engages
and attempts to turn us from the intellectual, industrial, aesthetic, or merely
indolent prioritization of the receptive/passive relation to self and world. Therefore,
when I read Rödl and Emerson together, I do not mean to suggest that there is an
inner Rödlian daemon within Emerson trying to burst free, nor that Rödl is secretly
Emersonian, despite his proclivity for philosophical systemization (though this is
probably more or less the case). Rather, I merely suggest that Rödl’s work of
making explicit the overcoming of philosophical empiricism provides a
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hermeneutical template for both drawing out Emerson’s formal, complementary
resonance with the actual work of idealism, as opposed to its doctrinal expression,
as well as allowing us to see structural patterns and relatively coordinated
strategies (of explication as reorientation) within Emerson’s improvisational
writing. As I have argued, these patterns and strategies resonate with the work of
philosophical idealism because they share similar ends of drawing active human
self-consciousness from out of its self-disavowal.
Thus, to return to Nature from “History,” we find Emerson prefiguring, if not
the Sphinx from that essay, then at least its primordial language (from the
Egyptian sphinx that prefigured the Greek sphinx), in the lines almost immediately
following its opening:
Every man's condition is a solution in hieroglyphic to those inquiries
he would put. He acts it as life, before he apprehends it as truth. In
like manner, nature is already, in its forms and tendencies, describing
its own design. Let us interrogate the great apparition, that shines so
peacefully around us. Let us inquire, to what end is nature? (TCRWE I,
7)
If I am an image inscribed in stone, if that is my initial condition, then this image
would have to come alive and move in order for it to discover what it is an image of,
and, hence, to know itself as an “I,” so that I can recognize it as my life. For this to
happen, I would have to shift my understanding of myself from merely being a body
in the world or a collection of perceptions (a literal or figurative “eye”) and discover
myself in my characteristic engagements with objects and ends, thus (re-)placing
my image within the pupillary circle of human life. Likewise, and it is important
that Emerson makes the interrogation of nature an analogue of self-discovery, if am
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to know nature, then I must encounter it as similarly alive, which implies it too
must be brought (for me) out of dead passivity and returned to the land of the
living.
How are we, however, to encounter a living nature, when we have worked so
hard to make it die? When Emerson says that “nature is already, in its forms and
tendencies, describing its own design,” then does this not lead us back into
supernatural mystification of natural processes? This phrase is more difficult than
it appears, though, since in earlier metaphysical/theological understandings, when
nature “describes its own design,” then this design that it describes is one that God
already imprinted within it through his creation: nature unfolds intelligibly because
it was intelligently made, and the “forms and tendencies” apprehended with it are
ultimately emblem of the transcendent divine. Emerson does not say this here,
however, speaking merely of nature “describing its own design,” which literally
implies that nature designs and creates itself as spontaneous being. What that
would mean in this context is not entirely clear, and it is perhaps meant as a debt to
be honored in the coming sections. This unclarity itself is a sort of disclosive
strategy, one of which Emerson is fond to the point of being overly fond: the gnomic
statement that encloses the enigmatic question that portends the profound answer
yet to be revealed, positioned as a dramatic locus of hope. How could nature, in
describing its own design, create itself as God creates Himself and the remainder of
the world? Even here, however, Emerson does not leave us stranded, since he goes
on to describe nature not in itself but rather in relation to us, insofar as it manifests
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to us as “the great apparition.” When he concludes, “Let us inquire, to what end
nature?”, we are to hear this “end” ambiguously, both as the end of nature itself, the
self-revelation towards which it is propelled in its forms and tendencies” and as the
end to which we assign nature in our subjective apprehension of it.
The typically modern scientific way to collapse this ambiguity of the
purposive being of nature is to claim that its end is nothing other than our own.
This is to say that nature has no proper end, that it is only an inert material object
in the scope of our comprehension. In this view, we find the paradigmatic form of
empiricism: we passively receive the impression of the utterly passive (dead) object,
to reconstruct it as we wish. The question Emerson implicitly poses here is one
concerning how we can keep the question of the “end of nature” as a real one and,
therefore, hold the ambiguity of its end in place. One significant thought here, itself
a promissory note, is that when I think myself “inside” the circling projection of the
object on the horizon of the space of reasons, I do not only think “myself”
immanently within the giving and asking for reasons: nature draws me forth to
respond to it, even as I perpetually decide upon my response and, thus, upon who I
am in relation to nature. Insofar as, to put this in a practically Heidegger-like form,
the circle circles, this means that the object always appears for me as meaningful or
relevant: on the horizon of ends.
Precisely because Emerson attempts to make idealism explicit in a poetic
form (and this also means he attempts to move consciousness towards a poetized
self-consciousness, since these are the same thing), he often sounds like a proto-
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Heidegger. Heidegger offers a joining locus for this interpretation of Emerson, since
Rödl quotes Heidegger and is obviously familiar with his work, often using
Heideggerian formulations, while Heidegger often employs idealist-like strategies in
his making explicit, not of consciousness but of the structures of Dasein and the
dispensations of being. For instance, in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger
finds the human and the space in which she dwells co-involved, rather than existing
separately, alienated into the actively representing and the passively received:
When we speak of the human and space, it sounds as though the
human stood on one side, space on the other. Yet space is not
something that faces the human. It is neither an external object
nor an inner experience. It is not that there are humans, and
over and above them space; for when I say “a human,” and in
saying this word think of a being who exists in a human
manner— that is, who dwells— then by the name “human,” I
already name the stay within the fourfold among things. Even
when we relate ourselves to those things that are not in our
immediate reach, we are staying with the things themselves. We
do not represent distant things merely in our mind— as the
textbooks have it— so that only mental representations of
distant things run through our minds and heads as substitutes
for the things. (BW, 358)
Of course, Heidegger’s fourfold is not the encircling projection of the subject in its
living forth towards knowledge and ends, exactly, but it is not not this subject
either, since Heidegger determines the human and its horizon in the wake of
different questions from Rödl. But Heidegger’s formulation does bear a poetic trace
of the living subject of idealism, a subject already traced in Emerson’s account of its
circling nature:
The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the
second; and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated
without end. It is the highest emblem in the cipher of the world.
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St. Augustine described the nature of God as a circle whose
centre was everywhere, and its circumference nowhere. . . .Our
life is an apprenticeship to the truth, that around every circle
another can be drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every
end is a beginning; that there is always another dawn risen on
mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep opens. . . .This
fact, as far as it symbolizes the moral fact of the Unattainable,
the flying Perfect, around which the hands of man can never
meet, at once the inspirer and the condemner of every success,
may conveniently serve us to connect many illustrations of
human power in every department. (TCRWE II, 179)
Heidegger presents his circling relations of the fourfold in a more morally
neutral tone, whereas Emerson emphasizes the perfecting projection of ends.57 Yet
both stress what might be called the inner connectedness of being in the world, a
connectedness that is most profoundly evinced through the articulations of idealism.
According to this formulation, because nature is encircled together with the subject,
for Emerson here is no such thing as a relation to the dead material object that I
then must construct an ad hoc purpose for, as if life in nature always involves
absolute instrumentalism. We encounter all things on the horizon of their

57. In Poetry and Pragmatism, Richard Poirier glosses Emerson’s circles in the
following way: “‘Circles’ in Emerson are equivalent to what are now sometimes
referred to as ‘discursive formations’ . . . an Emersonian “circle,” like a Foucauldian
“discursive formation,” actively creates truths and knowledge and then subtly
enforces their distribution. It follows that truths and systems of knowledge are to be
viewed as in themselves contingent, like other convenient fictions, and scarcely the
worse, if you are an Emersonian pragmatist, for being so. It is fictions that give us
hope. Among those forms of knowledge or truth created by an Emersonian “circle” is
knowledge by any individual of its sense of identity and selfhood, along with the
language by which that self is codified or becomes articulate” (22-23). On my
reading, I see Emerson’s idealism as a precursor not to pragmatism but rather to a
sophisticated analytic idealism that articulates the perpetual revolutions of infinite
projection. Therefore, these circles hold something more profound about human
ends and the human possibility of perfection than could be expressed through the
contingency of “discursive formations.”
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projection towards unity within the space of reasons. If I think that nature is a
“dead object,” then I find myself within the distortions of empiricism, needing to
remember the movement of self-consciousness in/as being.
Emerson’s writing, however, is nowhere near this discursive, operating with
innuendos rather than arguments. And yet, in the third paragraph in Nature, he
will state, “Whenever a true theory [of nature] appears, it will be its own evidence.
Its test is, that it will explain all phenomena” (TCRWE I, 8). This directly implies
that there is no external relation between theory constructed by the subject and the
external object as the target of explanation. If this were so, then there would not be
the possibility of a “theory be[ing] its own evidence,” since from the vantage of
empiricism, evidence for a theory’s truth comes from without, in the form of
confirming or verifying subsequent impressions, not from within that theory itself.
This construction is a statement of a coherentism wherein the goal of inquiry is not
to make theory approximate the external world but rather to make descriptions of
the world (for the subject) cohere with other descriptions of the world (for the
subject). Such statements commit Emerson to inhabiting the realm of the idealist
circle, because they imply that thought speaks with itself and its world within an
intimate dance of perfection.
In this evaluation of Emerson and his poetic-strategic relation to empiricism,
I have sometimes spoken in extremes, situating him in terms of an absolute
difference between intellectual and lived empiricism: the passivity of theoretically
receptive knowledge versus the passivity of a disengaged, overly conservative,
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overly spectatorial mode of living in the world. For human beings as living
intellectuals, however, the poles of this divide are functionally interconnected
within a complicated dynamic. We find ourselves moving between argument and
action, naturally enough, because our life is an interplay between the knowing of
objects and the striving for ends. Sometimes, thus, what would constitute moving
out of distortion involves moving from an intellectual sphere (altering intellectual
self-consciousness) to a personal sphere (altering our engagement with the living
world); for instance, allowing an intellectual-philosophical problem to be solved with
a the undertaking of a different practice of being in the world.
D. Solitude
We can see this nowhere more clearly than in the transition from the last
paragraph of Nature’s introductory chapter and the opening of its first chapter
“Nature,” where the one moves into the other as from ephemeral promise into loving
fulfillment. The chapter “Nature” begins with an imperative towards the fully
enacted engagement between the active subject and the natural world that is its
object: “To go into solitude, a man needs to retire as much from his chamber as from
society. I am not solitary whilst I read and write, though nobody is with me. But if a
man would be alone, let him look at the stars” (TCRWE I, 8). In these brief lines,
we already have a vision of the progressive movement of the subject.
First, we have the presupposition of a movement that has already taken
place, whereby I have retreated from society into my private chamber. In order to
retire from my chamber, I must already have retired to it. Insofar as “retiring”
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allows for a certain sort of solitude, even though it cannot be our final end, retiring
into a chamber already represents a certain minimal attempt at progress.
Otherwise, why would it be mentioned? Why, however, would withdrawal from
society (even if it is merely into a chamber in order to read or sleep) count as
progress, if this progress is supposed to be analogous to the movement from passive
retrospective history into active lived history? Just as Emerson has previously
understood such retrospective practices as biography and the construction of tombs
as inflected with empiricism, here he understands social relations in their negative
dimension, insofar as they can deprive the self of its active being. I have already
had the occasion to mention the social positioning through which industrializing
education places the subject in assigned stationary desks in order to receive
information passively, with that subject becoming more passive herself at every
moment during this process. There are so many instances of such pacification of the
subject that happen in its everyday social life that it would be an insuperable
problem to list them all: standing in line, confinement within vehicles (whether
carriages or cars), being ordered to stare incessantly at printed pages (in Emerson’s
time) or at glowing screens (increasingly in ours) for the accomplishment of social
work, etc. Similarly, as Descartes had to withdraw into his bread oven in order to
properly meditate, to think from his own foundations rather than from given
dogma, we often must withdraw into sequestered solitude in order to escape the
pervasive propaganda of the social world, as it forms us according to various
political orders that are never quite our own. Withdrawing into one’s chamber does
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not represent a divorce from the social but rather an interruption of its destruction
of our capacity for subjective solitude, a destruction whereby it is always
imminently in the process of destroying itself. Going into one’s chamber, supposing
that one does not carry the phone screen of social indoctrination along, already
amounts to an achievement.
But withdrawing into a chamber, even when doing so alone, is perhaps too
social in this negative sense of the term. This is not because dialectically private
chambers are always already social, precisely because the public-private distinction
is already a social one but rather because private chambers, like stationary desks
and prison cells, bear a substantial power for subjective pacification. Being alone is
not enough for active subjective engagement in the projection of objects and ends to
become fully self-conscious, since in order for this to happen, I have to be drawn
outside of myself and towards the objects and ends that sustain me as I sustain
them, within active encircling bursts. Familiar walls and a familiar chair in front of
a familiar fire do not engage me as myself; rather, they put me to rest in my
assigned sleeping quarters, either figuratively, in the zoned daydreaming of resting
life or literally, as the day vanishes, and I merely dream. We might think that
reading and writing in private would allow for an appropriately active indoor
solitude, but Emerson skeptically maintains that even while I remain active alone
inside, “I am not solitary whilst I read and write,” perhaps hearing the danger of
the call to order even within these characteristic practices of isolated engagement
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(with requirements of editing, reporting on what one has read, the need for
achievement, etc. hovering as perpetual threats).
Therefore, Emerson prompts us to retreat even further, into the paradigmatic
instance of looking at the stars, where we assume that this looking does not take
place in the context of an astronomical convention but rather simply when one is
alone, walking or standing, gazing at the night sky. This gazing, whereby the eye
becomes the I, where my hieroglyph life becomes read as living, requires an utter
turning from subjective entrapment. I will commence with the discussion of this
turning in the next section. Now, however, let us return to that point even before
we have withdrawn into our chamber, as we were already ensnared in our
negatively social exterior. Emerson situates the closing paragraph in the
introduction to Nature, before the opening of its chapter “Nature,” in the most
remote place from either solitude or the stars:
Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the
Soul. Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all
which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature
and art, all other men and my own body, must be ranked under this
name, NATURE. In enumerating the values of nature and casting up
their sum, I shall use the word in both senses; — in its common and in
its philosophical import. In inquiries so general as our present one, the
inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur. Nature,
in the common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the
air, the river, the leaf. Art is applied to the mixture of his will with the
same things, as in a house, a canal, a statue, a picture. But his
operations taken together are so insignificant, a little chipping, baking,
patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as that of the
world on the human mind, they do not vary the result. (TCRWE I, 8)
This entry into the space of the “philosophical definition” represents an utter
tumble back into the cave of retrospection, relinquishing even the modest gains
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wherein Emerson has moved from deadening retrospection to pure wonder at the
being of “language, sleep, madness, dreams, beasts, sex” in the space of a few
sentences (TCRWE I, 8). When Emerson defines nature as the “not me” in this
paragraph, synthesizing the ordinary definition of nature as the natural world and
the more proper philosophical definition of nature as the purely external object,
whether artificial or natural, he provides nothing for us to encounter, no obstacle to
overcome, and nothing to significant engage with when we read. Here, Emerson
enters the realm of the purely retrospective, critical-social concept, the very essence
of something inscribed in a dictionary. As we have seen, from the very opening of
the next section, this definition will have practically nothing to do with nature as
Emerson approaches it in the remainder of the work. Instead, as he says it is, this
paragraph provides an understanding of nature (“as I understand it”) that stands in
pure abstraction, almost as if no subject had ever stood in its midst.
This movement into the concept provides for another instance of an
Emersonian shock, this time not in unadulterated engagement without the
comprehension of loss but rather in the yielding to the desire for philosophical
conceptualization, one which in its definitive clarity loses what it seeks. To
withdraw from one’s chamber (and the reading and writing there) in order to look at
the stars would involve also seeing the danger of the concept, even if that concept
must be utilized to make clear what we are supposed to notice. The problem is
twofold. First, the separation of the subject (me) and the object (not me) is precisely
what Emerson is attempting to overcome, and, thus, there is a passive empiricism
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inscribed within this formulation. We can only imagine that this is put forward as a
problem for us to overcome, almost as if the voice of a sophist interlocutor had
intruded into Emerson’s essay. Second, the voice of this formulation performs this
passivity, through relating to subjects and objects with clear demarcating divisions,
losing the actively figurative language, losing the circle of engagement, displaying
the alien divide, across which we passively apprehend, even while conceptually
demarcating this very divide.
At such a juncture, we find the writing of spontaneity divided within itself,
not quite knowing what to do. If this writing were to stay within a philosophical
register, which Emerson’s here does not, then that would require this writing to
twist itself philosophically from the mode of philosophical representation in order to
show what resides beyond this representation, as Rödl does when the “I” that gets
“referred to” within subjective articulation ceases to be a passive object and becomes
revealed as a floating operator in the enaction of reasoning (as does its object).58 In
his poetic writing, with its movements of shock and transformation and overcoming
disavowal and inundation, Emerson sets himself towards making explicit the losses

58. In her excellent Less Legible Meanings, Pamela Schirmeister makes a
similar point: “Emerson’s writing throughout bears the stamp of theoretical
idealism, including its roots in Kantian thought, without, however, in the least its
will to systematization or discursivity and, to some minds, its rigor. We might read
this as Emerson’s failure as a metaphysician; however, it may equally evidence his
understanding that the self-realization of the human—of the scholar—lay not in
philosophy as such but in poetry, or, more precisely, in the unification of poetry and
philosophy called for by both Carlyle and Schlegel. Such a unification would, to a
philosophical eye, look aggressively antitheoretical, but this very refusal of the
theoretical would itself demonstrate and be replaced by the auto-production of the
subject” (42).
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occurring in various concrete modes of passivity, including those found in the
concrete practice of philosophical activity, and projects us towards turning those
losses into gains.
E. The Perpetual Presence of the Sublime
Therefore, following Emerson, we will have travelled from the articulation of
a universally social abstract definition into our being tranfixed by a higher
firmament, being held within a deeper solitude by the shining of a star. Emerson’s
solitude beyond or before that of the lonely chamber reminds us of, is perhaps
inspired by, the opening of Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles above
Tintern Abbey,” wherein “steep and lofty cliffs” on a “wild secluded scene/ Impress
thoughts of a more deep seclusion; and connect the landscape with the quiet of the
sky” (Lyrical Ballads 201-202).59 In Rödl’s idealist projection of self-consciousness,
we found an articulation of subjective transcendence, as it moved beyond passive
reception of objects and into the enacted engagement with the infinite, towards the
perfection of ultimate truths and goods. This transcendence does not project
towards an unknowable Platonic heaven but rather towards the immanently
knowing unification of human life, as it exists through the movement of selfperfection (in the unities of truths and ends). Rödl’s reorientation of the

59. In his biography Ralph Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes notes, “No
writer is more deeply imbued with the spirit of Wordsworth than Emerson, as we
cannot fail to see in turning the pages of “Nature,” his first thoroughly
characteristic essay” (92). The elucidation of Emerson via Wordsworth is, thus, not
fortuitous, and furthermore, because of their resonance, both can be elucidated
through the lens of a more contemporary idealism.
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philosophical intellect, though necessarily abstract, ushers that intellection beyond
even the greater distorting abstraction of empiricism that breaks the circle of
projective life into subjects divided from objects or even divided from themselves.
We can see the work of both Wordsworth and Emerson flowing in a similar idealist
vein, projecting engagement from out of retrospective loss, but the modalities of
their poetic projection more resemble stumbles and leaps towards the concretion of
life than they do the geometrical oscillations and progressions of critique and
dialectic.
For instance, as he unfolds his images of transcending seclusion, Wordsworth
does not exactly direct the reader towards the subjective limits of nature in the
encounter with the beautiful or sublime (thus allowing subjectivity to become aware
of itself in its shining through everything). Instead, he carries the reader from the
“lofty cliffs” to “thoughts of more deep seclusion” that immediately connect the
landscape (and perhaps the horizontally inclined self in repose) with “the quiet of
the sky” (LB, 201-202). From this sky, we fall back into repose (almost as if we had
repositioned our subjective stance) “under this dark sycamore,” amidst “plots of
cottage ground” and orchard tufts.” From there, almost being lost in the
inarticulate immanence of nature, we spot “wreaths of smoke/ Sent up in silence”
that perhaps portend “vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods” or “some Hermit’s
cave, where by his fire/ The hermit sits alone.” Wordsworth places these accordion
transitions between the inhuman and the human, the low the high, thought and its
other, etc. not as the means through which we can encounter a transcendent (or
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immanent) nature but rather as the indication of a nature that manifests for him in
the spacing of these transitions. The poem began with a reported return to this
scene (“again I hear/ These waters”), and after his speculation on the hermit in the
cave, Wordsworth informs us he has been another sort of hermit, living in “lonely
rooms and ‘mid the din/ Of towns and cities,” and yet even then had “owed” to the
recollection of such scenes, to which he has now returned (LB, 203).
In moving us into this (perpetually) transitional space, this flowing passage
between mourning and exultation and reflection and enjoyment that is the human
encounter with nature (and, hence, the only nature we know), it is not as if
Wordsworth does not avail himself of philosophical thought. When he makes
pronouncements such as “We see into the life of things” (LB, 204) or speaks of “A
motion and a spirit, that impels / All thinking things, all objects of all thought, /And
rolls through all things” (LB, 207), it is not as if Wordsworth is avoiding philosophy,
attempting to move into non-intellectual adoration of nature. When he articulates
his famous phrase, “Of eye, and ear, —both what they half create, / And what
perceive,” it is not as if this does not have a Kantian resonance wherein a divided
mind knows the world it represents (LB, 207-208). And yet, such utterances within
this poem are not (empiricist) conclusions that announce a substantial worldly
spirit or a living energy or the mind’s creative emanation of the world, as if these
were things among the trees. Rather, these phrases participate in the movement of
the reader to the spacing (of nature) within Wordsworth’s disclosive dynamics,
almost as if his words were carriages, transporting her to a time between the
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memory and expectation of the natural encounter, on the circling wheel of the
present.
Likewise, Emerson’s entreaty for the one seeking solitude to “look at the
stars” does not call for a fall into mere natural immanence. There would be no
engagement and no solitude in such immanence. There are two dangers here.
First, in my encounter with it, nature may overwhelm me, so that I lose any sense
of self-consciousness. The “experience” of being swept down a raging river would
provide a paradigmatic example. Although I would be all too alone in such a case,
there would be no solitude there, since the “I” would vanish in a torrent of fear.
Second, in the natural encounter, I may retreat so far into myself that the engaged
object becomes determined as a mere appearance. But in this case, I do not
encounter solitude qua isolation from others, since the others entirely disappear,
along with the nature into which I would withdraw. A daydreaming fugue under
the pines would not count as an instance of solitude in nature, since in losing the
relation to anything other than appearance for the mind, I also lose the sense of
myself as alone and in nature. Emerson, therefore, chooses his example of the star
carefully. The star engages the subject when she sees it, drawing her towards it. At
the same time, this star evinces its distance as object from the perceiver. Emerson
will open the paragraph following the star’s introduction with the following
conclusion:
The stars awaken a certain reverence, because though always
present, they are inaccessible; but all natural objects make a
kindred impression, when the mind is open to their influence.
(TCRWE I, 9)
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A complicated dynamic unfolds in Emerson’s isolating interplay with the
star, as he moves towards this conclusion in his writing. This passage, however,
contains within itself a microcosm of these dynamics. First, it implicitly indicates
that we encounter the star, at first, under the influence of empiricism, with its
language (“a kindred impression”) directly drawing from the philosophical
empiricist’s vocabulary. The very choice of the star as object, in fact, inclines us
towards empiricism, since it provides a paradigmatic example of the empirically
encountered object. The star impresses its light upon us from a distance. The star
is like an atom separated from all others, and I encounter the multiplicity of stars
in associative constellations. My relation to the star seems fundamentally passive,
since I cannot affect it. This experience of the star, however, provides a template for
our encounter with “all natural objects,” insofar as they make “a kindred
impression.” All such objects, when we hold a passively receptive relation to them,
appear as “present” but “inaccessible.”
On the one hand, these objects appear as given to the subject, emanating
towards it as presence, as light indicates the presence of a source. On the other, as
representations for the subject, these objects appear as forever separated from it. I
only see the light and not the star itself. What, however, holds this contradictory
relation of present inaccessibility in place? What allows for this tension (that will
manifest in a “reverence”: perhaps as the presence of God both emanates within and
yet transcends the holy space, inspiring a reverential atmosphere) between the
thing that simultaneously impresses as present but also withdraws as forever
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unreachable? What allows the stars to appear as ready for empiricist
interpretation, and yet, in their very shining, to transcend such interpretation?
Emerson gives the answer in his lead up to his apparent empiricist
separation between the subject and its object: “The rays that come from those
heavenly worlds, will separate between him and what he touches.” The rays of
light, on the one hand, announce the being of the star, but they also divide us from
it in calling our attention towards it. Those rays not only announce and scission us
from the being of the star. They also herald the simultaneous presence and
withdrawal of all things that appear to us. The rays of light “separate between him
and what he touches,” insofar as they reveal all things to be like the stars-reverentially inspiring heavenly beings. The strange point is here is that this
separating yet binding light itself has a strange quasi-objective presence, one that
keeps in place this differential opposition between star as found and star as lost.
Immediately thereafter, Emerson likewise invokes the figure of another strange
quasi-objective presence that both allows access and yet separates: “One might
think the atmosphere was made transparent with this design, to give man, in the
heavenly bodies, the perpetual presence of the sublime.” As rays of light both
reveal and obscure their source, the atmosphere both gives us access to these rays
and yet refracts them as they pass through to us. In its transparence (a between
neither visible nor invisible, almost as if it hovered between the sensible and the
intelligible), this atmosphere simultaneously allows for the luminescent
transitiveness of the stars to shine through, mimes this luminescent power, and
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practically condenses it into a “perpetual presence of the sublime.” The “presence of
the sublime” is an appropriately odd phrase, since the sublime takes place at the
edge of presence, where representation reaches its limits in the face of the
inaccessible, returning the subject to itself in a moment of awe.
As we found Emerson transporting us earlier from the abstraction of the
social concept into the chamber and back out into nature again (or Wordsworth
moving us between similar spaces and distances and modalities), this atmosphere of
sublime transcendence descends into urban life, allowing for another binding of
presence to separation:
Seen in the streets of cities, how great they are! If the stars should
appear one night in a thousand years, how would men believe and
adore; and preserve for many generations the remembrance of the city
of God which had been shown! But every night come out these envoys
of beauty, and light the universe with their admonishing smile.
(TCRWE II, 8-9)
This “one night in a thousand years” was perhaps one actual night some thousands
of years ago, since the stars were wondered at as divine before they were viewed as
natural phenomena, and these believers took those stars to herald the presence of
gods and angels who controlled the destiny of those below, who created mythic
stories about them. Seen in this light, Emerson impels the city dweller, now exited
from her chamber, strolling in a deeper isolation, to re-enter this ancient space of
reverential wonder, with this transcending wonder now being the crux of isolation
and with this dweller’s lonely chamber expanded to include the dome of the
heavens. We have, apparently, forgotten our capacity for this transcending
encounter, not only with the stars but with transcendence itself, because of the
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commonplace nature of normal stargazing, if we take the time to look up at all. But
Emerson reminds us that its possibility remains, twinkling every night in
admonishment.
In such a state of wonder, “nature never wears a mean appearance,” precisely
because the “mean” as “common” has been transformed into the uncommon
everyday. What we have here in these movements from rays of light to the actual
atmosphere to the spacing of transcendence as a metaphorical atmosphere,
surrounding and pervading everything is a drawing into the “isolation” of subjective
engagement that transcends the solitude of loneliness. In the movement towards
this realization, Emerson has proceeded from the simple conceptual division
between the subject and the object—the ME and the NOT ME—and he has moved
us through figures of retreat (from the social to the chamber, from the chamber to
the private gaze, from the private gaze to the separating/dividing rays that make it
possible, to the atmosphere that refracts the rays, to the atmosphere of the social
and historical that both withholds and yet allows for wonder, and then back to those
stars themselves, smilingly singularizing the one who beholds them in her higher
isolation.
In this other chamber of isolation, beyond abstraction and loneliness, within
a circulating atmosphere of transcendence illuminated by refracted starlight, my
intellect (“curiosity”) is directed towards the perfection of things, without that
perfection ever being exhausted. Once again, Emerson echoes Wordsworth, as he
finds “the flowers, the animals, the mountains” to reflect “the wisdom of his best
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hour” (Wordsworth from “Tintern Abbey”—"On that best portion of a good man's
life”), revealing how this circulating aura inspires those things caught up in its
vortex. Emerson here reflects,
When we speak of nature in this manner, we have a distinct but most
poetical sense in the mind. We mean the integrity of impression made
by manifold natural objects. It is this which distinguishes the stick of
timber of the wood-cutter, from the tree of the poet. (TCRWE II, 9)
Thus, we have travelled from the impression of nature, even the impression
of the star, to the underlying integrity of that impression, that which holds it
together within itself and in relation to others. Of this integrity, we both speak in a
poetic sense and reveal the working of this poetic sense in nature itself, bearing
witness to its transition from the atomized fragment into the integrated
articulation. Our gaze shifts from the industrialized severance of nature from itself,
not from the saw but rather from the eye of the wood-cutter, and towards the living
tree, restored to itself, through the vision of the poet. The philosophical empiricist,
in this sense, is an intellectual wood-cutter of the soul, insofar as she severs the
circle of the subject’s life in its projection of reasons in which it, temporalizing,
subsists as the being it is. The idealist such as Rödl, therefore, restores this circling
life back to itself from out of its self-dissection, in a revelatory step back into explicit
self-consciousness. The poetic idealist such as Wordsworth or Emerson also
provides for this step back, but it is a step back not merely of the intellect into its
living involvement with its world of ends but of the materialized person, where this
materialization is now not merely understood as the situating ground of projection
but rather as that which carries this projection forth, in the dynamics of the
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affective body, the stepping into nature, the concrete upwards glance, where the
spiritual atmosphere and the real one merge in a moment of disclosive reverence.60
Whereas an idealist like Kant, for instance, reveals that underlying the
supposed disconnectedness of our impressions of things, there operates a
subjectified schematism, a substratum of imagination binding and presenting those
things for what they are, holding the subject together as it holds this imaginative
activity together, a poetic idealist like Emerson provides for a series of schematizing
movements or transitions through which nature returns to a form of spontaneous
apparition, its immanent light relit. Notice that just as Rödl does not move out of
philosophical language in order to transform that language so that it shows forth its
own self-consciousness, Emerson does not attempt to gesture towards a move
outside or beyond language in order to encounter nature as such: an imperative
towards the mundane real of “actual” involvement, that paradigm of antiintellectualism of practical application. Instead, Emerson resists mere practical
application as part and parcel of this empiricist tendency, while turning our
language back towards emblems of the connected life of nature as I find myself
involved with it.

60. Elizabeth Peabody articulates this disclosive reverence in a beautiful
fashion: “This is not only of refreshing moral aura, but it is a passage of the highest
imaginative power, (taking the word imaginative in that true signification which
farthest removes it from fanciful,) the mind must become purified indeed which can
take this point of view, to look at "the great shadow pointing to the sun behind us."
Sitting thus at the footstool of God, it may realise that all that we see is created by
the light that shines through ourselves. Not until thus purified, can it realise that
those through whose being more light flows, see more than we do; and that others,
who admit less light, see less” (319-21).
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With yet another invocation of the circle, in “The Poet,” we can see Emerson’s
emphasis on the work of the poet in her turning the self out from the detachment of
empiricism into a circulating, projecting wholeness:
For, as it is dislocation and detachment from the life of God, that
makes things ugly, the poet, who re-attaches things to nature
and the Whole, — re-attaching even artificial things, and
violations of nature, to nature, by a deeper insight, — disposes
very easily of the most disagreeable facts. Readers of poetry see
the factory-village, and the railway, and fancy that the poetry of
the landscape is broken up by these; for these works of art are
not yet consecrated in their reading; but the poet sees them fall
within the great Order not less than the beehive, or the spider’s
geometrical web. Nature adopts them very fast into her vital
circles, and the gliding train of cars she loves like her own.
(TCRWE III, 11)
Emerson precisely shows the intimate relationship between the precise expression
of language and the articulation of the world, claiming, “The world being thus put
under the mind for verb and noun, the poet is he who can articulate it.” For him,
the subject gets pulled in together with its objects in their circulating projective
flow:
We are symbols, and inhabit symbols; workman, work, and
tools, words and things, birth and death, all are emblems; but
we sympathize with the symbols, and, being infatuated with the
economical uses of things, we do not know that they are
thoughts. (TCRWE III, 12)
Therefore, we do not realize (have explicit self-consciousness of) our intimate
idealistic relation to self and world, and, thus, we need to be reminded of this
deeper relation. It is the poet that does such reminding:
The poet, by an ulterior intellectual perception, gives them a
power which makes their old use forgotten, and puts eyes, and a
tongue, into every dumb and inanimate object. He perceives the
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independence of the thought on the symbol, the stability of the
thought, the accidency and fugacity of the symbol. As the eyes of
Lyncaeus were said to see through the earth, so the poet turns
the world to glass, and shows us all things in their right series
and procession. (TCRWE III, 12)
Returning to “Nature,” throughout this entire passage, where I have merely
walked outside under the stars, I am still in solitude, having withdrawn from both
philosophical reflection and the lonely chamber into the living outside of the world
(where I am already together with others), but this solitude is now not determined
by the interiority of presence but rather by hushed reverence of the spiritual
encounter with the world as spiritual. It is not as if a transcendent God flowed
through all things but rather as if the pre-existing breath of such a God, the one
that would animate Him, were He to exist, inspires both me and that world (and
everyone in it), propelling us to exist through its imparted strength. This “breath,”
like the rays of light separating between and the transparent atmosphere occurs not
as a physical or metaphysical spiritualized ether but rather flows as the life of the
subject as it projects itself towards the infinite in all its endeavors. This “life of the
subject” is not a physical or metaphysical ether, precisely because it is no thing at
all but rather occurs in the saying of the “I” that now finds itself in solitude, under
the stars towards which it directs its wonders and hopes. Human beings always
find themselves reasoning about what to do and how to know, but this reasoning
does not encounter the existential dimension of its own occurrence, particularly the
way in which it always already integrates the parts that it sees within the whole of
life. In his encounter with the stars, Emerson’s solitude happens precisely as the
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poetic engagement with this integration itself, allowing for a “seeing” not merely of
particulars but also of the projective movement in which these particulars come to
make sense. Poetic language allows this movement to show itself from itself,
insofar as it evinces not only singular words and designations, such as light and
atmosphere, but also its own capacity for illumination and transmission. After all,
the illumination and transmission of meaning carried forth by language always
transmits “from-towards,” with subjects and objects resonating in articulate, yet
incomplete harmony, so poetic language would shine primarily not on particular
things but rather on this resonating movement itself.
When we read Emerson here, on the one hand, we can, in a comparative
manner, make explicit what he does through his poetic transitions through
juxtaposing them with Rödl’s idealist formulations. On the other hand, in order to
keep the integrity of the poetic transitions as such, to allow them to keep working in
their effective mode, we must poetize ourselves, risking the loss of clear conceptual
language necessary for the explication of poetic texts. This Either/Or is the price
one pays for the resistance to empiricism, since in resisting this, one also resists the
space of targeting academic thematization, where one treats the text as an object or
collection of objects to be explained and situated or deployed for various purposes.
As scholarly commentators, we must be empiricists. We are called by the standards
of the profession as well as by concrete individuals instantiating those standards in
their professional lives to be such empiricists. We are always already before the
analytical law of empiricism. And yet, in order to enter into the space of Emerson’s
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engagement with empiricism, as he both discloses its limits and gestures beyond it,
we must precisely resist this wood-cutter language of the intellect in our attempted
co-engagement with the working of his work. We must operate not only against the
forces of institutionalized empiricism from without but also from those internalized
within, operative within this very sentence.
Because of this, we must employ a neurotic turning from the hyperphilosophical into the hyper-poetic that oscillates along the path of what was
supposed to be commentary and critical interpretation.61 Rather, however, than
doing this to expose “theory to its material outside,” as is so often done, in an
Emersonian spirit we must do the opposite, allowing an idealist spirit to dance with
itself in its projective articulations, as it leaps from the poetic to the philosophical,
over the empiricist abyss that lies between. Wordsworth famously said, we murder
to dissect, and we may, perhaps, from our inculcated empiricist stances hear both
Wordsworth and Emerson as being naïve Romantics, adoring the wholeness of being
and resistant to any analytical explanation. But their resistance to the empiricizing
of life is not a resistance towards life’s explanation but rather a resistance towards

61. This neurotic turning is required. If Emerson is turned too much towards
the hyper-poetic, he becomes a naïve Romantic. We can find an instance of such
unbalanced poetic turning in Arthur S. Lothstein’s pronouncement, “Vis-á-vis Plato,
for whom philosophy is a talisman against the bewitchments of poetry, Emerson
ascribes to poets, not philosophers, the pedagogical role of human liberation. Calling
them ‘the children of music’ and ‘liberating gods,’ through whom the divine aura
breathes, it is the sacred transcendentalist poet, not the idealist philosopher-king,
who unlocks our chains and leads us out of our caves or cellars into ‘the open air’”
(Emerson in the 21st Century, 88). For Emerson, however, there is no one central
figure that liberates us but rather a circulation between thought and figure, as life
finds itself in its overcoming of its obstacles.
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the death of subjectivity as such, since the life of self-consciousness requires these
movements to maintain this integrity, poetic or philosophical. When Emerson will
go on to denigrate owners and producers, this denigration gets carried out not out of
disrespect for these activities or professions but rather out of disrespect for the
allowing such activities or professions to consume the life of the mind in the world,
calling it perpetually into a disavowal of its own engagement with its environment,
even if it must take apart this environment in order to live.
F. The Transparent Eyeball
One of Emerson’s greatest sustained meditative streams of poetic prose
commences in the middle of Nature’s self-titled chapter “Nature,” beginning with his
first-person account of a glimpsed landscape and ending with his transformation
into a great encompassing eye. This meditation encapsulates the essential
structure of Emerson’s anti-empiricist strategy. In order to provide a reading of this
disclosive strategy, I will divide this passage into numbered segments to show the
quite meticulous process of Emerson’s poetic making-explicit of the truth of idealism
in the face of our empiricist urge to disavow this truth:
1. The charming landscape which I saw this morning, is indubitably made up of
some twenty or thirty farms. Miller owns this field, Locke that, and Manning
the woodland beyond. But none of them owns the landscape. (TCRWE I, 9)
I suppose that I am Emerson on a typical morning stroll. On such a stroll, on
the one hand, my possibilities for action seem endless. If I am walking, I might
strike up a conversation with a person across the way or head out into the forest to
look for berries or construct an altar to imagined arboreal deities or. . .. While
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walking, on the other hand, I perpetually see “a landscape,” a demarcation of the
horizon of engagement that already implies a certain confinement: a background of
being that acts transcendentally in the proper Kantian sense, both providing for
and restricting possibilities through providing a concrete empirical space of living. I
might engage in any number of activities, but my possibilities of engagement will
always already be limited by certain empirical constraints; for instance, by the
boundary of walking too far, beyond the distance that I could safely travel back to
find home and food. In order to assess the landscape, so that they can safely travel
within it, human beings must, as a function of the existence of a “landscape” at all
(and not an unbounded horizon of chaotic progression), cordon that landscape into
manageable regions for a variety of purposes. One of the principal modes of
cordoning the landscape is to section “it” off into parcels of property. The landscape
painting shows the interplay between the presentation of the boundless, in the
opening extendedness of nature in the horizonal line, and the presentation of the
bounded, in the containment of a specific aesthetic field of items, spaces, colors, and
relations.
In Emerson’s account, we find someone named “Miller” (perhaps as one who
processes the trees cut by the woodcutter in a timber mill or grain harvested by the
farmer in a grain mill) who both owns a plot of land and uses that land for an
assigned purpose. We encounter another person, “Locke,” whose name perhaps
indicates that Emerson here is directly addressing the empiricist as one who divides
experience into manageable subcomponents at the expense of the whole.
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Simultaneously, this appellation of “Locke” implies the entire range of confinements
and securities associating with the lock itself (including the flintlock), through
which the segmented landscape is held in its proper order. Finally, we come across
“Manning,” whose name indicates not only the presence of the human throughout
this cordoned landscape but also the necessary positioning and working of the
human in the activity of maintaining the landscaped zones against their loss
through the chaotic contingencies of natural irruptions. Thus, when Emerson
informs us that “none of them owns the landscape,” he completes a double disclosive
move. On the one hand, he shows the operative limiting inherent within seeing the
landscape as such and the way in which this operative limiting resonates with the
concretized empiricism of human life. On the other, however, precisely in the
disclosure of the landscape as limit, he reveals it as the possibility of transcending
these given boundaries in the pursuit of other possibilities. There is no human life
without limits and without possession and without protection and without actively
maintained confines, but the figure of the landscape not only shows the boundaries
of these confines but also hints towards the infinite possibilities beyond them.
In “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson clarifies these issues of
compartmentalization and possession through setting the empiricist (under the
name of “the materialist”) in relief against the background of the idealist. We can
make this identification between the empiricist and the materialist because
Emerson’s materialist in this essay is not primarily interested in the objective
existence of matter as external substance but rather in matter as measurable
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(containable, compartmentalizable, ownable) mass: the segmented impression.
Therefore, according to Emerson, “The materialist respects sensible masses, Society,
Government, social art, and luxury, every establishment, every mass, whether
majority of numbers, or extent of space, or amount of objects, every social action”
(TCRWE I, 203). The idealist, on the other hand, trades in the immeasurable: “His
thought, — that is the Universe. His experience inclines him to behold the
procession of facts you call the world, as flowing perpetually outward from an
invisible, unsounded centre in himself, centre alike of him and of them, and
necessitating him to regard all things as having a subjective or relative existence,
relative to that aforesaid Unknown Centre of him” (TCRWE I, 203). Notice that
rather than relativizing the existence of the natural world to a Cartesian subjective
self-presence or even a Kantian subjective infrastructure of formation, Emerson
relativizes the natural world to an unsounded subjective depth, an abyssal infinity
that would extend through all things. To be sure, Emerson sometimes phrases the
issue in this essay as if the soul were something like a subjective container,
claiming, “I — this thought which is called I, — is the mould into which the world is
poured like melted wax. The mould is invisible, but the world betrays the shape of
the mould” (TCRWE I, 204). But insofar as this mould is nothing other than the
unsounded itself, its function of containment operates paradoxically, as an opening
rather than an enclosure, which is why the world, perhaps, flows precisely as
melting wax rather than subsisting as a hardened, maintaining the impression of a
given form.
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2. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can
integrate all the parts, that is, the poet. This is the best part of these men's
farms, yet to this their warranty-deeds give no title. (TCRWE I, 9)
This transcendental seeing of the landscape, which means seeing it as the
limited limitless, gives the human being, beyond her possession of property, another
“property in the horizon” that demarcates and opens on the edge of the infinite.
Emerson’s transition from the term “landscape” to “horizon” is significant, since it
evinces a movement of realization that proceeds from the static positioning of a
limited opening (locating the landscape like a door, that both opens beyond but
simultaneously limits access) to a moving-opening that exceeds all boundaries. The
most interesting thing about this horizonal moving-opening (that the poet can see)
is the fact that it perdures as a condition of all integration: a horizon moves along
with and opens up according to the various modes of keeping things apart and
holding them together.
This, according to Emerson, is “the best part of these men’s farms,” and yet
their protective/social modes of holding these farms in place (through the warranty
of legal deeds and labor deeds) do not gives them access to this horizon. For that,
they must shift their lines of vision into a mode of poetic seeing that reveals the
horizon in everything: the opening of the infinite in all of the finite modes of human
presentation. Particularly, this invocation of the poetic requires a turning of
language, not back into the mundane vocabulary of everyday life, a language that is
always already empiricized, but rather into an aesthetically idealized language,
given to excesses of the beautiful and sublime. This turning must twist both out of
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the mundane and out of the industrialized fabrications of language, beyond the
everyday parlance of tending cattle and the professional jargon of dairy production
and into enunciating the between of living-beyond that happens at the crossing
between the human subject and the world she confronts.
In “The Poet,” Emerson refers to this “living-beyond” as a “divine aura”: “The
condition of true naming, on the poet’s part, is his resigning himself to the divine
aura which breathes through forms. . .” (TCRWE III, 15) In poetic speaking, a
resonance takes place between what is spoken and what is spoken about. This does
not happen through a simple onomatopoeic mimesis but rather through the coengagement of a poetic circulation. The poet suffers “the ethereal tides to roll and
circulate through him: then he is caught up into the life of the Universe, his speech
is thunder, his thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as the
plants and animals” (TCRWE III, 16). This happens because the projective
infinities in naming and the endless grounding of the natural call to one another
and harmonize together in the search for articulation. Such articulation is always
only a search, not a delineation, since “The poet knows that he speaks adequately,
then, only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or, “with the flower of the mind;” not
with the intellect, used as an organ, but with the intellect released from all service,
and suffered to take its direction from its celestial life . . .” (TCRWE III, 16). For
Emerson, true speaking requires the liberation of the word from self-possession in
the face of the liberation of the landscape of nature from what human beings
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consider its natural border, so words and boundaries are freed into the horizons of
their possibility.
3. To speak truly, few adult persons can see nature. Most persons do not see the
sun. At least they have a very superficial seeing. The sun illuminates only
the eye of the man, but shines into the eye and the heart of the child.
(TCRWE I, 9)
To say that “few adult persons can see nature” seems, on the face of it,
preposterous. Does this mean that human beings cannot see birds and trees and
rocks and . . .? A quick way out of this counter-intuitiveness is to realize that the
term “nature” is, in fact, both highly artificial and highly conceptual. For most of
their civilized lives throughout their history, most human beings saw birds and
trees and rocks, but they did not see ‘nature’ as a designated totality in any
heightened philosophical sense. There is something of the idea of a totality like
nature in religious myths, where a god creates the heavens and the earth, but this
idea of creation implies the existence of separate realms of being—those things that
exist below such as humans and animals and those things that exist above such as
gods and angels. The idea of nature, however, is not the idea of a realm, but rather
a way of understanding the universal being of beings: the natural world. From this
vantage, rather than being counter-intuitive, the claim that most human beings do
not see nature is, perhaps, too intuitive, since it is hard to understand in what
“seeing nature” would consist, as opposed to seeing rocks and trees.
Emerson gives us a concrete example of “not seeing nature” with the phrase
“most human beings do not see the sun.” This example does not alleviate the
mystery of what would constitute “seeing nature” but rather intensifies it. Of
176

course, most human beings do not see the sun, in a multiplicity of senses. We do
not see the sun but rather its light. We do not see the sun (in the sense of not being
able to look at it directly) because it is too bright. If we see a photograph of the
sun’s surface, where its brightness has been astronomically dimmed, then perhaps
this would count more as seeing the sun than the activity of directing one’s eyes
towards its shining apparition. Unlike nature, perhaps, we know the sun is a thing
and would never suspect it of being “a construct” or “a concept” in its fundamental
mode of existence. And yet, because of our normal visual relation to this sun, it has
the same functional status as a construct or a concept, and as the earlier example
shows, we can only relate to it as a thing directly precisely through a highly
artificial and conceptual means. This, perhaps, is why the sun so easily becomes a
god in myth, since its existence beyond its shining presence is unavailable for mere
human eyes.62 Once again, what seems counter-intuitive in this phrase quickly
transforms into the all-too-intuitive.
The empiricist within us attempts to stay at this level of intuitiveness. Even
if she disagrees with the claim that we do not see nature or do not see the sun,
precisely what she does is to gloss the meaning of ‘nature’ as the existence of

62. William Blake ends his “A Vision of the Last Judgment” with the following
pronouncement: “What it will be Questiond When the Sun rises do you not see a
round Disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea O no no I see an Innumerable company
of the Heavenly host crying Holy Holy Holy is the Lord God Almighty I question not
my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would Question a Window
concerning a Sight I look thro it & not with it” (The Complete Poetry and Prose of
William Blake, 555-556). Such pronouncements extend from various religious
traditions, shining forth in the imagination of deities such as Aten and Apollo.
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concrete natural things and the meaning of “the sun” as the indirectly seen,
theorized object of explanation for the presence of light and warmth. This, perhaps,
is why Emerson says that “the sun only illuminates the eye of the man,” since from
our empiricist vantage as human beings, we can only understand the existence of
something like the sun through its roles within a coordination of beings. Before
addressing the problem of nature, let us ask: what would it mean to see an
apparently concrete being like the sun otherwise than through not seeing it but
rather inferring it: thinking it as a cause of the light that shines in our eyes?
An answer to this question would, perhaps, involve turning towards the sun
not as an inferred cause but rather as an experienced source. This distinction is
subtle, since anything that is a “source” is obviously inferred as a cause, but
experiencing something as a source involves something more than inferring it as a
cause. Experiencing something as a source means affectively undergoing the wake
of its emanation. Whereas inferring something as a cause implies a detachment
from that thing along with a positing of its relational importance, experiencing
something as a source happens as an encounter with that relational importance.
For this reason, in contrast with the sun only illuminating the eye of the adult
human being, Emerson has the sun shining “into the eye and the heart of the child.”
Even though shining into “the heart of the child” means more than the child’s
direct, affective non-intellectualized encounter with the sun, this metaphorical
“heart” implies this at a minimum. To extend this minimum, perhaps, we could see
the sun’s shining into the heart of a child not only in terms of its affecting the child
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as a passive receiver but also in terms of its inspiring the child to go out and play: to
run and laugh and sing and be happy under the sun. The young child, after all,
does not think of the sun as an explanatory object at all: for her, the sun is that
which one turns towards for warmth and light, without the necessity for words for
either it or these latter two things. For her, the sun is a source of life, before the
concept or meaning of life becomes an issue.
As adults, however, if we remember the problem of the stars and particularly
the “rays of light that separate between,” then the matter at hand of seeing the sun
(on the way to an account of the seeing of nature) quickly transfigures itself.
Instead of saying, “Most persons do not see the sun,” Emerson could have written,
“Most persons do not see light.” To be sure, human beings see sources of light and
beams of light, but this sort of seeing represents a seeing of differences between
colors and between light and darkness. In this sense I intend, human beings do not
see light, just because light is a condition of any seeing whatsoever. Human beings
see differentially lit regions as such, but they do not see the lighting of light. To put
this analogously with the problem of the sun, rather than taking the sun as the
source of a ray of light, we can conceive of the ray of light as being its own source,
precisely in its emanating and beaming forth from itself. And whereas some adult
human might indeed think about the problem of seeing the sun, at some level, since
it is something to be seen, practically no adult human would ever think about the
problem of seeing light itself. Perhaps light is the non-sensed condition of the
appearance of everything visually sensible. In order to “see” such light, which
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would have to mean in this context to receive its emanations inspirationally, it
would never be a matter of mere perceiving. Neither, following the discussion
above, could this seeing be an intellectual perception, precisely since the positioning
it as an object of the intellect destroys its emanating inspirational quality that
would allow it to be what it is: light as such. Thus, for the adult (who cannot by
definition recapture the child’s relation to the world: artificial naivete is always
intellectually sophisticated), there would have to be a way for this light to be
received in its lighting capacity, apparently, neither sensibly nor intelligibly, or,
more plausibly, through some mode that cuts between the sensible and the
intelligible.
Therefore, perhaps, “the eye of the poet” would be the opening through which
this light might be received. In some sense, just as the poet’s eye integrates the
landscape (or shows its integrity) through transcending that landscape for the sake
of the horizon, somehow hinted towards in poetic language, this same poetic eye
would be able to see the lighting of light, which could be called the horizon of all lit
things and spaces, through hinting (for itself, for others) towards that light in order
to allow it to be received inspirationally, perhaps even through allowing it to
participate in the coming forth of the poetic word. On the one hand, this
participation seems to herald a return to a form of Platonism. In the chapter on
Plato from Representative Men, Emerson notes, “As every pool reflects the image of
the sun, so every thought and thing restores us an image and creature of the
supreme Good” (TCRWE IV, 39). This may make it seem that the projection of the
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word towards the thing happens as a projection towards some determinate and
definite icon or idol, where poetry becomes tantamount to ontotheology. And yet, in
the very next sentence (as often also happens in Plato’s work), this transcendent
ontotheology is itself transcended through an abyssal repetition, since “The
universe is perforated by a million channels for [the human’s] activity. All things
mount and mount” (TCRWE IV, 39). Light shines as self-moving energy beyond the
possibility of a source.
4. The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are still truly
adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit of infancy even into the
era of manhood. His intercourse with heaven and earth, becomes part of his
daily food. In the presence of nature, a wild delight runs through the man, in
spite of real sorrows.
Therefore, “he whose inward and outward senses are still truly adjusted to
each other” would be the one whose seeing eyes also open onto the inspirational
sense of what is given in such seeing. Moving beyond the concrete seeing of the
particular and into the seeing of emanation, where “a wild delight runs through the
man” resembles the quite Kantian encounter with the sublime, where the relation
to the concrete thing is transcended, opening onto ecstatic feeling at the edge of
subjectivity, as the limits of this subjectivity show themselves as the horizons of the
world. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the subject, insofar as it
encounters itself as an individual presence, even from an interior vantage, as it
beholds the emanations of its own spiritual power in the things it perceives, on the
one hand, and a subject that finds itself beyond any individual self-determination,
cast into the wake of (something like) a horizonal subjectivizing movement, with
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this subjectivizing movement transcending any immanently interior (empiricist)
reception. Perhaps Emerson uses the phrase “intercourse” to designate precisely
this interactional movement that leads into delight running through (ecstatically
charging) the individual subject.
This is a difficult thought, since the “spiritual” is usually thought, in our
given, quasi-metaphysical, quite empiricist sense as the influx or containment of a
heavenly power within an all-too-personal soul. This is exemplified within dogmatic
Protestant Christianity through its characteristic phrase, “having a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ.” Yet, for Emerson, even though “The
Transcendentalist adopts the whole connection of spiritual doctrine,” she does so in
a quite strange de-personalizing way, perhaps even one resembling the vanishing of
the ego in certain strands of Buddhist thought. This transcendentalist (from
Emerson’s lecture “The Transcendentalist”) “believes in miracle, in the perpetual
openness of the human mind to new influx of light and power; he believes in
inspiration, and in ecstasy.” On the one hand, he seems to believe in the taking in
of the spirit as the lungs take in a breath or the empiricist mind takes in its
impressions from the affect of the outside (TCRWE I, 204). But on the other,
Emerson’s emphasis on the breathing of inspiration is not on the holding capacity of
the lungs (of the mind) but rather on the being together of the interiority of the self
with the atmosphere that surrounds it. Accordingly, Emerson’s transcendentalist
“wishes that the spiritual principle should be suffered to demonstrate itself to the
end, in all possible applications to the state of man, without the admission of
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anything unspiritual; that is, anything positive, dogmatic, personal.” Thus, the
Emersonian “I” is always placed, inside and out, within a movement that
transcends it (hence the name ‘transcendentalist’), and it finds itself sustained in
projecting the universal, a movement as necessary as breathing.
5. . Nature says, — he is my creature, and maugre all his impertinent griefs, he
shall be glad with me. Not the sun or the summer alone, but every hour and
season yields its tribute of delight; for every hour and change corresponds to
and authorizes a different state of the mind, from breathless noon to
grimmest midnight. Nature is a setting that fits equally well a comic or a
mourning piece. In good health, the air is a cordial of incredible virtue.
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky,
without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have
enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. Almost I fear to think how glad I am. (TCRWE
I, 9)
When Emerson anthropomorphizes Nature, allowing it to speak to its lover,
the one who has turned towards it, we might understand him as thinking of this
Nature as pantheistically-infused by gods or even as a god itself. The important
fact here, however, is not the theological implication but rather the personalizing
one. Precisely in his resistance to empiricism, Emerson attempts to think Nature
as personally and intimately connected to the unity of the subject, with it
“speaking” to her through calling her forth in projective ecstasies, just as she
“speaks” to it through engaging it in action and cognition. This turning to
anthropomorphism is not an erroneous, childlike misunderstanding of a material
realm but rather a deeper turning out of a truncating empiricism/materialism into
the synthetic comprehension of the engaged life of the subject in the world. Because
of this engaged life, the moods of nature are intrinsically tied to the moods of the
subject.
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For the empiricist, the world is a set of meaningless points, interior or
exterior, that are interpreted according to the imposition of concepts, including
affective concepts. For the idealist, however, the dreary atmosphere that falls
between raindrops is bound together with the sadness of the subject, for instance.
The sad subject finds itself already in a depressing environment, and this
environment is understood only through the projective response towards it that
finds her, for instance, holding her head down and walking slowly through the
heavy downpour. Likewise, in Emerson’s case, in crossing an open transcending
environment, with its silence and its still snow puddles and its blanketing clouds,
he might indeed finds himself pulled towards an “exhilaration,” a breathlessness at
this opening transcendence that would elicit a sigh and an upward gaze and would
also call forth a happiness edging into fear for the loss of the personal project in the
midst of the opening that makes it possible. For Emerson, both things and affects
move within practically Escherian circles of mutual containment, with all of the
paradoxes that such circles elicit. Within this paradoxical opening containment,
“the universe is represented in an atom, in a moment of time,” and it is likewise
represented in a snow puddle, and the feelings of that moment are likewise
represented in that same atom or puddle, not merely in the mental eye of their
beholder (TCRWE II, 175).
For Emerson, this leads to a sort of transcendentalist ethics. Within such an
encounter, he says that the human being “will weave no longer a spotted life of
shreds and patches, but he will live with a divine unity. He will cease from what is
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base and frivolous in his life, and be content with all places and with any service he
can render. He will calmly front the morrow in the negligency of that trust which
carries God with it, and so hath already the whole future in the bottom of the heart”
(TCRWE II, 175). Therefore, even though affect may perpetually mirror itself
between the water of the soul and the blue of the sky, the self-consciousness of this
mirroring also brings with it another affective dimension, one of contentment and
giving, where the indifferent bequeathal of the environment inspires the calm
benevolence of the soul. One would expect nothing less than such harmonization of
affect, as it circulates through projective being.
6. In the woods too, a man casts off his years, as the snake his slough, and at
what period soever of life, is always a child. In the woods, is perpetual youth.
Within these plantations of God, a decorum and sanctity reign, a perennial
festival is dressed, and the guest sees not how he should tire of them in a
thousand years. In the woods, we return to reason and faith. (TCRWE I, 10)
Thus, as an example of self-transcendence in the midst of the natural opening
that the self makes possible, Emerson describes the experience of being in the
woods. For instance, in the engaged activity of walking through the woods, one
sometimes encounters the shed skin of snake. This skin is a sign of the living snake
that has grown into a larger, stronger animal, lurking somewhere out of sight. In
the woods, a person sheds the more finite concerns of the particular age/time of life
and recognizes the infinite involvement with nature, insofar as she infinitely
projects into it and infinitely receives from it. In this sense, she becomes a child,
precisely in the sense of inhabiting the world as opened possibility and as the
supplicating sources towards which all of one’s need is turned. Therefore, the woods
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become “plantations of God,” just because the woods are the site for the overseeing
parental figure, as both the opening of freedom and the satisfaction of need. In
connection to the reference to the plantation, we expect the owner and the design
and the architecture, and Emerson envisions that we undergo this possibility of the
encounter of nature within the woods as an orchestrated plantation festival, with us
turned towards nature itself as the beneficent host that allows us freedom and
meets our requirements.
We may take this plantation metaphor as a horrific one, remembering the
connection of the plantation and its master to the horrors of slavery. But this
taking is no different than the taking of nature as a horrific, meaningless backdrop
against which the isolated empiricist subject struggles. We may interpret
Emerson’s metaphor as politically suspect, but in its political suspect-ness, it
reveals a necessary naivete through which nature must be encountered, if the
freedom of the subject within it is to be properly understood. If the master
subjugates human freedom in the process of mastering nature for profit, then this
indicates the implicit possibility of celebrating freedom, providing hospitality,
cultivating nature, and turning oneself and others towards the peaceful natural
encounter. Therefore, perhaps, we can “return to reason and faith,” precisely as our
thinking and trust turn back towards the natural world that provokes and draws
them forth and away from the institutions through which they have been codified
and segmented. We pretend that reason and faith are internal properties of the
subject that have been cultivated for it only by virtue of the human institutions of
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subjects and their relations, but reason and faith have always been involved in the
thinking dependence on the natural world, in the truth of finding waterfalls and
food and in the thinking that predicts weather and designs shelters in order to
survive, hopefully, the coldness of the night.
We often believe that we live in a post-Romantic experience of nature, one in
which it is perpetually commodified and turned into a technological object of
representation, but for the most part, this is simply not true. When I walk with my
dogs behind my apartment complex, beside the trees and on the grass, I find the
incessant growing of the grass, the falling of the limbs, the use I can make of them
for playing with the dogs, the trust I have in the sturdiness of the ground where I
walk, and the warmth of the sun on my face. We have a certain empiricist language
that suggests itself to us that strips the world of all its meaning and forces us to put
it back there through ideological interpretation. The area behind my complex is
owned by a corporation, cut by lawnmowers, controlled by laws—a completely
commodified and technologized segment divorced from any natural wholeness. The
language of Emerson’s idealism is not a language of such (re-)interpretation but
rather a reminding/recollective language that poetically turns us towards
acknowledgement of our projective involvement with a world before empiricist
scission. If the critiques that the language of empiricist scission have power (and
they do), then they have this power only because we are already familiar with what
they are designed to restore, the naturalness of the world in its intimate connection
with reason and faith.
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In his famous “Divinity School Address,” Emerson invokes precisely this
communication between reason and faith as “Two inestimable advantages
Christianity has given us” (TCRWE I, 92). Corresponding to faith, we have “the
Sabbath, the jubilee of the whole world,” which suggests “the dignity of spiritual
being.” Emerson commands us to “Let it stand forevermore, a temple, which new
love, new faith, new sight shall restore to more than its first splendor to mankind”.
Corresponding to reason, we have “the institution of preaching,” in which we should
“speak the very truth, as your life and conscience teach it.” Giving the truthful word
within the compass of the faithful day promises us “new hope and new revelation”.
But for Emerson, we are always giving the truthful word within the compass of the
faithful Sabbath, as we find ourselves always faithfully turned towards the needs
and prospects of the day, and we are always naming and predicting and exhorting
within the horizon of this day as we seek our future. It is true that we
compartmentalize and calculate when cutting down a tree and equally true that we
reverentially admire when we paint a landscape, but usually accepting and
reasoning are joined within the projective life of the everyday, although we
sometimes need to be reminded of this, perhaps, even, at a Sunday service which
would especially mark this jointure.
7. There I feel that nothing can befall me in life, — no disgrace, no calamity,
(leaving me my eyes,) which nature cannot repair. Standing on the bare
ground, — my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space,
— all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing;
I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part
or particle of God. (TCRWE I, 10)
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In finding oneself in the woods, where these woods have transcended not only
their individual trees but also their forested being, exposed as a projective
environment opening up onto a world and out of the subject for which this world is
opened, materially receiving what is given in the faithful directedness of reason
towards the infinities within every finite act, one also finds oneself preserved within
this circulation. I may be injured in this environment, or I may be killed by disease
or accident: I am supported by the material body from which I project.
Simultaneously, however, I can only engage this circulation within its reparative
modality, precisely as the finite concern opens onto the infinite ends of the
preservation of life and health and intelligence as an endless pursuit. The
participation within this circulation opens the subject into the air of possibility,
where there is a movement from oxygen to the possibility of breathing and going
forwards in the exhilaration of subjective life and back again, as the life of the body
and the life of spirit resonate in natural harmony. I am standing on the bare
ground, since I find myself already contingently placed on the earth from which I
project, with parameters and boundaries for my actions already set and with needs
already impelling ratiocination, but I am already beyond myself insofar as I cease
simple self-preservation and attend instead to the preservation of the consciousness
of the infinite movement itself, to the self-consciousness implicit within any given
natural act or thought, as I attend to the things at the edge of the world.
Within this attentiveness, I become the transparent eyeball, the physical
thing yet opened to its transcendence, as it hovers between sensible and intelligible
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space, in media res within a projective act towards a beyond. For the empiricist, the
subject is either a spiritual container that cannot be an eyeball, since it can only be
an interior with no outside, or there is no container and there is only the outside of
associated cells, a blind eye with no visible interior, hence, not an eye at all. In
order to be a transparent eyeball, I have to ideally project from a realized material
ground, finding myself already situated at the edge of the infinite. “I” become the
nothing insofar as I am opened onto the infinite projection beyond my finite self, the
very projection that preserves this self in its pursuits and knowledge. In this
moment of self-conscious apparition, as the implicit becomes explicit, subjectivity
turns into its own circulation within a moment of transcendence. Since I am still in
the woods, I am still subject to its trees and snakes and the other pressing realities
there, but I also find the relevance of these realities maintained and known only on
the horizon of my projective concerns in the midst of my idealizing being.
To imagine oneself as an eyeball involves encircling and transcending distinct
impressions, their breaks and separations and the narratives used to stich them
back together, unless this imagination of the eyeball is itself such a narrative, as
the empiricist would undoubtedly claim. In his essay “The Oversoul,” Emerson
revisits the relation between parts and wholes mentioned in this passage in Nature,
even mentioning the juxtaposition of parts and particles:
We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime
within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the
universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally
related; the eternal ONE. And this deep power in which we exist,
and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only selfsufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing and the
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thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object,
are one. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon,
the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the
shining parts, is the soul. Only by the vision of that Wisdom can
the horoscope of the ages be read, and by falling back on our
better thoughts, by yielding to the spirit of prophecy which is
innate in every man, we can know what it saith. Every man’s
words, who speaks from that life, must sound vain to those who
do not dwell in the same thought on their own part. (TCRWE II,
160)
Here, we have the same Escherian synecdochal dialectic that we encounter
throughout Emerson’s early work, where on the one hand, the soul becomes an
internal God, conjoining every interior manifestation as a part of itself, made of its
substance, and a particle of itself, individuated as a separate body, and, on the
other, this soul becomes transported outside, as an external God that synthesizes
the piece by piecemeal existence of the world, making it into a world rather than a
collection of facts.
This might be easily read as containing a sort of naïve Plotinian metaphysics,
where all separation is illusion and oneness is reality. However, when the paradox
is properly engaged, we rather become involved in a “vision of that wisdom,”
perhaps one that can only be seen by a great imagined eye, whereby the “horoscope
of the ages” can be read and prophecy can be undertaken. This horoscope and that
prophecy do not involve seeing difference as illusion but rather involve seeing a
different order to things than one which analytically separates at the expense of an
intelligent understanding of life. From the vantage of this different order, life
makes sense in the living of it, on the advent of finding meaning and unity against
the horizon of hope. For the partitioners who does not share this thought as the
191

same, rejecting it “on their own part,” this vision and the words in which it is
expressed “must sound vain.” One would be suspected of the ultimate vanity of a
sort of transcendental narcissism. Yet, for one who does share this same thought,
for the idealist rather than the empiricist, the vision and the words become not a
theory of being but rather the outline of a mode of faithful reasoning whereby the
priority of senseful living to analytical explanation is perpetually maintained.
In this realization, within this faithful reasoning, I become Christlike insofar
as I become flesh transubstantiated. On the one hand, I am God, “part” of God
since there is no meaning or purpose of the infinite other than in my own projection
that connects to it, with my part having the power of the whole. And yet, I am also
“particle” of God insofar as this infinite is always already beyond any localization of
myself, as I find myself projected out of an endless past and towards an endless
future of projective negotiation. The realization of this moving placement, this
invisible making visible, in the paradox not only of situated seeing but also the
stabilized movement of active life amounts to a revelation, a seeing of the face of the
divine with a self-conscious mirror.
The empiricist will have none of this. For the empiricist, all talk of divinities
and infinities become localized in corporeal immanence, sensed or constructed. For
the empiricist, God cannot exist in the world, even though (perhaps) a God is
required to give determinacy to the individual atoms of existence in a world where
subjects do not exist. But along with God, for this empiricist, the circulation and
the faith and the reason and the ends and the knowledge also vanish, replaced by
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blind correlations that presuppose what they intend to disprove. This is so not
because the witness to the absence of consciousness presupposes consciousness but
rather because the saying of the “I,” its standing there in the midst of the woods as
it voices itself poetically, would be necessary to carry a moment of self-denial, just
as it is necessary to carry its own self-affirmation within revelation. None of this, of
course, proves that there is a “subject” in the world hovering there like a floating
orb and none of this remove the blindness of material interpretation, as the world is
figured as a gestalt without the positivity of an image. And yet, this turning of the
infinite back onto itself becomes proof of itself, not as a finite conclusion but
precisely in terms of the exhilaration of life it affords as the subject comes into
itself.
8. The name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign and accidental: to be
brothers, to be acquaintances, — master or servant, is then a trifle and a
disturbance. I am the lover of uncontained and immortal beauty. In the
wilderness, I find something more dear and connate than in streets or
villages. In the tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the
horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature. (TCRWE I,
10)
In the chapter “Spirit” from Nature, Emerson makes a pair of distinctions,
one quite traditional and another quite odd.
The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is
a remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in
the unconscious. But it differs from the body in one important
respect. It is not, like that, now subjected to the human will. Its
serene order is inviolable by us. It is, therefore, to us, the present
expositor of the divine mind. It is a fixed point whereby we may
measure our departure. As we degenerate, the contrast between
us and our house is more evident. We are as much strangers in
nature, as we are aliens from God. We do not understand the
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notes of birds. The fox and the deer run away from us; the bear
and tiger rend us. (TCRWE I, 38-39)
The traditional distinction is the one between the body and the spirit. The
odd distinction is the one between the spirit and the will. We normally think of the
spirit (or soul), insofar as it would be coextensive with our conscious, intelligent
being, as containing the will, or we think of the will as a manifestation of the power
of the spirit. In either case, the spirit is not something separate from will, such that
it would be “inviolable” by this will. For Emerson in the above passage, the spirit
seems so inviolable as to have no power at all, only serving as “a fixed point by
which we measure our departure,” almost as if this spirit were only a mathematical
abstraction. And yet, both the world and the body proceed from this spirit, so
despite its abstraction, it appears to have generative power.
This is a mystery if the spirit is thought as a substance that acts and is acted
upon. The mystery vanishes, however, if the spirit is not a substance but rather the
crossing point of the projective “I” as it returns to itself through projecting its world
and its deeds within it through movements of self-consciousness. In this case, this
spirit knows itself through determining its body as an object of knowledge and
concern, measuring itself in this specific distance, just as it knows itself through
determining its world as an object of knowledge and concern. This spirit is always
departing from itself, even as it projects its world from itself and plans for the
activities that the body undertakes. In order for this spirit to understand itself, it
cannot risk identifying itself with the body as a static corporeal identity, a corpuscle
of immanent materiality, but it must rather find itself in the purity of its projective
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reasoning. When it so finds itself, however, it becomes a stranger in nature, with
nature being as distant from it as we would be from an infinite God, were such a
being to exist. Unlike the beings in nature, we have meaning, so that we are those
beings who understand or do not understand, beings who localize themselves in the
“away from” or the “towards,” and comprehend the alienating pain of rending, as
their spirits lose their minds in excruciating pain. Even though these spirits bring
their world into being, they also must withdraw from this world, like Zarathustra
on his mountain, in order to know what they are.
Similarly, in knowing itself (in the numbered passage in our reading above),
as it comprehends its world in the imagination of the enveloping eye, the spirit
must withdraw from the name of the other and all determinate social relations that
would be objects of knowledge and action. Emerson does not devalue the
importance of the social and the relations and direct addresses that constitute the
social. Rather, in this self-conscious moment of the projective maintenance of the “I”
on the horizon of the infinite, which is the horizon of nature itself, this social nexus
becomes embedded within this horizon just as all other objects and ends, as they are
all surrounded by the opening of possibility that brings them forth. The wilderness,
however, has a certain privilege, because in “streets or villages,” there is a concerted
effort to contain the opening of projected within directed flows, an effort that is
normally necessary for civilized life. In the wilderness, however, one has a “more
natural” capacity to encounter unbounded possibility as such. Of course, in the
woods, since these woods are a material space with pressing material forces and
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dangers, one must bound this possibility and construct paths and huts that will lay
the ground for streets and villages. However, in the tranquil moment, the natural
woods reveal the contingency of all of these particular paths and structures. In their
silent background, there are only possibilities of movement and wandering and
staying and building and cutting and hunting and resting, with none necessitated
by any planning architect, whether human or divine.
Even though self-consciousness, the self-consciousness of the projective
speaking subject as it finds its woven life in a non-empiricized world, is a highly
intellectual human activity (it is the possibility of human activity itself), this
intellectual activity is paradoxically made easier in the unconstrained region of the
non-civilized world. This is also not so because this uncivilized world provides
“immediate access” to the real of nature, since every natural relation is always
already conceptualized in the infinite projection of ends. Rather, this facilitation of
self-consciousness happens because of the fact that in this situation, this necessity
of conceptualization becomes more visible to itself, so that one within its wake can
attend more easily to its ordering impetus, with the decisions and prospects that it
affords. Within this “line of the horizon,” which is, after all, already a “line,” a
geometrical figure that is identified within human conceptuality, human beings can
precisely behold their “own nature,” insofar as their nature exactly involves the
drawing of lines and the exploring (and containing) horizons into bound areas of
life. The opening determination already at the edge of natural, found as it appears
to (always linguistic) sapience within the natural space, is the beautiful: the site
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where order both contains and is projected beyond itself (into
disorder/uncontainment) at the edge of comprehension.
9. The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister, is the suggestion of
an occult relation between man and the vegetable. I am not alone and
unacknowledged. They nod to me, and I to them. The waving of the boughs in
the storm, is new to me and old. It takes me by surprise, and yet is not
unknown. Its effect is like that of a higher thought or a better emotion
coming over me, when I deemed I was thinking justly or doing right. (TCRWE
I, 10)
Another power of the natural world, along with its allowance of the visibility
of subjective projection at the limits of the unfounded (finding as founding), is the
way in which the teleology of nature resonates with the teleology of spiritual life.
For the mechanistic empiricist, there is no “life” in nature, other than that afforded
by the interaction of particulate elements, projected or represented. Aristotelian
and Christian ghosts have been exorcized and the world has been disenchanted into
a clockwork mechanism of parts in relation. But as authors such as Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Michael Thompson remind us, our relation to a living being such
as a fly is first and foremost not a relation to a thing composed of parts but rather to
something that has ends, towards which and for which, and we understand the
activity of the fly precisely on the basis of these ends: it flies towards the sugar in
order to get food. We would not understand the fly as a living thing at all, with its
life in need of explaining (through tracing its powers to underlying elements) if we
did not experience it first as having living powers. We encounter plants as things
that grow towards the sun and animals as things that seek food and companionship.
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Therefore, in the woods, I find “an occult relation between man and
vegetable” precisely because I become aware of a growing, self-nurturing and
extending nature of the spirit in its analogical similarity with the plant that
appears for it. The plants “nod to me” not, of course, anthropomorphically, as if
they too had spirit like mine but rather they remind me of a relation (requiring a
nod back), wherein I mark their living, growing resonance, not only with the life of
my body but also with the life of my mind. I am reminded, for instance, by the
“waving of boughs in the storm” of the way that life both bends and rebounds from
natural forces, reconstituting and holding and preserving itself in place. And I am
reminded of the way the subject constantly projects in the wake of irruptions of the
new within its field of experience, as these constantly require it to bend and extend
while yet holding itself firm in the maintenance of a self. Because these boughs and
those trees do what is proper to life, they also remind me of what is proper to my
own life, my own health and well-being and intellect and emotional growth (and the
danger of dismemberment and death): these plants have their own sorts of infinite
ends and they remind me of my infinite ends and they show me both my stability
and fragility as I endeavor in the pursuit of these ends. The “moral ideal” of doing
right, either in one’s relation to other human beings or to oneself, is not found in
some other realm, as a template to which one’s life is compared. Neither is it
understandable as “something constructed,” as if morality did not have something
to do with the living/dying of life in the pursuit of its proper goals. There is a
profound attunement between the tree’s keeping order for itself in the wake of the
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storm and my keeping order for myself in the midst of emotional turmoil, and my
moral/personal being may break down if I do not hold it intact within projections,
just as the limbs of the tree may break in the storm if they have not grown to
sufficient thickness to withstand these winds. We will be naturally inclined to say
that the nodding of trees to us is mere metaphor, but everything about trees is
metaphorical, including their standing, their swaying, their growing, and their
falling, since trees literally do not do anything, they just are. In fact, they are not
even trees but rather collections of atoms, if the concept of a collection was not itself
a metaphor. In order for trees to appear as such, they must already be thought,
conceptualized, described, and metaphorized.
These observations even further extend our understanding of Emerson’s
eyeball metaphor, since the imagination of myself as a transparent eyeball
comprehending the natural surrounding is also the imagination of myself as a
strange bio-spiritual phenomenon, projecting my own stability as ideal (thus
transparent) yet having a certain comprehensive shape and orientation (thus an
eye-ball) through which and for which this stability is shaped and governed. This
resonates with the fact that as an “I” projecting in the world, for Emerson I am not
a Cartesian ghost but first and foremost a natural body, so my participation in the
transcendental world does not require me to remove myself as an actual reality.
Rather, it involves a gestalt-shift like reorientation of my being in this world, so
that I sense the world for me as being already grounded with the openings of
subjective projections on the horizon of my knowledge and ends. As the structure of
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the tree limbs both open themselves to the wind, allowing for their respiration and
yet providing for their stability, the structure of my “spirit” as one of perpetual
circulation, provides an orblike space for me to breathe as a sapient being. As a
function of its “breathing,” my spirit moves from and towards itself in its
repetitional placement of itself, its comprehension of what it determines, and its
replacement of itself in light of this determination,
10. Yet it is certain that the power to produce this delight, does not reside in
nature, but in man, or in a harmony of both. It is necessary to use these
pleasures with great temperance. For, nature is not always tricked in holiday
attire, but the same scene which yesterday breathed perfume and glittered as
for the frolic of the nymphs, is overspread with melancholy today. Nature
always wears the colors of the spirit. To a man laboring under calamity, the
heat of his own fire hath sadness in it. Then, there is a kind of contempt of
the landscape felt by him who has just lost by death a dear friend. The sky is
less grand as it shuts down over less worth in the population. (TCRWE I, 1011)
“The power to produce” the delight found in the self-consciousness of the
resonance between this self-consciousness itself and nature does not come from
outside of it, in an externalized natural objective world, but rather from within. But
as this world shows itself within consciousness, as that consciousness projects upon
it, then there occurs a realization of the harmony between the natural organicity of
living things such as trees and of the horizon and the subjective-forming that occurs
within conscious self-projection. This harmony may, from any side, be empirically
contested. For instance, one may determine the subjective projection of
consciousness that occurs in sapient life taking care of itself as the naïve surface of
unconscious forces that shape these projections. And, at any moment and in
multifarious ways, self-consciousness may be blind or deluded, shaped by forces
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beyond its control. And yet, in order for there to be such shaping and controlling,
there has to remain a (becoming) proper activity that is already involved in
maintaining its life, otherwise there would be nothing to save through the lens of
critique. The Emersonian reading of consciousness in nature may seem naïve to
someone whose main focus in precisely the objective critique of conscious blindness,
but the reminding of the strength and the shape of self-conscious movement is
equally necessary in the face of an empiricist language that demands its occlusion.
This reminding shows us, for instance, that the apparition of the world for
consciousness, whether deluded or not, not only affects consciousness but also shows
itself forth in an affective dimension. This means that the moods of consciousness
alter the limits of the world, so that its possibilities and even its forces come to be
seen to resonate with these moods. Rain and outside dreariness, of course, may
make one sad, and one may interpret the outside as having a sad look, but there is
also an occurrence whereby the subject and the outside are “sad together,” such that
it wants to go nowhere, precisely because the possibilities of the world seem closed
off, withdrawn into the limits of the body and perhaps the room in which it lives.
Mood is not something contained within the subject, but it is rather always already
part of a scene and indissociable from that scene. There has never been a sad
feeling that has not also been intertwined with the empty teacup into which one
emptily stares or the corner chair into which one curls, alone. For this sad subject,
this sad room is indeed the world, its world, as its horizon has been withdrawn for
it. There is no objective world for the subject beyond its opening of possibility, so
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the withdrawing or opening of the world in resonance with affect happens naturally,
as a function of the modulation of this opening in projective articulation.
From the vantage of theory, such as this present writing or from Emerson’s
poetized theoretical showing, one can see both sides of the gestalt, sad and happy
nature, the duck and the rabbit of projective possibility from the vantage of the
posited enactive subject. But this seeing itself takes place in a poetic mood, and not
surprisingly, this mood itself harmonizes with Emerson’s account of the tranquil
inhabiting of the natural setting, so that possibility itself comes to awareness, as
the life of life comes to mind. Importantly, as well, Emerson in the closing passage
of the chapter “Nature” reminds us of others, in the mention of the death of the
friend. After all, in the aloneness in nature that affords the tranquility of a certain
vantage on it, the friend is absent in one way, but this absence is itself already a
reminder of the others, since in articulation one also speaks to the other, even if one
determines oneself as alone. In death, even if there is articulation towards the dead
other, there is no more possibility of the response of the other, so the life of speech,
as it were, vanishes on one’s breath, and one may indeed feel the fire of directed
emotion and speech, life itself, to return to one as cold and empty. For the
empiricist, these descriptions are only superficial layers added onto the coldness of
impressions without meaning within (pre-)synthetic projection, so for her, things
are already colder than cold: there is no duck-rabbit—there is only real material
mark without meaning. But the mark itself displays another form of affective
coldness, precisely one where nature has been retreated from, and there is only the
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cutting coldness of the laboratory and the bureaucratic office. It is not surprising
that Emerson ends this chapter “Nature” with an account of the affects both
positive and negative that the natural world, like that encountered in the woods,
affords, when one withdraws from this other form of inhuman, yet all too human,
coldness.
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